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Propaganda is a form of communication that has always been a part of human society, 
regardless of time and geographical space. Throughout history, people have tried to influence 
each other, especially in the struggle to win or maintain power. With the formation of new states 
at the begging of the XX century, these efforts have become more organized, centralized and 
coordinated. It this thesis, the organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria will be examined during the 1930’s as this was a very important period for the history 
of propaganda on a global level.  
At the beginning, it is important to shed light on the interwar history of the three Slavic 
states formed in the early 20th century. Bulgaria was officially recognized as an independent 
state in 1908, whereas Poland and Yugoslavia became independent after the First World War 
These three countries could be considered as latecomers to the European society and as a product 
of a long term struggle for the independence of the Slavic people who occupied those territories 
as well as from the fall of the Great Empires after the first World War.  
The Bulgarian modern state was formed more than 500 years after the Turkish invasion 
of the Bulgarian medieval state. The idea of the unification of all Yugoslav people was an idea 
from an influential group of intellectuals in the independent Serbian state and amongst the South 
Slavs that had been living in the Habsburg Empire (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians).1 After the 
XVIII century, occupation by the two great neighboring powers, Germany and Russia, Poland 
regained its independence. New states geographically occupied territories in the Eastern and 
Southeastern parts of the Europe2 and those territories were inhabited (and still are) by a large 
number of nations, especially compared to Western Europe or North America.  
                                                 
1 The meaning of the idea changed during the time, but the unification of all Yugoslavs was officially declared in 
late 1914 as one of the war goals set by the Serbian government. See: D.Jankovic, Niska deklaracija, Nastajanje 
programa jugoslovenskog ujedinjenja [Nish declaration, The Creation of the Yugoslav unification program], Istorija 
XX veka, X (Belgrade, 1969), pp.7-111.; M.Ekmechic, Ratni ciljevi Srbije [The War Goals of Serbia], (Belgrade, 
1990). 
2 In this dissertation, I used geographical terms Eastern and Southeastern Europe as these were used at The United 
Nations Statistics Division’s Standard Country and Area Codes Classifications (M49). See: 
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The decision to choose Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as cases for comparison in this 
dissertation was based on their common Slavic origin, even more to the similarities of their 
interwar development, and finally based on the similarities of their state propaganda 
organizations and these factors will be evaluated in greater detail in this thesis. The interwar 
history of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was mostly unknown to the readers from other 
European countries, even with historians outside of these countries. That history was fascinating, 
but somewhat complex due to the language’s obstacles.  
In this introduction, it was important to mention a few words about the history of Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the interwar period, stress some crucial points about their 
development, point out some problems of that development and underline key events that 
influenced the specific history of each country. Common elements of each of these states’ 
development will be highlighted as well as highlighting issues specific to each individual state. 
The results of the First World War strongly shaped the present and future of the three 
countries. Poland and Yugoslavia benefited from the outcome of the War and Bulgaria suffered 
as a defeated ally and its territory was reduced. Yugoslavia, and especially Poland, was built as a 
part of the cordon sanitaire between Germany and the Soviet Union and the aim of the two 
examined countries was to keep an established system and then change it later. Their foreign 
policies in the interwar period were built on that assumption and that goal influenced their 
politics, especially in the 1930’s. These countries were considered to be “small fry” when the 
Versailles treaty was put together and they eventually suffered after the breakdown of this treaty  
Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria after the First World War were predominantly 
agricultural societies. This could be true for the interwar period and for practically all the Eastern 
and Southeastern countries at the time.3 In 1918, that percentage was very high as in Bulgaria 
80% of people was in agriculture related activities, in Yugoslavia, this figure was 75%, and in 
Poland, this figure was 63%. At the end of the period under review, those numbers dropped, but 
only very slightly.  
In all three countries under the review which followed the process of transition from a 
parliamentary democracy (with all its faults) to the dictatorship and authoritarian system (with all 
its ‘’democratic elements’’), the fall of democracy in these countries was not attributed to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#europe. The division used was geographical, which lacked 
any shifting political content.  
3 An exception is only Czechoslovakia with 34%. 
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World Economic Depression, like in Germany, but instead it was due to the failure to implement 
democracy into these societies with authoritarian heritages and non-productive political party 
struggles (dictatorships in Poland and Yugoslavia were introduced before the global crisis 
between 1926 and 1929). Nevertheless, the dictatorships introduced in these three states were not 
fascist, despite some elements of fascism existing within these states.4  
The political systems of all the three countries suffered greatly due to corruption and 
inefficiency that were due to the incompetence of political leaders and to the conditions they had 
inherited. The failure to fully develop and establish democracy was also the result of people 
apathy and a lack of proper education. All those factors combined with the strong military and 
authoritarian tradition made it easier for the ruling classes to maintain order, often by using force 
and repression. 
The countries under review passed through similar political changes in the interwar 
period. After the first World War, a parliamentary system was established, which set up both the 
Polish and Yugoslav constitutions in 1921 and this gave the main powers to the Parliament. The 
situation was similar in Bulgaria where power remained in the hands of the “Tarnovo” 
Constitution from XIX century, the first Bulgarian constitution.5 
In Poland, parliamentary democracy lasted until 1926 when there was a ‘coup de etat’ led 
by Marshall Pilsudski. He changed the government and he appointed his friend, scientist 
Moszinski as the new national President. Marshal took the chief position in the country, but he 
never took the presidency nor the position of prime minister and he stayed “in charge” of the 
country until his death in 1935. After the death of Pilsudski, his comrades-in-arms ruled the 
country with the most important person, apart from the president Moszinski, being the new 
                                                 
4 Some notable works: D.Bunikowski, ‘Prawo hegemona w Polsce pilsudczykowskiej po 1935 roku’[Right of the 
Hegemon in Pilsudskist Poland after 1935], in: M.Wolos, K.Kani, eds, Polska bez Marszałka: dylematy 
piłsudczyków po 1935 roku, (Torun, 2008),  pp.229-255; N.Poppetrov, ‘Avtoritarizam-fashizam (kam modela na 
politichesko razvitiye na на Balgariya1918-1944)’ [Authoritarianism-fascism (to the model of Bulgaria’s political 
development  1918-1944) Istoricheski pregled 1997/2, pp.25-48; P.Tsvetkov, N.Poppetrov, ‘Kam tipologiyata na 
politicheskoto razvitiye na Balgariya prez 30te godine’ [To the typology of the political development of Bulgaria 
during the 30’s]  Istoricheski pregled nr. 45, 2/1990, pp.63-78; P.Markovic, ‘Die Legitimierung der Diktatur in 
Jugoslawien und die Offentliche Meinung’ In: Autoritaere Regime in Ostmittel- und Suedosteuropa 1919-1944, ed. 
E.Oberlaender (Paderborn/Muenchen/Wien/Zuerich, 2001),  pp.577-632; Dyktatury w Europie Srodkowo-
Wschodniej 1918-1939 [Dictatorship in Central and Eastern Europe 1918-1939], Konferencja naukowa w Instytucije 
Historii Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2-3 XII 1971, (Wroclaw/Warsaw/Cracow/Gdansk, 1973). 
5 The constitution ran from 1879 and, with the some changes from 1893 and 1911, remained in power until 1947. 
The “Tarnovo” constitution was finalized after the Congress in Berlin in 1878 when Northern Bulgaria received 
autonomy from within the Turkish Empire. 
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Marshal Rydz-Smigly and Colonel Beck. This ruling group (together with other less important 
militarists) was known as the ‘Government of the Colonels’. 
In Yugoslavia, the parliamentary system fell apart in 1929 after King’s Alexander 
Karadjordjevic’s ‘coup de etat’. After that, the governments did not depend on the will of the 
people, but on the will of the ruler, which made the entire parliamentary model more distant from 
the earlier democratic practices in the country. With the death of King Alexander in 1934 in 
Yugoslavia, party politics was alive again, but true parliamentary principles were by no means 
re-established.  
In Bulgarian literature, there was some disagreement about how long the parliamentarian 
system lasted.6 As in Poland and Yugoslavia, the forceful change of government happened in 
1934 and this was led by the military. With this act, the parties and the parliamentary system 
were abolished and in 1935, normal parliamentary practices were re-established, but with 
significant limitations. The government of Georgi Kjoseivanov, supported by “Tsar” Boris, led 
the country down a road of a non-party system which meant the suppression of previously 
existing political parties and of their work.  
One could conclude that the 1930’s for the three countries under review was a transition 
from semi-democratic to semi-authoritarian states. Describing the political situation in Eastern 
European countries (which included Balkan’s as well), the historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote 
in 1946:  
“Most of the political struggles of the Eastern European States during the last 
twenty years were fought between different small groups within narrow ruling 
classes, over the heads of the people. These struggles were no more than 
scrambles for power, for material advantages and for personal prestige between 
ambitious individuals and interested cliques.”7  
This classification could be applied at the ‘democratic’ period of these states’ 
development and even more at the ‘authoritarian’ stage. Many of those struggles involved an 
enormous use of propaganda and those activities were applied towards the people as well as to 
political opponents, both inside and outside the ruling party. 
                                                 
6 Older Bulgarian historians (Migev, Milkova) stated that 1923 was the year which announced “The end of 
parliamentary democracy” in Bulgaria. 
7 H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941, (New York, 1946), p. 256. 
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The 20th century became known for the vast growth in the power of mass 
communications. Many forms of media were invented and developed very quickly and specialist 
publicity methods were used to develop propaganda into an outrageously “fine-art”. At the 
beginning of the First World War, national governments started to use massive propaganda 
campaigns for the first time.  
The Allies victory in 1918 was achieved by a skilful combination of military power, 
economic power, and propaganda and in the aftermath of the First World War, there was some 
kind of “propaganda truce”. Some states even cancelled their propaganda ministries, which 
operated during the war such as Britain whose public had a “healthy” dislike for all forms of 
government propaganda.  
Changes occurred when the Nazi party came to power in Germany in 1933 as party 
propaganda played a key role in their foreign and domestic affairs. Joseph Goebbels believed 
that propaganda was to play a central role and that the function of the newly formed Ministry of 
Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda was to co-ordinate the political will of the nation with 
the aims of the Nazi state. Italy followed this step and founded the same Ministry in 1935 (firstly 
called The Ministry of Press and Propaganda and later, this was renamed The Ministry of 
Popular Culture). Other European countries, influenced or rather threatened by these examples, 
started to form similar institutions as well as giving greater priority to those which had already 
existed. Eric Carr wrote about this period:  
“In the totalitarian countries, radio, press, and film are state industries completely 
controlled by governments. In democratic countries, conditions vary, but everyone 
is heading towards more and more centralized control (Carr 1939: 9)”.  
Foreign and domestic propaganda became one of the main preoccupations for most of the 
European countries at that time as state propaganda efforts, as well as budgets for propaganda 
purposes, increased during the period under review. The 1933 budget of the French Foreign 
Office to the Chamber of Deputies included an estimate of sums to be spent by European 
countries on propaganda in 1933. They were (in French francs): Germany 256.000.000; Italy 
119.000.000; France 71.000.000; Great Britain 69.000.000; Poland 26.000.000, Hungary 
23.000.000; Czechoslovakia 13.000.000, Yugoslavia 13.000.000, Romania 7.000.000. In total 
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the amounts spent by the aforementioned European countries were: 597 million French francs 
which was the equivalent of about 24 million US dollars or almost 5 million British pounds.8 
 This dissertation focused on the organizational models of state propaganda of Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930s. As part of this study on the history of propaganda in 
Yugoslavia, it was important to highlight the similarities in the organization of Eastern European 
states’ propaganda, the ways in which they influenced each other and the extensive use of the 
elements of Nazi and fascist propaganda. The wide use of radio technology in propaganda 
purposes, the development of the leadership cult and the growing nationalism, were some of the 
propaganda motives and practices applied by Eastern European countries. However, the regimes 
in those countries were not seen as a great example of authoritarian practice by the fascist 
countries. 
The state propaganda of most of the important European countries at the time, especially 
the totalitarian (Germany, Italy, Soviet Union) states was well documented and analyzed in 
historical terms. It was important to stress the studies, completely or partly done, by using the 
comparative method (Eric Carr9; Bytwerk Randall10; Kracunova Daria11; Welch Dаvid 199312). 
Those books were helpful for recreating the practices of this era.13  
There was a lot of detailed Polish literature, which partly or completely dealt with state 
propaganda in the interwar period. Monographs “The system of state propaganda of the 
government in Poland 1926-1939” by Elzbieta Kaszuba14 and “Newspapers in the system of 
government propaganda in Poland 1926-1939” by Andrzej Notkowski15 are the most prominent 
and these monographs served as an excellent starting point for further research and comparative 
                                                 
8 R.Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, (New York-London, 1937), p.207. 
9 E. Carr, Propaganda in international politics, (Oxford, 1939). 
10 R. Bytwerk, Bending spines, The Propaganda of Nazi Germany and The German Democratic Republic, (East 
Lansing, 2004). 
11 D. Kracunova , Totalitalitarizam – Vlast i propaganda 1917-1953 [Totalitarism – power and propaganda 1917-
1953], (Sofia,  2002). 
12 D. Welch, The Third Reich, Politics and Propaganda, (London, 2005). 
13 Monograph The Metaxas Myth, Dictatorship and Propaganda in Greece by Marina Petrakis published in 2006 
(London-New York) covered a very conveniently Greek case in the 1930’s. 
14 E. Kaszuba, System  propagandy państwa obozu  rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926-1939 [System of  the State 
Propaganda in the Poland 1926-1939], (Toruń, 2004). 
15A. Notkowski, Prasa w systemie propagandy rządowej w Polsce 1926-1939, Studium Techniki władzy [The Press 
in the system of the State Propaganda in Poland 1926-1939], (Warsaw /Lodz, 1987). 
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analysis. Besides them, there were several other authors whose literature dealt with some 
propaganda aspects or cult of personality.16  
When considering Southeastern Europe, this phenomenon was analyzed only generally 
and without detailed explanation. Literature from Yugoslavia (Serbia) and Bulgaria dealt with 
particular cases of state propaganda and they offered particular analyses of some propaganda 
institutions and media development (Bjelica Mihailo17; Dimitrov Veselin18; Lazetic Predrag19; 
Markovic Predrag20; Dragan Tesic21; Petko Belokonski22). Those authors mostly did not use 
comparative methods and did not go beyond the reconstruction of the general framework of 
propaganda institutions and propaganda manifestation.  
In the dissertation, generally, the state propaganda in terms of propaganda of the most 
important of the state’s officials (president of the governments and government’s parties) was 
examined and the people with the most influence on political decisions made in period under the 
review were Marshal Rydz-Smygli in Poland, Prime Minister Stojadinovic in Yugoslavia and in 
Bulgaria, the Prime Minister Kjoseivanov. The influences of the monarchs and president, King 
Boris in Bulgaria, Prince Paul in Yugoslavia and president Moszinski were not ignored, but their 
importance was noted according to significance. 
An important part of the dissertation was written on previously unexplored archived 
sources on state propaganda found in the Serbian, Polish and Bulgarian archives. For the 
Yugoslav case, the most important archive was the archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije – 
AJ). At that time, the state was highly centralized and all the working papers of governments and 
ministries were located in this area. There were only documents missing from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and this was because these were destroyed during the Second World War.  
                                                 
16  M. Pietrzał, Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918-1939, [Regulation of the Freedom of the Press in 
Poland 1918-1939)], (Warsaw /Wiedza, 1963); H. Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa 
polskiego 1926-1939, [The Cult of Pilsudski and his importance for Polish Society 1926-1939], (Warsaw, 2008). 
17 M. Bjelica, Srpski rat rečima 1844-2000 [Serbian war of words 1844-2000], (Belgrade, 2003).  
18 V.Dimitrov, Istoriya na radio v Balgariya, II, [History of radiophonia in Bulgaria, II], (Sofia, 1994). 
19 P.Lazetic, ‘Milan Stojadinovic i predizborna kampanja 1938’ [Milan Stojadinovic and propaganda for 1938's 
elections], Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije, 1988, number.25, Belgrade, pp.117-139. 
20 P. Markovic, ‘Die Legitimierung der Diktatur in Jugoslawien und die Offentliche Meinung’, In: Autoritaere 
Regime in Ostmittel- und Suedosteuropa 1919-1944, ed. E.Oberlaender, (Paderborn/Munchen/Vienna/Zurich, 
2001),  pp.577-632. 
21 D. Tesic, Jugoslovenska Radikalna Zajednica u Srbiji  1935-1939 [Yugoslavian Radical Community in Serbia 
1935-1939], (Belgrade, 1997).  
22 P. Belokonski, Istina po vreme na voina, Propagandata v Balgariya prez 1941-1944 [Truth about Wartime, 
Propaganda in Bulgaria 1941-1944], (Sofia, 2000). 
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However, the two sets of documents most crucial for this study were in found the section 
of The Centralni Press Bureau, and those found under the sub-section of Milan Stojadinovic. The 
Centralni Press Bureau was an institution that served as the Ministry of Propaganda and the sub-
section of Milan Stojadinovic stored papers from the period of Stojadinovic’s government, who 
was Premier and Foreign Minister from 1935 to 1939.  
The archive of the oldest cultural institution of modern Serbia, Matica Srpska, was also 
important for this study. This was mainly for the personal papers of Stojimirovic Milan 
Jovanovic who was a famous journalist and writer, publisher of pro-government paper 
“Samouprava” and head of the state press agency Avala. There, one could find not only personal 
papers, but also official documents of the government party and state agencies. There were also 
similar types of documents found in the town of Smederevo, which was part of the Stojimirovic 
legacy. 
As in the case of Yugoslavia, there was an archive in Bulgaria where all the most 
important government documents of period, the papers of ministries and state agencies were 
stored. This was the Central State Historical Archive (Централен Държавен исторически 
архив – CDA) in Sofia and cards on the organization of propaganda in the preceding periods 
were used. However the Archive of state news agency (Бьлгарска Телеграфна Агенция, BTA) 
has only a small amount of saved documents and this made the reconstruction of the history of 
BTA very difficult. 
Documents, relating to the government, how the parties were founded and influenced by 
the government were located in the Archives of Modern Documents (Archiwum Akt Nowych) in 
Warsaw. These included the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government - BBWR 
and later, “The camp of national Unity” - OZN, including the state press agency (PAT). The 
Press department was part of the Foreign Ministry and this was a more important detail for this 
study. There were some useful documents in the personal section relating to the second Polish 
Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and it was interesting to see the development of his cult as a 
successor to Pilsudski. 
Contrary to the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the most important documents for state 
propaganda in Poland were located in the Central Military Archive (Centralne Archiwum 
Wojskowe - CAW) because the army played a crucial role in the country throughout the period 
between the first and second World Wars. Major official propaganda campaigns were created 
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and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation and in 
these documents, one could see the organizational charts of the propaganda departments, the 
methods of influence and the efforts used to coordinate all the organizations of propaganda by 
the military.  
This dissertation was organized into four chapters. In the first chapter entitled “State 
Propaganda in Europe during the 1930’s”, where the state propaganda organizations in Europe of 
this period were discussed, both totalitarian (Germany, Italy and Soviet Union) and democratic 
(Great Britain and France). Special attention was given to the neighboring countries with similar 
regimes such as Hungary, Romania and Greece and others similar in size and internal 
organization such as Czechoslovakia and Turkey. 
The second part of the thesis “State Propaganda Organization in Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria during the 1930’s” mostly covered the structural organization of state propaganda in 
Poland and its manifestation in the political aspect of states’ development where it dealt with the 
central propaganda’s institutions. In this part of the dissertation, the organization, financing, 
personal structure, influence and specific manners of these institutions were all explained in 
detail. 
In the third part of the thesis, the role of the news agencies PAT in Poland, Avala in 
Yugoslavia and BTA in Bulgaria was discussed with explanations regarding their foundation, 
their connection with the state and governments as well as their structure and role in the state 
propaganda. Relations with the most important agencies in Europe will also be examined with 
significant attention paid to the other news agencies which existed in Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria during the 1930’s as well as examining their influence and relations with the main 
state’s agencies. 
In the final section of the dissertation “Media in the service of State Propaganda”, the role 
of the media in the increasing use of state propaganda was analyzed. The accent was on pro-
government newspapers, radio and cinema and a comparative perspective was imposed on 
legislation, technical development, and structural changes. The role that the media played in 
policies and public life of the three countries was of great importance in understanding the 
structural changes in the phenomena of mass politics that occurred in the period under review. 
Special attention was focused upon their structural similarities, level of correlation and 
cooperation, common elements and patterns of their work.  
13 
 
Finally, three translated documents were presented, one for each country. The first 
appendix considered the radio propaganda in Poland, the second the transcript of propaganda 
film made in Yugoslavia in 1938 and the third discussed the organization of the practical 
propaganda in Bulgaria. It was important to publish these documents for the first time in English 
as a valid illustration of the propaganda work done in the period. 
 As previously noted by other historians, an evaluation of the impact of the most 
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, proved a difficult task due to censorship, the lack 
of public opinion surveys and other important, sometimes even basic sources. Some other 
sources, like foreign services reports could partly help to resolve that issue, but the main aim of 
this dissertation was, primarily, how propaganda organizations in Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria were organized during the 1930’s and which institutions and organizations were 
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PROPAGANDA – HISTORY OF THE TERM AND 




At the beginning of this chapter, it is important to say something about the use and 
meaning of the term propaganda in history and in the present. In general, propaganda does not 
have any positive or negative connotations; it merely exists, not only in the modern period, but 
also from the beginning of organized human society. It exists regardless of time or geographic 
location and it is only tied to human communication. The use of propaganda practically began at 
a time when humans started to communicate to each other and simply speaking, propaganda is a 
communication of ideas designed to persuade people to think and behave in a desired way, but 
what distinguishes propaganda from other processes of persuasion is the question of intent.  
Propaganda is similar to education. The crucial difference is that education teaches 
people how to think and propaganda tells people what to think. Propaganda uses communication 
to bring a message that is designed to serve the self-interests of the person or people doing the 
communicating where the success of propaganda is measured by comparing the outcome with 
the original intention of that person or persons.  
According to past experiences, the most successful propaganda is one that preaches to the 
already converted. At the beginning, propaganda was based on face to face communication, but 
in modern times, a third party is now involved and this involves the widespread use of various 
media such as the press, radio, television etc. because they intervene in the communication 
process between the sender and recipient of any propaganda messages. This form of propaganda 
can also deliberately deliver partial information that can be either misleading or purposely 
withholding certain information. The control of the flow of information is very important for the 
propagandist and during history, censorship has often been used. In the struggle for power, 
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propaganda is the weapon for those who want to retain their positions in power and for those 
who want to replace them.23 
The term propaganda comes from the Latin word propagare, which means to spread. It is 
a well accepted fact that the term was coined in 1622 when Pope Gregory XV, frightened by the 
global spread of Protestantism, formed the Office for the Propagation of the Faith (Congregatio 
de propaganda fide) to supervise the Church’s missionary efforts in the New World and 
elsewhere. The Pope wrote:  
“It is to be desired that, especially inspired by divine grace, they should cease to wander, 
amidst heresies through the unhappy pastures of infidelity, drinking deadly and poisonous 
water. However, they should be placed in the pasture of the true faith that they may be 
gathered together in a saving doctrine, and be led to the springs of the waters of life.24 
The word remained closely linked with the Catholic Church well into XIX century and 
only in the First World War did it lose its neutrality.25 There are also scholars that claim that the 
term propaganda lost its neutrality at the very beginning because the society that was formed 
under its name was in conflict between the Catholic and Protestant church.26 One encyclopedia 
offers us a chronology of the development of propaganda that places its roots in the V and IV 
century BC with the use of Plato’s books for influence on Greek’s towns.27 
 Literature about propaganda is vast and28 the term propaganda has been defined in 
numerous ways in scholarly literature. In the XX century, the number of definitions grew to such 
an enormous number that its collection would take several years’ work and even nowadays, there 
is no uniform definition of propaganda. Many of them are partial, limited by the political, 
psychological or sociological aspect of the problem and it is difficult to add something new in 
the theoretical analysis of propaganda that hasn’t already been written. Thus, we will shed light 
on some authors and their theories that are the most interesting and influential in the modern era 
                                                 
23 Inspiring introduction about propaganda, Psychological Warfare and Persuasion see in: P.Taylor, Munitions of the 
Mind, A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day (Oxford, 2003), pp.1-16. 
24 Quoted from: E.Bernays, Propaganda (New York, 2005), p.10. The Latin text of Gregory’s bull is included in 
Magnum bullarium Romanum: bullarum, privilegiorum ac diplomatum Romanorum Ponfificum amplissima 
collection (Graz, Austria: Akademische Drucku. Verlagsanstalt, 1964-1966). It is available online at the Notre Dame 
Archives, http://classic.archives.nd.edu/bull.htm. 
25 T.Clark, Art and Propaganda in the twentieth century (New York, 1997), 7. 
26 J.Garth, V.O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Newbery Park/London/New Delhi, 1992), p.2. 
27 International Encyclopedia of Propaganda (Chicago, 2001), p.608. 
28 At the end of thesis, some notable titles in the field could be found in the list of references. 
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and these will be highlighted in order to illustrate their scope and direction in the development of 
propaganda. 
In the 1920’s, Edward Bernays defined propaganda as a consistent, enduring effort to 
create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group.29 
Bernays saw himself as a “propagandist for propaganda” and thought of it as a modern 
instrument by which “we can fight for productive ends to bring order out of chaos”.30 
In the 1950’s, Jacques Driencourt said: “Everything is propaganda” (“Tout est 
Propagande”).31 This tempting, but unsatisfactory, explanation could be used by some as an 
excuse for not studying this phenomenon further, but contrary to Berneys, there are more authors 
that looked at propaganda as being negative.  
One of the most important books in the 1960’s was Jacques Ellul’s Propaganda’s, The 
Formation of Men’s Attitudes as he looked at propaganda more as a technique than a science. His 
definition is: “Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to 
bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, 
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated into an 
organization”.32 Ellul saw propaganda as negative and manipulative and also stated that only 
successful propaganda is real propaganda, but from a personal viewpoint, one must disagree with 
such thoughts. 
In recent years, the number of definitions has multiplied. The historian of propaganda 
David Welch offered a solid chronological survey of the development of the term, as well as 
dozens of existing definitions. According to him, propaganda is a “deliberate attempt to 
influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values for the 
specific purpose, consciously designed to serve the interest of the propagandist and their political 
masters, either directly or indirectly”.33 This definition is satisfactory and it will be used as a 
basis for future references. However, it is important to stress that a “deliberate attempt to 
influence the opinions of and audience” is true for both giving and withholding the information. 
                                                 
29 Bernays, Propaganda, p.52. 
30 Ibid, p.168. 
31 J.Driencourt, La Propagande nouvelle force polituque [The Propaganda New Political Force], (Paris, 1950), pp.18 
and 26. 
32 J.Ellul, Propaganda, The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York, 1973), p.61. The first edition of the book was 
in French in 1965. 
33 N.Cull, D.Culbert, D.Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to present, 
(Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.317-323. 
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In general terms, propaganda consists of six elements and these elements make the 
totality and only when seen together could one see the complete picture. These elements are: 
- Subject of propaganda; 
- Propaganda message; 
- Propaganda object; 
- Media that transmits the propaganda; 
- Conditions in which the propaganda is conducted; 
- Consequences of the propaganda work. 
Political propaganda is the instrument of politics and it is shaped by politicians while 
professional propagandists only carry it out. The subject of propaganda is the one who decides to 
start the propaganda activity and that subject can be institution, organization, group or individual.  
In this thesis, we will be focusing upon state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria where the subjects of propaganda were representatives of state such as kings, marshals, 
presidents of the government, ministers and chiefs of propaganda institutions.  
The message is one of the crucial aspects of successful propaganda as this is transmitted 
by subject and has to meet some conditions if it is to be successful. The most important of those 
conditions are to be reachable, attractive, clear, interesting and convincing for the recipients of 
such messages. Every one of above mentioned conditions must be met, otherwise the propaganda 
could be easily unnoticed and rejected and it is also important that balance exists between the 
mentioned elements. In that case, propaganda could achieve the goals set by the subject. 
Objects of propaganda are groups or individuals targeted by the propagandist’s message. 
Even in the early years of propaganda usage, one of the main tasks of the subject of propaganda 
was to better understand the behavior of its object as human behavior is complex and not always 
easy to understand. Its study remains an open task for both the propagandist and scientist as the 
hypothesis must be always tested and retested, and adjustments must be constantly learned and 
relearned. In general, a constant revaluation of what we already know about the topic is the only 
road to successful propaganda. 
An analysis of propaganda requires an understanding of the communication media as 
they are generally the connection between the propagandist and propagandee. With the 
appropriate media, the subject of propaganda can reach many targets (objects of propaganda) at 
the same time as this number rises along with the development of modern technology.  
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The greatest emphasis in this thesis will be placed upon the newspapers, the most diverse 
at the period, the radio, and the motion picture because this is the media that reaches the largest 
numbers of people. Of these media, the media of sight and sound is the most effective but during 
the 1930’s, one could only talk about the film because television was so poorly developed. 
The conditions in which propaganda is happening cannot be overlooked. To better 
understand the impact of propaganda, one must know the specific situation in the society or 
group linked to the propaganda, the historical heritage of the people and area as well as the 
overall social, politic, economic and cultural environment. As an example, one should look at 
Germany during the 1930’s as similar propaganda campaigns there only ten years previous were 
rejected and looked somewhat ridiculous.34 
Propaganda can be divided and classified in numerous ways and one of the most popular 
classifications is regarding the source of propaganda as this can be black, grey and white.  
 “Black” propaganda (sometimes referred as covert propaganda) tries to conceal its own 
identity by purporting to emanate from someone or somewhere other than the true source. If 
“black” propaganda is to be successful, it is very important that attention is paid to the message 
as that message should be well adjusted to the objects of propaganda such as beliefs, cultural, 
social and political experiences. Examples of “black” propaganda are various, especially in war 
conditions, e.g. Nazi radio broadcasts during the Battle for Britain or the war against France in 
1939/40.35 
On the other hand, propaganda can be honest and open and in this instance, we are 
talking about “white” propaganda. The foundation of the Ministry for Popular Enlightenment 
and Propaganda in Germany in 1933 is one clear example. The minister Joseph Goebbels openly 
declared that the responsibility of the new ministry was to be “the mobilization of mind and spirit 
in Germany”.36 In this case, the source was well known, its intentions were well known and the 
public knew that an attempt to influence its opinion was going to be made. The “white” 
propaganda message was given with the intention to convince people of the sincerity of their 
regime and their ideology. 
                                                 
34 I.Kershaw, Hitler, I, (Belgrade, 2003), pp.17-30. 
35 For examples see: D.Welch, Black Propaganda in: Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, A Historical Encyclopedia, 
1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.41-43. 
36 Ibid, p.425. 
22 
 
The “Grey” propaganda is somewhere in between “black” and “white” propaganda. The 
subject of propaganda is not formally presented, but its identity could be assumed. This type of 
propaganda is usually used to bring confusion in to the enemy lines and weaken their morale.  
 During the “Cold War”, Radio Moscow took the opportunity to use the assassinations of 
Martin Luther King and John F. Kennedy to undermine the United States and the Voice of 
America on the other hand exploited similar opportunities with the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Sometimes, it was difficult to differentiate between “black” and “grey” propaganda.  
The division of propaganda is determined by whether the subject is known or not, but this 
cannot explain all the fine work that exists, no matter what form of propaganda is used. Jacques 
Ellul offered the division on vertical and horizontal propaganda.  
Vertical propaganda comes from the top and it is made by leader who acts from the 
superior position of his authority and seeks to influence his subordinates and this type of 
propaganda is by far the most common.  
According to Ellul, the horizontal propaganda is determined from inside the group (not 
from the top) where, in principle, all individuals are equal and there is no defined leader. The 
propagandist is there only as animator or discussion leader and sometimes his identity is not even 
known. The example of this form of propaganda was found in Mao’s China where37 one other 
classification of propaganda could be made by the areas where propaganda presented itself such 
as politics, economics, culture, ecology, theology and sport.38 Beside this classification, 
propaganda could be divided into war and peace propaganda, internal and foreign propaganda as 
all these divisions are clear by names and there is no need for further explanations. 
We could also classify propaganda in various ways but that is not of primary importance. 
The most important issue is to evaluate propaganda by analyzing all its elements and to look at 
propaganda as a whole and only then the propaganda can be evaluated appropriately. 
In this thesis, an analysis of the state propaganda in the three Eastern and Southeastern 
states during the 1930’s will be conducted. When we mention state propaganda, we are 
discussing propaganda made by higher state officials such as the King, Prime Minister, other 
Minister etc. and existing propaganda apparatus which was made to serve the interests of the 
ruling classes. Therefore, a working definition for state propaganda in this thesis will be a 
                                                 
37 Ellul, Propaganda, pp.79-85. 




deliberate attempt made by the ruling classes to influence the opinions of people through the 
transmission of ideas and values for their specific purposes, both by giving or withholding the 
information. However, the main focus will be on the organization of propaganda apparatus that 
was made and developed to in order to spread the state propaganda in the examined countries. 
For a clearer picture, a survey will be conducted on the organization of state propaganda in 
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Each European country in the inter-war period paid full attention to intelligence and 
propaganda according to their interests, intentions, desires and possibilities. During the 1930’s, 
with the development of the international situation and the existence of imminent threat of war, 
that activity became more important and intense. It was fair to say that in the 1930’s, propaganda 
had become an everyday preoccupation of all European governments.  
The state propaganda in the period was usually carried out by ministries, propaganda 
departments (press office), sections that were located within the individual ministries, private and 
non-governmental organizations. With modern means of propaganda, especially radio, it was 
possible to broadcast messages across the boundaries of individual states and for them to have a 
much wider impact than before. Propaganda efforts of some countries were so extensive that we 
could talk about a new kind of war – a war of information and the conflicts became so bitter that 
it was clearly highlighted that some states even achieved agreements to cease hostile 
propaganda.39 
 The organization of propaganda in European countries in this period differed because of 
the unequal organizations of the state, administration, needs, goals and tasks, internal and 
international situation, as well of the views of leading circles and their goals and means for 
achieving these goals.40 Several documents were published regarding the fear of propaganda in 
                                                 
39 The first such agreement was reached between Germany and Poland in 1931. This agreement was supposed to 
ensure that issues of radio broadcasting in any case did not offend the national interests of other listeners. Carr, 
Propaganda, p.20 
40 If we put faith in the reporter of CPB, Switzerland was one of the few countries in Europe that did not have any 
form of press offices. To publish their communiqués, the government used the Swiss Telegraphic Agency that was 
formed on the basis of a joint-stock company whose shareholders were the most successful Swiss newspapers. For 
this service, the government gave subsidies to the Agency in the form of individual subscriptions to its newsletters’ 
agencies. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AY), Fond Centralni Pres-biro (38), box 141. CPB correspondents’ report from 
Switzerland 3 February 1934. 
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the interwar period and their aim was to regulate the question of the prohibition of propaganda, 
which was directed against peace.41  
European experience in the field of organizing state propaganda in the interwar period 
was interesting and varied, depending on the country and region. Many states had similar 
organization of state propaganda; sometimes they were just copied from one country to another if 
they proved to be successful. The organization of the propaganda institutions in 1930’s Europe 
was often changed and modified according to needs of the moment and the will of the political 
leaders and such changes occurred even when the chief of ministry or department changed. On 
the other hand, many of those institutions were ideal for resolving problems like material 
independence, entering the higher social level, advancing in careers, personal benefits etc… 
One of the biggest problems for historians in the study of state propaganda organization 
was the secrecy of their work as well as issues with funding. The real amount of money invested 
in one country propaganda was almost impossible to quantify, but in general, one could assume 
that fascist countries and other big European countries spend the most. One of the reasons for 
that was active foreign propaganda, but on the other hand, small countries put the greatest efforts 
in controlling their own public opinions and guiding these opinions. 
Looking into the institutional organization, one could classify two groups of countries: 
ones with the ministry for propaganda and ones with the propaganda departments within the 
ministries or governments’ bodies.  
There were only a few countries that used a Ministry for Propaganda before the outbreak 
of the Second World War and it was important to mention that all European countries used 
domestic news agencies, regardless of whether they were in the state property, semi official or 
private. In the countries where there was great freedom of press like France, Great Britain and 
Belgium, they had more freedom than in countries with a more controlled press like Hungary, 
Romania and Turkey and countries with a guided press like Germany, Italy and Spain.42 In the 
following thesis, one will try to explain the organizations of the state propaganda in some 
European countries during the 1930’s by grouping them together with similar states. 
                                                 
41
 Such documents were signed in 1925 in Washington, 1932 in Geneva, 1933 in Madrid and Vienna and 1938 in 
Geneva. M.Orech, Sloboda informacija i propaganda [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), 
p.62 
42 More about news agencies in Europe and countries under review in the third chapter of the dissertation. 
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After the Nazi Party in Germany came to power in January 1933, many things started to 
change in Europe. It could be argued that their takeover of power was firmly linked to the 
situation in German society where there was a difficult economic, psychological, moral and 
political crisis that had engulfed society after World War I and which peaked in the early 1930’s.  
Hitler's new regime quickly introduced a one-party system in which any opposition party 
was banned. Hitler underlined the importance of propaganda in his speech at the party congress 
in Nurnberg in 1936 where in his speech, he shouted to crowds: “Propaganda has brought us to 
power, propaganda has allowed us to maintain power, and propaganda will give us the 
opportunity to master the world.”43 
When one considered these details, it was no surprise that one of the first tasks of the new 
government was the establishment of a propaganda organization. The Ministry of National 
education and propaganda (Reichministerium fur Volksaufklarung und Propaganda) was 
established with presidential decree on 12th March 1933, headed by Joseph Goebbels and its 
offices were located in Leopold Palace in Berlin. 44  
In a speech held before the establishment of the Ministry, Goebbels presented his ideas 
and plans about the role of the newly established ministry. For the press, which was also valid 
for the media in general, he said that it would be: “ideal if the press is so nicely organized as a 
piano in the hands of government where the government can be an unusually important and 
significant tool for influencing the masses.”  
This performance was a typical example of “white” propaganda when the subject of 
propaganda stated clearly their intentions and goals. On the other hand, in the same speech, 
details were revealed about punishments for those who would not want to accept the roles 
offered to them and Goebbels openly announced that the Government will fight with “all means” 
against such attempts. 45 In the above speech, Goebbels gave one of the most important principles 
of Nazi propaganda – simplicity and this rule was also promoted by Hitler in his book “My 
                                                 
43 Quoted from: P.Ostojic, Propaganda, (Belgrade, 1940), p.72. 
44 Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) graduated from the University of Heidelberg and obtained his PhD in 1921. He 
began a journalistic career that could not be seen as too successful. In the conflict between Hitler and Gregor 
Strasser, he took Hitler's side and became party chief of the Berlin district. In Berlin, he founded and edited the 
party newspaper Der Angriff that could be translated as “attack”. He became a deputy in the Reichstag in 1928 and 
in 1933, he became a Minister. He was very intelligent, revered in mass psychology and an excellent speaker. After 
Hitler’s suicide, he was appointed as his successor as Chancellor, but he took his own life. For historical science, 
one could find his important saved diaries and recorded talks. More on Goebbels see: R.G.Reuth, Goebbels, (New 
York, 1993).  
45 Joseph Goebbels speech in Reichstag from March 1933. AJ, 38-141. 
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struggle” (Mein Kampf) that was written in the 1920’s. The tendency for the ‘facts’ to be 
presented to the people in a more accessible manner was a dominant one throughout the period 
of Nazi rule. In his book, the leader of new government made the distinction between ‘scientific 
exposition’ which was for intelligentsia and propaganda, which was for the masses.   
 To better understand how the Ministry of Propaganda worked, one had to look at its 
structure. Initially, it was planned that the ministry had only five parts but during April, the 
structure had changed so the number of sections increased to seven. The division of departments 
and their parts could be seen as follows: 
 
 
Department 1: Legislation and Legal Problems, Budget, Finance, and Accounting; 
Department 2: Co-ordination of Popular Enlightment and Propaganda (“active 
propaganda”); Regional Agencies of the Ministry; German Academy of Politics; Official 
Ceremonies and Demonstrations; National Emblems; Racial Questions; Treaty of 
Versailles; Opposing Ideologies; Youth Organizations; Public Health and Sports; Eastern 
and Border Questions; National Travel Committee 
Department 3: Radio; National Broadcasting Company (Reichsfunkgesellschaft) 
Department 4: National and Foreign Press; Journalism; Press Archives; News Service; 
National Association of German Press 
Department 5: Film; Film Picture Industry; Film Censorship’ Newsreels 
Department 6: Theatre 
Department 7: Music; Fine Arts; People’s Culture46 
 
The names of these departments told us clearly which area they covered and what their 
main task was. On the other hand, it was interesting to note who was the supreme leader (besides 





                                                 






Control in Nazi Germany47 
 











Films Goebbels Goebbels 
Books Goebbels Bouhler 
Rosenberg 
Amann 









Theater Goebbels Goebbels 
Rosenberg 
The Arts Goebbels Goebbels 
Rosenberg 
Domestic Radio Goebbels Goebbels 




Just by looking at the above table, one could see the influence of Goebbels for the state 
propaganda in Nazi Germany. The Goebbels’ ministry began with only 350 administrative and 
executive officials, but its number grew over time and the main task of this institution was to re-
educate people for the new society based on National Socialist values and much of the pre-war 
German propaganda was devoted to instilling a military spirit. 
The creation of the German ministry of propaganda had worldwide influence as 
Mussolini’s Italy soon followed. The agreement about the foundation of an Italian propaganda 
                                                 
47 R.Bytwerk, Bending Spines, The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic (East 
Lansing, 2004), p.59. 
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organization was made in May 1933 when Goebbels visited Rome and the Italian propaganda 
institution started as a sub-directory for press and propaganda. In later years, that sub-directory 
became the Ministry for Press and Propaganda (Ministero della stampa e della propaganda) and 
the head of this Ministry was Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law.48  In 1936, the Ministry 
had ten general directorates: 
 
Directorate General for the Italian press; 
Directorate General for the foreign press;  
Directorate General for propaganda;  
Directorate General for cinematography; 
Directorate General for the National Authority for the tourism industries (ENIT), and 
provincial authorities for tourism; 
Directorate General for the theater; 
Directorate General for the Istituto Luce; 
Directorate General for the National Institute of Ancient Drama (INDA); 
Directorate General for the State Record Library; 
Directorate General for the Committee for the hotel credit. 
 
 Ciano soon left to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his place was taken by the 
journalist Dino Alfieri.49 In 1937, the Ministry changed its name to the Ministry for Popular 
                                                 
48 Galeazzo Ciano (March 18, 1903 – January 11, 1944) was a famous politician in Mussolini’s Italy. He was the son 
of Admiral Count Constanzo Ciano. After receiving his law degree, Ciano served as an attaché in Rio de Janeiro. On 
April 24, 1930, he married Benito Mussolini's daughter Edda Mussolini, with whom he soon left for Shanghai where 
he served as an Italian Consul. Back in Italy a few years later, he became the minister of press and propaganda. 
Ciano took part in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935–36) as a bomber squadron commander. Upon his highly-
trumpeted comeback as a “hero”, he became Foreign Minister in 1936, replacing Mussolini. At the beginning, he 
supported Italian participation in World War Two but in 1943, he turned against the doomed war and pushed for 
Italy’s exit from the conflict. He was silenced by being removed from his post and resigned as ambassador to the 
Vatican. On the Fascist Grand Council, he voted for Mussolini’s demission and was arrested, tried and shot in 
January 1944. Ciano is best remembered for his famous Diaries 1937-1943, a daily record of the meetings with 
Mussolini and many foreign political figures. 
49 Eduardo Dino Alfieri (1886 – 1966) was an Italian fascist politician. He finished law studies and participated in 
the First World War. He was member of the nationalistic group even before he became a member of Mussolini’s 
party. He was elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1924. Under Mussolini's government, Alfieri was 
assigned several tasks between 1929 and 1934, such as the co-director of the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, 
deputy secretary of the Corporazioni, and deputy secretary for Press and Propaganda from 1935, taking over the 
duties of Minister Galeazzo Ciano during the latter's mission in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. When Ciano 
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Culture (Ministero della Cultura popolare, MinCulPop) and this change had more to do with 
camouflage than a genuine change of its original purpose. There were about 4,000 instructions 
for the press in only one year from this ministry and this told us a great deal about its range and 
influence.50 The Ministry continued to operate under the new government even after the fall of 
Mussolini.51 
The two largest democratic states in Europe in this period, Great Britain and France did 
not have a Ministry for Propaganda during peacetime, except the French for a short period in the 
first half of 1938 during the second government of Socialist Leon Blum. In Britain, the real 
Ministry of Propaganda existed during both World Wars under the name of the Ministry of 
Information, but even on the eve of the war, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain refused to 
create such a Ministry because it was unnecessary during peacetime.52In the meantime, several 
propagandistic institutions were active with the most important being: the Foreign Office News 
Department, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the British Council. 
The duties of the Foreign Office News Department were to: give information to the 
domestic public, to give briefings to correspondents of the British press, correspondents of 
foreign news agencies and press based in London and to the all other news agencies based in 
London. The department had three sections with different functions. One was giving the 
information to the journalists in London; the second was collecting the information from abroad 
and third was managing the official radio service. This department was responsible for all 
attaches for the press in the embassies and consulates. 
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) was mainly the propaganda arm of the 
British government overseas – and occasionally at home as well.53 The corporation was founded 
                                                                                                                                                             
moved on to become Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dino Alfieri found himself appointed the Minister of People's 
Culture in 1937 and he declared himself to the Antisemitical racial segregation laws passed in 1938. He was Italy's 
envoy to the Vatican in 1939 and then to Nazi Germany (where he met Adolf Hitler). A member of the Grand 
Council of Fascism, he supported Dino Grandi's coup d'état in July 1943 after sanctioning the presence in the Axis 
and under Mussolini's rule. He was sentenced to death in absentia and had to flee. In 1947, he returned to Italy and a 
year later, he published his memoirs as Due dittatori a fronte [Two Dictators Face to Face]. 
50 Dj.Gocini, Istorija novinarstva [History of Journalism], (Belgrade, 2001), pp.322-323. 
51 More about MinCulPop see in: A.Mignemi (ed.), Tra fasciscmo e democrazia, Propaganda politica e mezzi di 
comunicazione di massa [Between Fascism and Democracy, Political Propaganda and mass communications’ 
instruments], (Novara, 1996); N.Tranfaglia, La stampa del regime 1932-1943 [Regime’s Press 1932-1943], 
(Bompiani, 2005). 
52 Chamberlain’s speech on 15.June 1939. 
53 For example during the General Strike of 1926, its airwaves were commandeered to powerful effect by the 
government. Cull, Culbert, Welch, Propaganda, p.37. 
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in 1922 and it began to transmit its programs overseas at the beginning of the 1930’s, which was 
very important for foreign propaganda. The service was used in the struggle against opponents 
like Italy after 1935 and in the Middle East after 1938 (with the foundation of the Arabic 
service). 
The British Council was formed in 1934 and its duty was to spread British influence all 
over the world by organizing lectures about British culture, concerts, plays and the English 
language. Its influence and funding grew over the years and in the following table, one could see 
the rise of investments: 
 







 Source: Report on the work of the British Council 1934-1955, p.10. 
 
For easier co-operation between the propaganda institutions in Great Britain during 1938, 
the Co-ordination Committee was formed. The head of this committee was Foreign Affairs 
state’s undersecretary Sir Robert Vansittart54 and this change was needed for more efficient state 
propaganda due to the intensive crisis in Europe and the onset of World War Two. 
Before and after the idea of the Ministry of propaganda was abandoned in 1938, the main 
propagandistic institution in France was the Department for Information and Press within the 
                                                 
54 Robert Gilbert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart (25 June 1881 – 14 February 1957) was a senior British diplomat 
in the period before and during the Second World War. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 
from 1928 to 1930 and Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938 and later, he served as 
Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government. He was best remembered for his opposition to Appeasement 
and his hard-line stance towards Germany during and after the Second World War. Vansittart was also a published 
poet, novelist and playwright. 








Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This department had three sections: Central, Section for studying 
and the analysis of the foreign press and Document section. The Central section was the most 
important one and the chief of the Department was also the chief of the Central section. This 
section maintained the relations with the domestic and foreign press and special attention was 
paid to relations with the foreign journalist based in France as these journalists often received 
favors like regular contact with the Department’s chief, railways passes, easy appointments with 
the state’s officials. This was all aimed to create a better image of France abroad.  
Over the years, several commissions were formed with the aim to co-ordinate propaganda 
activities like the inter-ministerial commission in 1936 and the General Commissariat for 
Information and Propaganda in 1938 that was directly under the Prime Minister. After the 
beginning of the war in 1940, the Ministry of Information was formed and its life was very short, 
like the Ministry for Information and Propaganda from 1938, but it was interesting to note that 
the same minister Frossard was employed in both ministries.55 
Smaller countries in 1930’s Europe officially did not have a Ministry for propaganda and 
usually this job was performed by some departments within the ministries. The ministries 
involved were usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior or Council of 
Ministers.  
However, the relevance of the most important propaganda department in the specific 
countries varied e.g. in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the press department within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affair was dominant and in Turkey and Albania, the Ministry of Interior was 
dominant. Later in this study, a survey of the organizations of state propaganda in Europe during 
the 1930’s will be carried out and special attention will be paid to the neighboring countries to 
Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
Two Central European countries Czechoslovakia and Hungary had two press departments 
within the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The general division 
between them was that the first one was pre-occupied with internal affairs and the second with 
foreign propaganda. In the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there was a third 
department dedicated to foreign propaganda and this department was split into six sections with 
Propagandistic and Political-Information being the most important. Those sections did not only 
                                                 
55 Ludovic-Oscar Frossard (also known as L-O Frossard or Oscar Frossard; March 5, 1889, Foussemagne, Territoire 
de Belfort—February 11, 1946, Paris) was a French socialist and communist politician, a member of six successive 
French governments between 1935 and 1940. 
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make propaganda instructions for the press, organized exhibitions, concerts and plays, but they 
also monitored the articles by the foreign press about the country. Like many other states in the 
inter-war period, Czechoslovakia had problems with the existing territorial revisionism by its 
neighbors, especially Germany and Hungary and that was one of the main preoccupations of 
foreign propaganda. The Political-Information section published the review Zahranichni politika 
(Foreign Policy) and helped other propagandistic newspapers. 
As mentioned above, the main task of the press department in the Council of Ministers of 
Czechoslovakia was internal propaganda and as this department had 40 officials, their main role 
was to guide and control the domestic press. One could also have mentioned “Orbis”, the 
commercial enterprise controlled by the government whose main task was to publish 
newspapers. In one moment during the 1930’s, this company published eight newspapers, 
amongst others Prager Prese that even published an edition in German.56 Clearly, an attempt 
was made to stand up to the aggressive and powerful Nazi propaganda. 
Considering the above mentioned territory revisionism, Hungary57 invested a lot of 
money in propaganda during the inter-war period. The press departments in the Hungarian 
Council of Ministers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the same functions and responsibilities 
as their Czechoslovakian equivalents. In the Hungarian case, the Press department of the Council 
of Ministers published four daily (Figetlenseg, Esti Ujsag, Uj Maguarsag and Budapesti Hirlap) 
and influenced more than 80 newspapers.  
One of the differences between these two countries was funding. Hungary invested large 
amounts of money into propaganda during the period and according to Yugoslav intelligence 
reports, the annual funding for Hungarian propaganda was 55 million dinars, more than three 
times more than in Yugoslavia, despite the fact that Yugoslavia was a bigger country. The same 
report informed us that the former chief of the department Stefan Antal even rose “double from 
the banks and industry by under-hand pressure and anti-semitic threats”.58 
Special directions for propaganda, as independent institutions, also existed in Romania 
(the General Direction for Press and Propaganda), Portugal (the Secretary for National 
                                                 
56 AY, 38-141. 
57 Fear of Hungarian revisionism forced its neighbors Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania into an alliance 
known as the “Little Entante”. The main aims of the organization formed during 1920/21 were a common defense 
against Hungarian irredentism and the prevention of Habsburg restoration. France supported the alliance by signing 
treaties with each member country. 
58 AY, 38-141, Report of Bozidar Albert, Yugoslav attaché for the press, from 21.January 1937. 
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Propaganda) and Greece (the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism). Several changes occurred in 
the propaganda institution in Romania during the 1930’s which could be understood as a request 
for a proper propaganda organization to be established. In 1938, the General Direction for Press 
and Propaganda had six different parts:  
 
Direction for national propaganda of tourism;  
Direction for cinematography and committee for control and censorship of the movies; 
Direction for press and propaganda;  
Direction for books;  
Direction for radio and  
Service for phones and telegraphs. 
 
At the same time, the sub-secretary for press and propaganda had to enforce the work in 
the field of foreign propaganda. This section was supposed to co-operate closely with the 
Romanian news agency Rador and at this point, it was interesting to note what was needed for 
someone to become an attaché for the press. The future attaché had to finish a Faculty of Law, to 
speak French and the language in the state that he was working, to have a certificate from a 
journalistic society and at least two years practice in a newspaper editorial. If someone wanted to 
be married, he had to ask for permission from the Minister and in the case of marriage with a 
foreigner, he needed personal permission from the head of the government.59 
As time passed, the state propaganda asked for more money and a different organization 
and the outbreak of the Second World War urged the regime in Romania to form the Ministry for 
National Propaganda which was established at the beginning of 1940.  
In Portugal, the central propaganda institution was formed in 1933 under the name of the 
Secretary for National Propaganda (Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional) and it was not under 
government rule, but instead, it was under the direct command of the dictator Salazar.  
The institution was formed with the aim of reforming the new regime established a year 
earlier.60 Its role was written in the foundation law: “With the institution of the Secretary for 
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 More about Salazar’s regime see in: F. Ribeiro de Meneses, Salazar: A Political Biography (New York, 2009) 




National Propaganda, there was now a single body responsible for managing all the information 
on the activities of various ministries in order to highlight the new spirit of unity that at last 
prevailed in the country”.61 About the tasks of the organization, Salazar said it was to: fight 
against all lies and to have centralized control over all information, especially considering the 
regime.62 The head of the institution was Antonio Ferro (1895-1956), a politician, journalist and 
writer, and a close friend of Salazar. The Secretary was simply divided into two sections: 
Internal and External, in other words, by their work functions. Due to the stability of the regime, 
this institution existed for many years after the Second World War.63 
The case of Greece was somewhat different. After the Metaxas came to power in Greece 
in 1936, the special sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism (Yfipourgeion Typou ke Tourismou) was 
established. This institution was in fact the Ministry of Propaganda and Indoctrination and 
Theologos Nicoloudis, an old politician and publisher, and a close friend of the dictator became 
the new chief of this ministry. Nicoloudis controlled and directed the entire propaganda 
organization in order to strengthen Metaxas’s position. In the Article 1(a) of Emergency Law 45, 
about establishing the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism, its mission and tasks were clearly 
stated: 
“The sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism regulates and governs all issues concerning the 
indoctrination of public opinion through the Greek and foreign daily and periodical press, 
through the control of all congresses, exhibitions, theatres, cinemas, and gramophone 
records, as well as any kind of cultural demonstrations. All these expressions, including 
radio broadcasts, should be in accordance with the values and traditions of the nation.”64 
 
One important decision taken in controlling the media in Greece was made in 1938, when 
the new Press law was passed. This law introduced stricter regulations on news coverage and 
imposed heavy penalties for editorials unauthorized by the regime and the press was obliged to 
publish all the material distributed daily by the sub-Ministry marked ‘compulsory’, including 
large amounts of foreign news coming mainly from German sources.65 It is possible to say that 
                                                 
61 Quoted from: G.Adinolfi, Ai confine del fascismo, Propaganda e consenso nel Portogallo salazarista (1932-1944) 
[Borders of Fascism, Propaganda and Consesus in Salazarist Portugal], (Milan, 2007),  p.94. 
62 Ibid, 99. 
63 From 1945, its name was the National Secretary for Information (Secretariado Nacional de Informacao). 
64 Quoted from: Petrinax, The Metaxas, p.9. 
65 Petraxis, The Metaxas, p.11. 
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the sub-Ministry was the actual Ministry, but not “officially” as it had the quality and power of 
the real ministry. 
Turkey and Albania were examples of countries that were far more committed to internal 
than to foreign propaganda. The main task of the Turkish Press Department was to control and 
guide the domestic press and it was no surprise that this department was part of the Ministry of 
Interior. Formal censorship was not proscribed by the law, but the punishments for those that 
were writing against the regimes were severe. Journalist’s devotion to the regime in combination 
with the fear of retaliation resulted with harmonious relations between the journalists and state’s 
representatives.66  
In the light of this relationship, one could observe the fact that the Minister of Interior 
was the honorary president of the journalist association. The department had only around 20 
employees who made substantial payments, but on the other hand, they could be removed from 
their position immediately so this “winning combination” secured their full co-operation and 
loyalty.  
The Press Department only had a few sections: Turkish, Balkan, Italian and English (in 
which there was also an American section). It was interesting to note that the institution did not 
have any correspondents abroad so this seemed to back up the aforementioned statement that 
Turkish propaganda was strongly oriented towards the domestic public. 
Pressure was one method that some authoritarian regimes used in the order to suppress 
some information from the foreign public and one interesting comment was made by the 
correspondent from Yugoslavia about the way of imposing propaganda in Turkey. In his report 
to the state’s central propaganda institution, he made the following observation:  
“There is one other method, which can be easily used in authoritarian regimes like 
Turkish, and that is to make clear to all foreign correspondents that they are putting 
themselves at great risk if their work can bring even the smallest damage to the interests 
of the state in which they live. The foreign correspondents know that and they are very 
careful with their words.”67 
 
                                                 
66 In one report, the correspondent of the Yugoslav CPB said that co-operation between the journalists and regime is 




This was not rare and not common to a single country. Authoritarian countries used that 
kind of pressure regularly, but this anomaly was not exclusive to them. Like in Turkey, the main 
press department in Albania was within the Ministry of Interior from 1936. It was called the 
Central Press Bureau and its tasks were to control the domestic press and to help pro-government 
newspapers. One of other tasks of the department was writing denials for the news published in 
foreign press that was unsatisfactory for the regime e.g. the coverage of the poor economic 
situation in Albania, stories that the Albanian press department did not have any contracts with 
the foreign news agencies and the budget for propaganda was only 0.7% of the state’s total 
budget.68 
With the arrival of the Italians during 1939, the new General direction for press, 
propaganda and tourism was formed. Italians invested more money in the propaganda service in 
Albania which was more than three times higher than in the period when financing was arranged 
by domestic politician. This easily explained the plans of Italian state towards its neighbors 
Greece and Yugoslavia. 
At the end, it is interesting to note the example of the first Socialist state in the World, the 
Soviet Union. As Eric H. Carr noticed in 1939, the Soviet Union was the only first-class 
European power which had no official propaganda department and he explained this paradox 
“either by saying that Soviet institutions, having been pioneers in the use of propaganda as a 
normal instrument of policy, were so familiar with the spirit of propaganda that they did not 
require a special organization for this purpose, or by regarding the Russian Communist Party and 
the Communist International respectively as the domestic and foreign propaganda departments of 
Soviet Russia.”69 
With reference to all the above mentioned organizations and institutions in the service of 
the state propaganda in the 1930’s, Europe aimed to create the conditions which would ensure 
that the regimes remained in power and could convince people of their rightful missions. There 
were no exceptions, then as there are today, regardless of some differences both in the methods 
used and the organizations formed. Some states like Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Soviet 
Union had more ambitious aims in foreign policy than the smaller countries whose primary tasks 
                                                 
68 AY, 38-22, Report from 17.January 1937. 
69 Carr, Propaganda, p.23. 
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were to control public opinion at home. Normally, the first mentioned countries had more 
developed propaganda organization and these were far better financed. 
In the late 1930’s, propaganda had become an established fact of everyday life. 
International broadcasting, state-controlled cinemas and newspapers, public opinion polls, mass 
rallies all became new features of an age characterized by a globalised ideological struggle 
thanks to the increased use of technology in the communications revolution. As Philip Taylor put 
it, “truth was a major casualty long before the actual fighting began”.70 
Many of the aforementioned propaganda organizations were short lived because of the 
change of regimes in many European countries during and after the Second World War. 
Countries that lost the war like Germany and Italy significantly changed their regimes and that 
was also the case in the majority of Central and Eastern European states that became Socialist 
states after 1945 such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
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71 Dimo Kazasov, Minister for Propaganda in Socialist Bulgaria from 1944-1946 was also the editor in chief of the 
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As discussed in the preceding chapter, very few countries had central state propaganda 
organizations in the rank of their ministries. We could only find these types of institutions in the 
three countries under discussion, but these organisations lasted for different periods of time in 
each country and only in Yugoslavia did it truly last for a longer period of time. That institution 
was the Central Press-Bureau and this lasted from 1929 to 1941. We could argue that the CPB 
was the Ministry of Propaganda, but under a different name. In Bulgaria, before the beginning of 
the Second World War, there was only one central state propaganda institution from 1934-1935 
and this was the Direction for Social Renewal (“Дирекция за обществена обнова”).  
In Poland, similar propaganda state organizations were formed in 191872, 192073, and 
1939, periods when country was in war. Nevertheless, it seemed that state propaganda in Poland 
was highly organized and coordinated, especially in the 1930’s. In the following chapter, all the 
central and state propaganda organizations that operated in all three countries under the review 





The central state propaganda institutions in Interwar Poland were placed in Council of 
Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War. The Council of Ministers was the 
most important centre, but the other aforementioned ministries maintained a certain level of 
                                                 
72 Shortly, in the first government of Ignacy Daszynski was a Ministry of Propaganda headed by Waclaw 
Sieroszewski.  
73 The name of the institution was Internal Propaganda Bureau (Biuro Propagandy Wewnętrznej) that lasted few 




autonomy during the entire Interwar period. In essence, the Council of Ministers took control of 
internal propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took control of propaganda abroad. The 
Ministry of War, as expected, took control of propaganda in the army, but its influence over the 
two other ministries could not be determined as its influence was so great that it could not be 
underestimated or overlooked in the research. Those propaganda centres did not always work in 
harmony.  
 
Council of Ministers (PRM) 
 
One of the main characteristics of the Polish Government after 1926 was that it would 
make key political decisions amongst members in small informal groups, which was not 
considered to be the traditional and legal way of conducting Government affairs at the time. The 
final word was usually had by Marshall Pilsudski, regardless of the position that he occupied at 
the time. The closest supporters of the marshal were: Walery Sławek, Ignacy Mościcki, 
Kazimierz Świtalski, Aleksander Prystor, Józef Beck, Bogusław Miedziński, Ignacy 
Matuszewski, Bronisław Pieracki, Janusz Jędrzejewicz, Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski and 
sometimes Stanisław Car74. There were more key Pilsudski supporters and these included two 
leading Sanacja journalists, Ignacy Matuszewsky75 and Boguslaw Miedzinski76. The later 
                                                 
74 A. Micewski, W cieniu Marszalka Pilsudskiego, Szkice z dziejów myśli politycznej II Rzeczpospolitej [In the 
shadow of marshal Pilsudski], (Warsaw, 1968), pp.350-384.  
75 Matuszewski Ignacy (10.IX 1891, Warsaw - VIII 1946, New York), colonel, politician, publicist, close 
collaborator of J. Pilsudski. After coup d’état in 1926 belong to right wing of Sanacja. In 1928-1929 was 
ambassador in Hungary, 1929-1931 Minister of Treasury, 1932-1936 chief editor of Gazeta Polska. After Second 
World War in emigration in USA. 
76 Miedzinski Boguslaw (Miedziński Bogusław), nickname Świtek (Firefly), (22.III 1891, Miastków, Garwolina – 
8.V 1972, London), politician, publicist, lieutenant colonel, close collaborator of Jozef Piłsudski. During the First 
World War member of Polish Army. From 1918-1922 member and chief of Section for Information in the Ministry 
of War. Long time member of the Sejm (1922-1939) and last two years senator and president of the Sejm. 
Participant in the Coup d’état led by Pilsudski in 1926. One of the founding members of the both pro-pilsudski 
parties, first BBWR and then OZN. Well known journalist and editor of several important Sanacja newspapers. 
Assistant editor of Głos Prawdy, 1929-32 chief editor of Gazeta Polska. After occupation of the Poland in 1939 he 
went in emigration, first in France and from 1940 in Great Britain. Author of several different papers in the field of 
propaganda. For his accomplishments he was highly decorated. See more in: A. Adamczyk, Bogusław Miedziński 
(1891-1972), Biografia polityczna [Boguslaw Miedzinski 1891-1972, Political biography], (Torun 2000). 
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maintained his high rank position until 1939, only overshadowed by a key propaganda expert for 
the ruling government Woicieh Stypiczynski.77 
The institutional organization of state propaganda was formed from existing institutions 
after the coup d’état in 1926. Changes were made in the human resources department where the 
key positions were occupied by people who were loyal to the marshal and who were trusted by 
him. Many of these people had a military past and were very often recruited directly from the 
army. Their purpose was to serve the ruling circle and to develop general propaganda ideas 
received from above. 
The transfer of information was vertical, very well structured and organized. It could be 
assumed that until 1935, Pilsudski made the key decisions regarding state propaganda 
and general directives were established by the chief of staff to all the political departments of the 
ministries, editors of PAT and most importantly, pro government newspapers after discussions 
with his closest supporters, the Prime Minister, other department ministers as well as the leaders 
of other ruling parties. Instructions were then passed on to the heads of local communities, 
duchies and regions so that they could influence their local newspapers. 
After the death of J. Pilsudski in 193578 , the PRM again strengthened its position as an 
important centre of the government’s propaganda machine, mainly due to efforts made by the 
Prime Minister Marjan Ziyndram-Koscialkovski (M.Zyndram-Kościałkowski) who was 
determined to make the Office for the Press PRM the highest centre for state propaganda.  He 
used the Office of the Press to restore control over state actions relating to the problem of 
uncontrolled leakage of information from ministries to the public. He told all department 
ministers in the form of a memorandum that he wanted a better coordination of media activities 
within their individual departments.  
                                                 
77 More about Stpiczynski on the pages 47 and 48. 
78According to polish historian Waldemar Paruch The Pilsudski camp in a specific historical time comprised the 
following numerous political milieus divided into four groups: 1) the Kazimierz Bartel ruling government, the 
colonels group, the naprawiacki (“repairers”) movement, conservative groups, “national Pilsudskites”, the Sanacja 
left; intraparty splinter groups and individual politicians that left the people’s movement, Polish Socialist Party, 
National Workers’ Party, Christian Democrats and even the all-Polish camp; 3) non-formalized political circles 
assembled around journals such as Droga, Glos Prawdy, Przelom, Epoka, Mysl Mocarstwowa, “Bunt Mlodych”, 
Jutro Pracy, Zaczyn; 4) social organizations – Legions of the Young, Union of Polish Democratic Youth, 
Organization of Working Youth, Central Union of Young Countryside/Rural Youth, Central Union of Farmers’ 
Circle. W. Paruch, Myśl polyticzna obozu Piłsudczykowskiego 1926-1939 [The Political Thought of the Pilsudski 
Camp 1926-1939], ( Lublin, 2005), pp. 871-872.  
43 
 
This document was divided into three areas: a) The responsibility for the information 
campaign; b) The coordination of information activities within the Office for the Press PRM and 
c) Informing the press.79 The exact responsibilities of individual officers were written in order, 
the ways in which the information was forwarded, and what type of information was forwarded. 
These were the responsibility of each individual ministry. The Prime Minister reminded the 
individual officers that the information must be forwarded to official channels after passing 
through a “double filter”, firstly via special ministry departments and then the Office for the 
Press PRM.80 These activities not only established guidelines for the future work of state 
propaganda, but also discussed flaws with the previous strategy so mistakes would not be 
repeated in future. It was interesting to note that the autonomy and power of the Foreign Ministry 
and the Ministry of War was also confirmed by this document. It was also stated that another 
directive would regulate the obligation of those two ministries that were not affected by these 
changes.81 
The departure of the Prime Minister Zyndran-Koscialowski in 1936 did not halt work 
towards the institutionalization of state propaganda where there were clear moves towards setting 
up a more centralized propaganda organization. In June 1936, a new Prime Minister general 
Slawoj-Skladkowski (Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski) formed the Office for Special Tasks (Biuro 
Zadań Specjalnych) as well as the Office for Planning (Biuro Akcji Planowania).  
The creation of these new institutions reduced the activities and responsibilities of the 
Office for the Press PRM. This office was now only responsible for the transfer of media 
information relating to the ongoing operations of government and to the preparation of press 
surveys for the Prime Minister. The new chief of the Information Department was journalist 
Kazimierz Okulicz.82 
The Office for Planning focused on the issues of conception and the programming of 
propaganda. Its director was a candidate of Inspector General Zdislav Grabski. Due to the strong 
support of Ridz-Smigly, he controlled the publishing company Kurier Porrany (Morning 
Courier) in 1936. He replaced one of the most prominent members of the Sanacja left wing, 
                                                 
79 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Arhive of Modern Documents, AAN), Prezydium Rady Ministrów, (Council of 
Ministers, PRM), 63-54-2/5. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 A. Notkowski, Prasa w Systemie Propagandy Rządowej w Polsce 1926-1939, Studium Technik Władzy [Press in 
the System of State Propaganda in Poland 1926-1939], (Warsaw/Lodz,  1987) , p.234 
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Wincent Rzymowski.83 Grabski then became the head of a newly established political Discussion 
club whose members were important Sanacja members and the group maintained close contacts 
with influential people within government.84 
The Office for Special Tasks was formed to deal with topics of press and propaganda 
with an emphasis placed upon the effective coordination of information activities between the 
different government institutions. The Director of this office until the outbreak of war was Major 
Miechislav Lepecki (Mieczysław B. Lepecki, 1897-1969) who was an ex-legionnaire and well-
known journalist who wrote for Pilsudski’s biased press. During the period from 1926-1935, he 
was one of the key officers working in the propaganda sector and he performed the following 
duties whilst in office: Adjutant of Marshal Pilsudski, chief of Office for the Press of the 
Ministry of War and the director of the Presidential Office in PRM.  
Of all aforementioned offices in the Council of Ministers, the Office for Special Tasks 
proved to be the most important one. At the end of 1938, there was a structural change that 
increased the activities and responsibilities of this department due to the termination of the 
Offices for Planning and the Press PRM. In addition, its activities and responsibilities were also 
extended to include all work relating to the PAT and Polish Radio. These two institutions were 
now accountable to the Council of Ministers and also accountable for the tasks set by the 
President of the Council of Ministers. One could reasonably conclude that within the Office for 
Special Tasks, one of the most important functions was the centralization of key sectors within 
the official propaganda: the Government’s press offices, the state Information Agency and the 
radio. After this structural change, Council of Ministers had six departments: a) Presidential; b) 
Legal; c) Economic; d) Modernization of Administration; e) Office for the Special Tasks; f) 
Personal issues.85 
On the eve of war, the necessity for the absolute centralization of propaganda was 
evident. The first step towards the creation of a Ministry of Propaganda was the introduction of a 
Commission for the coordination of propaganda (Komitet Koordynacji Propagandy), which 
worked continuously. This Commission was led by Joseph Olpinski (Józef Ołpiński) who was 
director of the Presidential Office of the PRM. The members of this special body were 
                                                 
83 Notkowski, Prasa w systemie, p.233 
84 Colonel Leon Strzelecki and Major Emil Vacqueret, close collaborators of marshal Rydz-Smigly. They had close 
contact with general Kordian Zamorski, chief of State Police (Policja Państwowa), A. Micewski, Z geografii 
politzcznej II Rzeczypospolitej [Political Geography of the Second Republic], (Warsaw, 1966), p.280. 
85 AAN, PRM 20-10-40. 
45 
 
representatives of all key government’s departments: President of the Council, vice-president of 
the Council, Minister Interior, Minister of War and OZN.86  It was obvious that all key political 
figures were involved in this process. These included representatives of marshal Rydz-Smigly, 
who was delegated by the President of the Council and representatives of President Moscinski, 
who was delegated by the vice-president of the Council. The Presence of the OZN party 
members, plus key Ministries clearly underlined the significance of the newly formed body. The 
Commission had several different departments: a) Spoken word; b) Radio; c) Theatre; d) 
Cinema; e) Press; f) Books; g) Holidays and Tourism; h) Public appearances.87 
The Main functions of new formed commission were as follows: 
a) Developing of the ideological assumptions and goals identified by the Government Delegate;  
b) Initiating the different objectives of propaganda; 
c) Giving orders and the purpose of predicting the timing of their implementation;  
d) Giving the propaganda plan and identifying trends and methods of the implementation, as well 
as inter ministerial cooperation;  
e) Identifying resources needed to finance the propaganda campaign;  
f) Setting up the transfer of the Office of Coordination for the implementation of the propaganda 
goals.88 
The head of this Commission was a government delegate who was none other than 
General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, Minister of War. This spoke for itself.89 
In one similar document from 1938, it clearly stated the action instruments from which 
given tasks should be accomplished:   
                                                 




89 Kasprzycki Tadeusz (16. I 1891, Warsaw – 4. XII 1978. Montreal, Canada) one of the most important Polish 
militarists, a member of the “First Brigade”, personal assistant of J.Pilsudski in 1919. Kasprzycki was Polish 
delegate at the League of Nations. Worked at Ministry of War for a long period of time. From 1935, he was Minister 
of War. After the occupation, he left Poland. During the Second World War, he was in internment. After the war, he 









Office for Film of Ministry Interior 
Office for the Press PRM 
Press OZN94 
League for Supporting Tourism  
TKKT theater and other organizations95 
  
According to a communication from the Prime Minister from 10. March 1938 the main 
goals of this institution were: “Ensuring that the action of propaganda at the end gives parental 
influence on the society” and also “coordination and monitoring the implementation of agreed 
action plan across all ministries, public institutions and other that will be in orbit its work.”96 As 
we can see work of this commission went in to two general directions. One coordination and 
control within government’s bodies and the other to influence public opinion in order to gain 
dominant influence on it.  
The commission was the highest center of planning and propaganda. On October 1938 in 
its protocol were enlisted 102 documents/plans considering propaganda. The documents were 
divided in eight sections: a) general (23); b) film (29); c) radio (17); d) various (22) e) theatre 
(5); f) publishing (3); g) press (2); h) tourism (1). Protocol was signed by three officers 
lieutenant-colonel Kilinski from Ministry of War, major Kencbok and captain Radecki.97 That 
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was only one example that military took dominant role in the creation of state propaganda in the 
state. 
In the opinion of historian Andrzej Notkowski, the Commission for the Coordination of 
Propaganda was so significant in the history of the Second Polish Republic that it was one of the 
most important bodies set up in Poland during this period of time along with the Office for 
Internal Propaganda, even though both didn’t operate at the same time. The Office for Internal 
Propaganda operated under the PRM and during the Polish-Russian war in the 1920’s. This last 
change in the organization of state propaganda in Poland led to the formation of the Ministry of 
Propaganda which came into effect when the war started. 
One of the measures for improving press relations was to hold press conferences twice a 
week from June 1939. These conferences were set up by the Prime Minister and these included 
the editors of newspapers, agencies’ correspondents and all chiefs of press departments within 
the government. The aim of these conferences was to control the transfer of information as much 
as possible in the situation of a crisis such as the outbreak of war.  
At this point, it was important to mention Wojciech Stpiczynski (Wojciech Stpiczyński) 
as he was probably the most important person in the creation of state propaganda in Poland as he 
was effectively a member of government with the same level of authority as the Minister for 
propaganda. He was a protégé of marshal Rydz-Smigly and was very dynamic, sharp and well 
known for being confrontational towards opponents. He was also a very experienced journalist 
and in the 1920’s, he published a weekly newspaper called Glos Prawdy (Voice of Justice). 
Stpiczynski didn’t get along with Walery Slawek and was moved aside during his presidency. At 
the beginning of the 1930’s, he was editor in chief of Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier), which 
was a very influential newspaper. In this period, he became a close friend and adviser of Rydz-
Smigly. He was one of the creators of the aforementioned reorganization of the Council of 
Ministers with the mission to create a more centralized state propaganda machine. His position at 
the Council of Ministers allowed him to be chief adviser to the Prime Minister on every issue 
concerning propaganda. In the well-informed circles, Stpiczynski was already seen as a future 
Minister of Information and Propaganda and he managed to strengthen the position of PRM in 
the field of controlling information as the censorship over PAT and government administration 
was soon established.98 Only the Ministries of War and Interior had partial freedom in their own 
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activity. He died suddenly in August 1936 whilst preparing the Marshall’s visit to France, but his 
death did not slow down the path towards the further centralization of state propaganda in 
Interwar Poland. 
The Ministry of Information and Propaganda was formed in September 1939 when 
German troops were already on Polish soil. The head of this Ministry was Michal Grazynski 
(Michał Grażyński).99 However, this institution wasn’t able to function effectively due to the 
Nazi/Soviet occupation of Poland, but the creation of this ministry was seen as the final step of 




Ministry of War 
 
  The Ministry of War was one of the most important areas of state propaganda in Interwar 
Poland. This was not only because of its huge influence on the army, but also because of its 
influence on civil institutions and government. In one propaganda brochure issued by the 
Military Institute of Research and Education in 1937,  this was very clear. As propaganda 
objectives, the document underlined the 3 main issues namely: 
- Support for the army amongst public opinion; 
- Preparing the public for war; 
- Detection and control of political opponents.100 
  All the aforementioned objectives aimed to be established well beyond military level and 
one could tell that they were primarily addressed to the non-military sectors. Thoughts and ideas 
about the “consolidation” of the nation under the name of “defense of the people” were more 
common in the late 1930’s and therefore, the influence of army and military institutions grew 
during this period. 
                                                 
99 Michał Grażyński (May 12, 1890, in Gdów – December 10, 1965, in London, United Kingdom) was a military 
leader, social and political activist, doctor of philosophy and law, voivode of the Autonomous Silesian Voivodeship, 
scouting activist and president of “Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego”. 
100 P. Stawecki, Następcy Komendanta – Wojsko a polityka wewnętrzna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1935-




In the Ministry of War, one could find several different institutions that were full of 
propaganda. The most important ones were the Military Institute of Research and Education 
(Wojskowy Institut Naukowo-Oświatowy, for future references WINO), Ministry of War’s Press 
Department, and the State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (Państwowy 
Urząd Wychowowania Fizycznego i Przysposobienia Wojskowego, for future references 
PUWFiPW). 
WINO was the most developed and most important military propaganda institution. It 
was created in 1921 under the name of Institute for Education and Publishing (Institut Naukowo-
Wydawniczy). After a number of reorganizations that resulted in the increase of its powers, this 
body was finally formed as the Military Institute of Research and Education at the end of 1934 
(WINO).  
WINO had four departments, which consisted of sections. These departments were:  
a) General; 
b) Scientific;  
c) Press; 
d) Budget and publishing.101 
The General Department102 and Department for the Press were the offices with the most 
responsibilities in the propaganda area. The first department was split into the following sections: 
a) Propaganda, b) Organization and Technical Resources of Propaganda and c) Culture and 
Education.103 WINO had other institutions, over which it had full control. These institutions 
were: Central Military Library (Centralna Biblioteka Wojskowa), Mail Military Bookstore 
(Główna Księgarnia Wojskowa) and from 1935, the Corps of Cadets (Korpusy Kadetów).104 
On the order of Minister of War to the chief of WINO, one could see the main 
responsibilities of this institution: 
“- Conduct the cultural and educational work in the army under the general guidelines of 
Vice Minister of War;  
                                                 
101 L. Wyszczelski, Oswiata, propaganda, kultura Wojsku Polskim w latach 1918-1945 [Education, Propaganda, 
Culture in Polish Army 1918-1945], (Warsaw, 2004), p.193. 
102 In 1932, there were only three departments: a) Scientific, b) Culture and Propaganda and c) Publishing. Kaszuba, 
System propagandy, p. 33. 




- Propaganda of ideas and issues of national defense among the troops, trainees, 
reservists and the broad mass of the population; 
- Cooperation in countering the propaganda of sedition in the army; 
- Maintaining the libraries  of the army; 
- Maintaining the press and publishing in the army; 
- Leading the military, scientific-publishing action and administrative budget of 
scientific publication I and II from Vice Minister of War, the principal chief of 
stuff.”105 
WINO developed a very wide and complex propaganda machine. In December 1932, it 
published 17 different journals.106 In the late 1930’s, the publishing activity of the WINO was in 
progress and in February 1939, the “Bulletin of the Press Department Press WINO” was 
published every 2-3 days. 107 The budget of WINO was 400,000 zlotys, 124,000 of which, was 
spent on military schools.108 
 In May 1936, on the initiative of Minister of War general Kasprzycki, the Central 
Coordination Committee of WINO was formed. Its purpose was to coordinate the actions of 
propaganda within the military, all with the common objective of “people defense”. This was a 
clear sign of the ruling circle’s desire to create a more centralized and more coordinated 
propaganda organization. Those tendencies were also clear in the government so one could 
safely assume that there was a general strategy towards a more centralized and controlled state 
propaganda. 
In the second half of the 1930’s, WINO played an important role in the political 
consolidation of the nation around the army and Marshal Rydz-Smigly and one could say that 
this was one of WINO’s unofficial objectives.109 
The Office for the Press in the Ministry of War was established by Marshal Pilsudski 
immediately after he regained control of the army. The head of the office was Major B.Lepecki 
until the end of the 1935 when he became head of the Presidential Office in the Council of 
Ministers. His post was taken by the captain Karol Kożmiński (Kozminski), a former 
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legionnaire, writer, historian and publicist.110 As was noted earlier, this office had a certain level 
of autonomy alongside a similar office inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The State Office of Physical Education and Military Preparations (PUWFiPW) was the 
third centre of military propaganda. It was formed in 1927 and it was directly under the control 
of the Ministry of War. His chief carried the rank of general, which underlined the importance of 
this institution. The chief was in charge of all military training for young people. This 
organization was vast and in 1937, its membership levels reached 179,000.111 Therefore, the 
influence of this organization was powerful and significant.  
The aim for this kind of organization was explained even before its foundation in 
December 1926. Captain Tadeusz Zakrzewski wrote in Bellona: “If we assume, that (...) all 
youth will be directed towards growing up in the organization of the army and be trained only by 
the military, then you can be sure that young people will actually be brought up in the spirit of 
the military and the ground state. It will be capable of not being prematurely drawn into the 
vortex of political struggle and often rescued from the destructive impact of subversive 
elements.”112 The supervision of adopting military training was held by the district commanders 
of the corps and regiments.   
PUWFiPW had its own publishing service and its budget for that purpose was 40,000 
zlotys. Alongside WINO, this institution participated in several different activities such as 
helping people to learn to read and write, the organization of cultural activities, film production, 
teaching about civil rights, cooperation with the Polish radio etc. 113  
 There were other organizations in the military that were working in the propaganda 
industry like education sections in the Corps Area Command (Dowództwo Okręgand theu 
Korpusowego, DOK). In the districts, they set up independent newspapers and maintained 
contact between local and military authorities. They also followed the latest political 
developments and informed their leaders on current affairs issues. The heads of these offices 
were usually officers in the rank of Major.114 
 Propaganda activities in the army from 1935-1939 were focused on centralizing the 
organization and expanding its influence beyond the military. They thought that winning future 
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wars would depend, to a large extent, on factors of morality and ideology. These factors began to 
impact on society in two ways. One was through a massive paramilitary organization and other 




Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 During the 1930’s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by Colonel Beck, one of the 
most important Sanacja people. He took the position in 1932 and remained in this role until the 
occupation of Poland in 1939. In the second half of the 1930’s, he kept a certain level of 
independency from both the president’s and marshal’s groups.116 His ministry was primarily 
responsible for foreign propaganda i.e. propaganda towards other countries. Most of that work 
was carried out by the Office for the Press of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych, MSZ). After the reorganization at the end of 1932, the Office for the Press MSZ 
had two departments; Political and Propaganda, with 30 clerks. 
These two departments were divided into the following sections: 
 
Office for the Press MSZ in 1932 
 





Roman countries  
Northern-eastern  
 
                                                 
115 Stawecki, Nastepcy Komendanta, pp.213-214. 
116 More about Colonel Beck as Minister see in: O. Terlecki, Pułkownik Beck [Colonel Beck], (Cracow,  1985).  
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The main tasks of the office were to inform the foreign public of news from Poland and 
to give information to the Polish media about news abroad. 
The final structural change of the Office for the Press MSZ happened in 1936. As a result 
of those changes, the organization of the office was simplified, with some sections merged 
together. There were now five sections instead of ten under the following structure:  
a) Polish press – leading the internal work of the national press and studied the 
native public opinion; 
b) Western; 
c) Eastern; 
d) Information – providing official news to the national and foreign journalists 
and transmitted instructions to the diplomatic missions of the Republic of 
Poland; 
e) Propaganda – exchange of cultural, artistic and scientific cooperation with 
foreign countries.117 
Under this organizational structure, the Office for the Press MSZ remained until 
the beginning of the Second World War.  
The key working tasks and responsibilities of the Office were written and published in 
1935 as follows: 
a) Various forms of material and program influence on the national press, PAT, other 
agencies and radio;  
b) Supervision of the activities of foreign correspondents of the PAT and semi-official 
agencies;  
c) Concluding agreements between the Polish and the other states’ press and control over 
their observance;  
d) Sovereignty over the foreign press sections through letters and agencies in the spirit of 
proper exposure of Polish foreign policy and events and domestic issues;  
e) Studying the foreign and domestic press;  
f) organization of the arrivals and departures of the journalists, scientific exchange, Polish 
readings and cultural events abroad, the issues of foreign publications about Poland.118  
                                                 




As an example, in an order from the Office for the Press MSZ to the correspondent in 
Romania (4.II 1936), topics of this propaganda work were also mentioned: Financial stability in 
Poland, development of commerce, rise of the city of Gdansk, Polish tourism, literature, music, 
sport etc119 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent a substantial amount of its budget on propaganda. 
In the financial year 1931-1932, the budget of the Office for the Press MSZ alone was 1.5 
million zlotys plus 909,000 zlotys was allocated for diplomatic missions. However, in the 
financial year 1935-1936, the entire propaganda budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
excluding the press, for organizing lectures abroad about Poland and the popularization of Polish 
science, culture and art, totaled 4.36 million zlotys.120 
According to the opposition, in November 1935, a monthly subsidy was given to several 
different papers. The list of newspapers and sums that they spent were as follows: Gazeta Polska 
– 45,000 zlotys; Słowo, Vilnius and Wiadomiości Literacky – 10,000 zlotys; Iskra agency, close 
to the ruling party – 30,000 zlotys.121 
The propaganda influence of the Office for the Press MSZ was crucial for Polish 
propaganda abroad and very important at home. Significant amounts of money were spent in 
order to achieve their goals and this was proof of the strong desire of the ruling circle to maintain 




Camp of National Unity  (OZN) 
 
 Shortly after the creation of the government party, Camp of National Unity (Obóz 
Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZN) in 1937, the Party Propaganda organization was formed. As 
one witnessed in the final phase of the centralization of propaganda, representatives of the OZN 
participated in the Commission for the Coordination of Propaganda so that they could be 
involved in making the key propaganda plans and decisions. During its brief existence, even the 
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propaganda organization in the OZN had structural changes. Chief of staff Colonel Zygmunt 
Wenda created the following organizational structure: 
 
Organization of propaganda of OZN under Wenda (1938-1939) 
 
General Press Propaganda 
Organization Foreign Publications 
Finance Information Radio 
Archives Registration Techniques 
 Photography Scholarship/Research 
  Film 
Source: E.D. Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition, The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 
1935-1939, (Athens, 1974), p.191. 
 
Even with the problems with the party organization, the OZN propaganda department 
was very active, especially in the election campaign of 1938.122As a result, the OZN had 
complete control of the Parliament after these elections. 
Due to its complicated structure, it was difficult to establish how much money was 
invested in the Polish state propaganda during the Interwar period. According to Yugoslavia’s 
CPB correspondent from Warsaw, the budget for Polish propaganda in 1937 was around 5.6 
million zloty. In the second part of the report, he added that a yearly subsidy for PAT was around 
2 million zloty.123 Therefore, funding for the Polish state propaganda was at least about three of 
four times more than in contemporary Yugoslavia.124  
As a result of the efforts of the ruling circles in the 1930’s, their control of the powerful 
institutions in the information and propaganda industry became much stronger. Privileged 
positions in the communications industry ensured that Pilsudski’s camp brought cohesiveness to 
an expanding government hierarchy. The obvious centralization of activities in the field was not 
completely eliminating opposition across the propaganda activities of individual government 
departments.  
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According to historian Kaszuba, activities of official Government propaganda, both 
civilian and military, never led to the implementation of a uniform and fully concentrated 
system, in fact, this was closer to the model of totalitarianism. In some military circles, the 
OZN’s preferences for strong and even radical solutions in terms of the propaganda apparatus of 
the state were equally limited and suppressed as they feared the environmental mechanisms for 
the total abolition of the liberal-democratic institutions.125  
In matters specifically relating to state propaganda in the Second Republic, the army had 
the biggest influence. Plans and implementation of major official propaganda campaigns were 
created and carried out directly by the military authorities or by their prominent participation. 
During the mid 1930’s, these had been taken over by the armed forces’ initiatives in this area. In 
view of the support for public interest on the matter of consolidation, citizenship and national 
solidarity, the “militarization” and active defense of independence blurred boundaries between 














                                                 








In the Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians (from 1929 Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia), the “general state intelligence services” were the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, except from 1920-1921, when they were the responsibility of the Council of 
Ministers. Then, the Central Press-Bureau was established. 
The Central Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia (CPB)  was founded in April 1929. This institution had its roots in the practice 
already established in the Princedom of Serbia, i.e. from the institution of the Press Bureau. This 
had been founded as early as the 1860’s during the rule of Prince Mihailo Obrenovic.126  
According to the Law, which had only four articles, this institution was meant to be a 
state information service. According to the same law, the detailed tasks, obligations and the 
structure of the newly founded body were to be formulated by the President of the Council of 
Ministers in an appropriate manner. The law stated that the Central Press-Bureau should be a 
constituent part of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers as one of its departments and that a 
special budget should be set aside for this department as part of the Council’s overall budget 
(Article 3). A general scheme of the internal organization of the CPB was set by law as an 
organization of the Presidency of the Council of 1 May 1929.127 The detailed structure was 
established in the following years by the Statutes of 1931 and 1935. 
The head of CPB was a clerk who was later named chief of the Central Bureau of the 
press. This role from 1929-1941 was performed by:  
                                                 
126 The head of this institution was a renowned publicist from Dubrovnik, Matija Ban. For further information see: 
M. Bjelica, Srpski ratovi rechima 1844-2000 [The Serbian War of Words 1844-2000], (Belgrade 2003), pp. 21-21. 
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Milan Marjanovic (Милан Марјановић)128, Milan Nikolic (Милан Николић), Teofilo Djurovic 
(Теофило Ђуровић)129, Kosta Lukovic (Коста Луковић), Bosko Bogdanovic (Бошко 
Богдановић)130, Predrag Milojevic (Предраг Милојевић)131 and Milorad Radovanovic 
(Милорад Радовановић). The Chief’s mandate was not specific and they were appointed, 
removed and retired by the existing government.  
It should be noted that the first head of CPB was Tony Shlegl (Toni Šlegl), a director of 
Zagreb newspaper Novosti and a close friend of King Alexander. However, he never resumed his 
duty because he was killed shortly before he was to start his post.132 The Chief of the CPB had 
the rank of vice minister and he was responsible to the President of the Council and the 
government. The department was divided into three sections: Administrative, Information and 
Publicity. Each of these sections had its own chief who reported to the Head of the CPB. Heads 
of departments had the same rank and privileges as the State’s secretary. In the same 
                                                 
128 Milan Marjanovic (1879-1955) was a journalist, writer and film director. He was expelled from Karlovac High 
School after attending a trade school. He was one of the leaders of the movement against the Hungarian 
administrator in Croatia ban Kuen Hedervari (Károly Khuen-Héderváry) who was one of the founders of the 
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129 Teofilo Djurovic was born on 8 March 1896 in Gornji Milanovac (Western Serbia). He was educated in Serbian 
high schools. After the military retreat through Albania in 1916, he went to study in France. His faculty education 
was completed in Poitiers. He gained PhD. in Paris in the field of political and economic sciences. He joined the 
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the Royal Embassy in Paris. In 1934, he became Consul General in Valona (Albania). From 31 October 1938, he 
was Consul General in Thessaloniki (Greece), until the beginning of World War II. He later immigrated to Canada. 
130 Bosko Bogdanovic (1888-1945) gained his primary and secondary education in city of Valjevo (Western Serbia). 
He was a graduate in Classical philology at University of Belgrade. He was professor in Third Belgrade High 
School, National Teacher's Academy and Trade schools in Skopje. Bogdanovic was a long time associate and chief 
editor of the newspaper Vreme. During the Second World War, he cooperated with the government of general Nedic 
(Милан Недић) who was appointed by the Germans. In 1944, he tried to escape to Germany, but he was captured 
later. He died during the deportation to Yugoslavia. Bogdanovic spoke Latin, Greek, Italian, German, English and 
French. Patriarch Varnava Rosic (Варнава Росић) was his wedding godfather. He was a close friend of Minister 
Interior Korosec (Anton Korošec). 
131 Predrag Milojevic (1901-1999) lived almost all his long life in journalism. After high school, he enrolled in 
philosophy with the famous professor Brana Petronijevic who chose him to be his assistant. Shortly after that, he 
quit his studies and became correspondent of the most important newspaper in Serbia Politika. After the dictatorship 
of King Alexander was established, Milojevic lost his regular column, but still became a foreign correspondent for 
Politika. He had worked in England and Germany. In addition to journalism, he did some translating work. After the 
Second World War Milojevic has long worked in the Politika, where he was even fired twice and returned. 
132 V.Dragovic, Srpska stampa izmedju dva rata, osnova za bibliografiju srpske periodike 1915-1945 [Serbian Press 
Between Two Wars, Basis for Biblograpfy of Serbian Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p.382. 
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document133 about the organization of the Council of Ministers, it stated the exact duties of each 
of the departments of the CPB. The Administrative department was responsible for the conduct 
of personal affairs of the staff, ie. receiving and sending mails, letters etc. In this Department, 
there was also the Secretariat whose responsibility was to deal with all complaints from the staff, 
business or personal.  
The Information Department was responsible for collecting and providing information on 
a variety of different national issues such as political, economic, financial, cultural etc. The 
principal function of this department was to inform domestic and foreign  citizens about the 
existing situation in Yugoslavia.  
Another important feature of this department was to collect information on foreign and 
domestic press as well as maintain the data archives and a library. It was also determined to 
improve on existing levels of writing and printing journalistic and literary work so these could be 
improved to the highest possible level.  
The Central Press-Bureau was constantly seeking to improve the organisation as much as 
possible and formal legislation, governing its structure, was passed in March 1931. The head of 
the CPB was given the official title of Chief of the CPB. This duty, in later years, was often 
performed from some of the heads of other departments. The Department for Administration, 
Information and Publicity remained unchanged, but there were a lot of changes inside all these 
departments. 
The Publicity department held a news service of propaganda abroad, whilst the 
Information Department held information propaganda services at home during 1931. For the 
benefit of all the clerks, 56 different instructions were issued. It was important to note that the 
establishment had two separate archives - confidential and administrative. It was interesting to 
note in 1931, there were around 3,900 files in the administrative archivess and in the confidential 
archives, there were about 12,000 files.134 This summed up the secrecy of the institution. The 
Headquarters of the CPB was located in a big palace in the “Veliki Milosh” street in Belgrade. 
 
The majority of CPB employees were clerks and they were divided into two groups. The 
first group consisted of full time clerical staff whilst the others were only part-time. It was 
                                                 
133 See note 127. 
134 AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj o radu CPB-a za 1931.godinu (Annual CPB’s Report for 1931). 
60 
 
interesting that the Law for Clerics for the Central Press Bureau-provided specific benefits to 
them. They were allowed to progress within the civil service, regardless of their academic 
qualifications and experience. This was obligatory for career progression in the case of other 
state department officials in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. CPB officials thought that these 
benefits would enable them to recruit more clerical staff from the national pool of journalists, 
regardless of their qualifications. So officials were recruited and allowed to advance to a position 
that corresponded to their rank and reputation in journalism as well as to their personal abilities 
and performance135 it was easier to understand the actual number and duties of CPB with the 
following scheme: 
 
The structure of CPB in 1931 
 
Staff of the Central Press-Bureau and their rank 
Duties Number 
Chief of Central Press-Bureau 1 
Deputy chief of CPB 1 
Heads of Sections and secretaries 4 
Clerks 12 






Other staff 40 
TOTAL 125 
* Of which the regular salary 112 and 13 confidential clerks. 
Source: AY, 38-1, Annual CPB’s Report for 1931. 
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the Press and Propaganda in Yugoslavia”). 
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The number of CPB employees varied in future years, but usually it was around 150.136 
In addition to this number, there were a number of associates who were not officially on the 
payroll. This was done because of the secrecy of their work so they were not even mentioned in 
the report, but they did work for the CPB.137 
 Central Press-Bureau employees were different, not only in their education levels, but 
also with their temperaments and behavior. Among them were PhD. holders, professors, writers 
etc. Many of them worked for the CPB more for material reasons than for their personal beliefs 
about political and moral correctness. The salaries and benefits that this job offered were way 
above average when compared with other jobs in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  
In addition, one could not ignore the possibility of employees progressing within the 
CPB, gaining social status and position, the ability to travel, earning good money etc, but all 
these benefits brought competition, rivalry, conflicts of interests and intolerance between all CPB 
employees. Milan Jovanovic Stoimirović, who for decades was in the CPB and close to it, 
referred to it as the “wasp’s nest”, “the pit in which different types of insects crawl” and “the 
mad house in which much wickedness was accumulated”.138 
Correspondents in the country and abroad played an important role in executing the 
propaganda goals set by both of these institutions. Their key task was to be a link between the 
central institutions and the editing boards of the newspapers in the area entrusted to them. The 
duties of the correspondents in the states were practically identical. They were, above all, 
responsible for monitoring the work of the press and they were to report to the central institutions 
on regular basis. They had to inform on the work of the press and on political events in the 
entrusted area every week. They were also to send a complete report on their activities and on the 
work of the correspondence center at the end of each month and year, and not every three or six 
months.  
Besides these regular duties, the correspondents also had to co-operate with all political, 
national or cultural tasks organized by their sector. They had to fulfill all the tasks given by the 
central institution to help to bring about all the desired results for the CPB.  
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There were also supervisors in charge of the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. They 
paid regular visits to the editorial office and kept in touch with the editors and the journalists to 
whom they gave instructions, and made threats when necessary.  The success of their work 
depended on the competence of the correspondents themselves as well as the department in 
which they worked. The complaints of the correspondents about the lack of cooperation of the 
local media were frequent, especially in the Croatian parts of the country.139  
 The Central Press-Bureau in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had regular correspondents, not 
only in Belgrade, but also in each of the nine banovinas140. They were located in the centers of 
the banovinas, but also often made trips into the provinces. The seats of the regular 
correspondents in the country were: Ljubljana in the Drava Banovina, Zagreb in the Sava 
Banovina, Banja Luka in Vrbas Banovina, Split in the Primorska Banovina, Sarajevo in the 
Drina Banovina, Cetinje in the Zeta Banovina, Novi Sad in the Danube Banovina, Nis in the 
Morava Banovina and Skopje in the Vardar Banovina. In addition, there were correspondents in 
Susak and Osijek.  
With regard to foreign countries, the propaganda organizations had their correspondents 
in the most important European capitals and in the capitals of neighboring countries. The regular 
CPB correspondents from abroad were situated in London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Sofia, 
Prague, Budapest, Warsaw, Bern, Vienna, Athens, Bucharest, Washington, Brussels and 
Frankfurt. In 1931, the correspondence centers were closed in Brussels and Frankfurt and a new 
center was established in Tirana. The correspondents from abroad were called attaches for the 
press with the Royal Legates. This change was introduced in Yugoslavia in order to stop the 
ongoing practice of the provisional granting of titles.141 
The obligations of the correspondents from abroad were to an extent more numerous and 
complex than those of their colleagues back home. They were expected to be completely at the 
disposal of the state. The correspondents, nevertheless, kept some level of independence 
regarding the entrusted tasks. Their additional duties were the monitoring of the newspapers and 
                                                 
139 AY, 38-11, Izveshtaj dopisnika iz Primorske banovine [The Reports of the Correspondents from the Primorska 
Banovina].  
140 Banovina was an administrative unit of the internal division in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia introduced by King 
Aleksandar on 3 October 1929. 
141 AY, 38-1, Pravilnik o atasheima za shtampu (chl. 1) [The Book of Regulations Regarding the Attachés for the 





publications in their area, informing on these issues to the state, reacting to unfavorable mentions 
of the country in the foreign press, offering help in writing denials and similar official 
documents, making connections between the state and the editorial staff of the newspapers, 
making sure that the highest possible number of articles of the country got published in foreign 
newspapers and of course, reporting on a regular basis to the central institutions in Belgrade. 
Bearing in mind all the enumerated duties, it seemed that the most important qualification 
for correspondents, besides being competent, was to be well acquainted with the situation in the 
state to which they had been sent and, above all, to have contacts  with the key people in power 
and among editing staff of the newspapers.  
In order to achieve this, it was necessary for the correspondents to have certain work 
experience, many years of service in the given state and of course, a good command of the local 
language. In the reports on the work of the correspondents, it was noticeable that they weren’t as 
efficient in their work as a result of their relocation. New correspondents needed time to become 
“acquainted” with the “important people” and to gain trust and distinction in the new country.  
Of immense importance to them, besides the usual activities, was the so called “invisible 
propaganda”. This consisted of their normal daily activities – visits to the editing staff, 
restaurants, taverns, talking to people, giving information which formally had no official 
character. These kinds of activities could, depending on the professionalism and talent of the 
correspondent, have had more far reaching effects than the regular activities.  
The regular correspondence with the central institution was carried out through written 
reports, phone conversations and codified telegrams, depending on the importance and urgency 
of the news.142 The correspondents found it considerably easier to get the news about certain 
celebrations, such as public holidays into foreign newspapers than to push their country’s 
political agenda. In England, for example, articles on the Yugoslav royal family were published 
quite often, due to their family and friendly ties with the English royal family. 
The principal aims of propaganda produced by the Central Press-Bureau in the first years 
after its foundation was to explain and justify the new course established by the King's 
dictatorship. Even the establishment of the CPB could be associated with the foundation of the 
                                                 
142 Some of the correspondents had problems with their telegrams being read, thus they could not inform openly on 
the real situation at hand. In such cases, they turned to various options, such as paying a visit to the home country for 
the purpose of “presenting reports”. Milos Crnjanski was one of the correspondents who encountered these sorts of 
problems during his service in Italy. He had to send some of his reports through the Legate, M.Crnjanski, Nova 
Evropa, (Belgrade 1991), p.139. 
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dictatorship regime. The King needed an institution that could justify and explain his actions to 
the domestic and foreign public, especially foreign allies like France and Czechoslovakia. After 
the constitution was established in September 1931, one of the main aims of the propaganda was 
to bring it closer to the foreign and domestic public as the entire CPB propaganda could have 
been divided on political, cultural and touristic grounds.143  
The period of Milan Stojadinovic’s government (1935-1939) brought significant changes 
to the intensity, scope and the structure of the Central Press-Bureau. The first such change in the 
manual was established in November 1935. This constitution helped to more precisely define the 
tasks and structure of the CPB.144  
It was important to note that Milan Stojadinovic only had ten days to change the existing 
manual after taking over the presidency in 1935.145 It was noticeable from the beginning that 
Stojadinovic was well aware of the importance of this institution for the state propaganda. One 
should not forget his personal ambition within the country and to the international public. The 
latter was, of course, more understandable if it were not for the fact that Stojadinovic was not 
just Prime Minister but also Minister of Foreign Affairs. His more active foreign policy helped 
the work of CPB and opened up relations to some countries like Italy and Bulgaria, with whom 
there had been very little, if any, formal relations beforehand. Bilateral agreements with these 
countries were signed in 1937 and relations with these countries improved.  
During the entire period of Stojadinovic’s government, the head of Central Press- Bureau 
was Kosta Lukovic. He held the position from April 1934, even when King Alexander ruled, 
until January 1935 when he was replaced by Teofilo Djurovic, but Lukovic quickly returned to 
the post.  
The fact that Lukovic stayed on the post was one of many examples of Stojadinovic’s 
pragmatic policy. He accepted people based upon their expertise and personal loyalty to him, not 
whether they were members of the Radical Party. It was one of the reasons for clashes with 
members of the National Radical Party who were initially cooperating with him.146 Lukovic was 
                                                 
143 This division was made by the CPB’s clerks in the 1930’s. 
144 AY, 38-1, Poslovnik o radu u Centralnom Pres-birou Predsednishtva Ministarskog saveta (Manual of 
Central Press-Bureau of Concil of Ministers). 
145 This data was written even in introduction of the Manual. 




a prominent journalist, founder and director of the newspaper Vreme, and he served in the 
Central-Press Bureau even during the World War I from 1914/1915.147 
 At the time when Milan Stojadinovic came to power, Lukovic had already had 
experience as a chief of the Central Press-Bureau, but the new manual gave him more power. He 
led all of the CPB's activities (Article 1) and all legislation was formally signed off by him, apart 
from those which authorized the heads of departments and certain officials (Article 2).148 The 
head of the CPB was considered to be an immediate reference to Prime Minister in his relations 
with the press and propaganda, both at home and abroad. In fact, Lukovic received orders from 
Stojadinovic directly and answered only to him.  
When one considered his position and power, Kosta Lukovic was a key figure in 
planning and conducting propaganda in Yugoslavia.149 He gave numerous instructions to 
correspondents, both home and abroad, including one from the Prime Minister and these were 
sufficient proof of his influence.  
These instructions were wide ranging from any moderately important issue, every speech 
from the president, every public appearance or performance by the ministers etc.  The 
interpretation of these instructions was sent to correspondents home and abroad. Such 
interpretations differed in size and frequency ranging from short telegraphic instructions to ten 
pages of text. These depended on the importance of specific events, damages or benefits that 
could arise from such events.  
As an example, one could examine the case of the Concordat who demanded a huge 
propaganda effort by the CPB and by the correspondents themselves. The position of the 
government was rocked by the decisive protest by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the summer 
                                                 
147 Kosta Lukovic was born in 1886 in Belgrade. He was educated in France at Rennes 1906/1907, where he 
defended his dissertation in the field of literature in 1933. Lukovic was a clerk at the Arts Department of the 
Ministry of Education and was one time head of the National Theater in Novi Sad. He received domestic and foreign 
decorations - the Order of White Eagle Order V level in 1928 and the Order of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and 
France (1926 and 1934). For a successful service in the CPB, Lukovic received the Order of St. Sava, the second 
level in 1938. In the fall of 1944, the Yugoslav partisans executed him as a collaborationist. 
148 AY, 38-1, Central Press-Bureau’s Manual from 11. November 1935. 
149 M. Jovanovic Stoimirović, Varia o Pres birou, Rukopisno odeljenje Matice Srpske, document, M 13.314, p. 70a. 
In the one of his manuscripts, Milan Jovanovic Stoimirović referred to Lukovic as the intelligent, but lazy man. 
Interestingly, the observation was made in the period while he was head of CPB and a great influence on him was 
Stanislav Vinaver, writer, former correspondent from Berlin and later chief of the Publicity department. M. 




of 1937. That protest gathered strong opposition, from the right to the communist left.150 The text 
of the Concordat, the mystery death of the patriarch and skirmishes on the streets demanded an 
immediate response from the propaganda center. On that occasion, Lukovic sent instructions on 
a daily basis, which described a less serious crisis with a reduced the number of demonstrators 
and incidents. These accused opposition groups who were allegedly supported by leftist and 
extreme elements.”151  
Instructions sent by Lukovic were created primarily in the interest of the government and 
secondly in the interest of truth. That did not automatically mean that all the instructions were 
incorrect, but that the priority was to present situation in the best interests of the government, 
especially from the Prime Minister’s perspective. One could also note cases when the Prime 
Minister was not satisfied with Lukovic’s work. So in September 1935, the Chief of the CPB 
received criticism that information sent from Lukovic to the press in the afternoon was “too late” 
and that this needed to be published next morning. This order sent on behalf of Stojadinovic by 
his chief of staff Jovan Gasic.152 
Throughout the period of its existence, the institution were in search of the best 
organizational practice, which would make it possible for them to fulfill their set objectives.  
These ’’roamings“ were best illustrated by the fact that the operating regulations of the 
CPB were passed in March 1931. They relied on exisiting laws and these defined the structure of 
the department in more detail.  
The head of the Press-Bureau was a civil servant with the title of the Chief of the Central 
Press-Buerau, and he had deputies. The job of the deputy of the Chief of the CPB was often done 
by one of the chiefs of the department.  
There were three departments: Administration, Information, and Publicity.153 This 
division within CPB was the most lasting one. The rationale behind it was that, although it did 
                                                 
150 More about Concordat crisis in Yugoslavia see: M.Misovic, Srpska crkva i Konkordatska kriza (Serbian Church 
and Concordat Crisis), Београд 1983; R.Radic, Zivot u vremenima: Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950 (Life in Times, 
Gavrilo Dozic 1881-1950), (Belgrade, 2006), pp.156-186. 
151 AY, 38-1, Kosta Lukovic to all correspondents on 22. June 1937. It was said that this report has been sent from 
the “highest place.” 
152 AY, 37-73-97. 
153 AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj o radu CPB-a za 1931 [The Report on Work of the CPB for the year of 1931]. 
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not function perfectly, it was still written in the constitution. It was very likely that the 
Department for Radio broadcasting was added to these three departments in 1939. 154 
 









The General Section Department for activities 
regarding the enforcement 
of the Law on the Press 
Department for public 
realtions with the foreign 
press 
The Secretariat of the CPB Department for the national 
political propaganda 
Department for propaganda 
in the sphere of culture 
 Department for political 
service 
Department for monitoring 
of the press 
 Department for monitoring 
of the press in the country 
 
 Department for radio 
broadcasting 
 
 Department for film and 
tourism 
 
 Department for economic 
issues 
 




The institution was financed through regular and secret funding. As an illustration of the 
allocation of these funds, it is important to note the budget of the CPB for 1931, which totaled 
                                                 
154AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj: “Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsednishtva Ministarskog saveta” [The Report 
“The Domain of Action and Work of the Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers]. After 




between 18,180,580 dinars.155 The 11,580,580 came from regular funds and 6,600,000 dinars 
came from the secret funds156. This amount remained almost unchanged throughout the 
following years. It is important to note that the chiefs of the Central Press-Bureau were never 
satisfied with the considerable financial means allocated for the activities of this Department of 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. Their constant complaints about the lack of funding 
reappeared in numerous reports throughout this period.157 
During this period, the activities of the Administration Department remained unchanged, 
but it is important to examine the work of two other departments: Information and Publicity.  
Firstly, it is important to examine one of the key departments within the Information 
Department, the department for activities regarding law enforcement on the Press. This 
department was solely responsible for the preventative examination of the press, magazines, 
books and other printed documents.  
During the 1930’s, press legislation passed in January 1929 came into effect. This was 
one of the first pieces of legislation passed at the start of the King’s dictatorship and it was very 
strict on the press. This remained until the fall of Stojadinovic’s government.  
Although, Article 1 of the Press Law formally proclaimed the freedom of the press 
against any preventive examination, in practice this was not the case. According to Article 14 of 
the Press law, any newspapers could be prosecuted for the slightest offense. After three such 
prosecutions, newspapers could be definitively terminated.  
Due to this strict legislation, newspapers had to show the CPB copies of their 
forthcoming articles for a review every day before they were published. This was preventative 
censorship that gave the press a very limited amount of freedom.  
Outside Belgrade, this type of work was performed by prosecution or police 
administration where there were no prosecutions involved. This job was carried out by directives 
                                                 
155 AY, 38-141. The initial draft of the budget drawn up for the CPB totaled 36,580,580 dinars. It also had a 
paragraph regarding publishing activities in the country and abroad, which suggested a budget of 20 million dinars 
for these activities. 
156 The draft of the budget for the period 1929/1930 (the first year of the existence of the institution) was specific in 
so much as the 3,400,000 dinars came from regular funds and 9,600,000 from the secret ones. This can be explained 
by imprecise calculations of the possible expenditures of the institution at the time when it had not been in 
operation. Naturally, there were also cases later on when the secret funding was boosted due to specific needs and 
exceptional expenditures. 
157 AY, 38-1, Izveshtaj: “Delokrug rada Centralnog Pres-biroa Predsednishtva Ministarskog saveta” [The Report 
“Domain of Action and Work of the Central Press-Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers”] of 1938. It 
was interesting to note the emphasis placed on the fact that Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary had twice as high 
budgets, which was, as stated,  also the case in all the neighboring countries.  
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and instructions from the CPB158 and these were sent by telephone and telegraph to save time. 
This department, in addition to carrying out activities related to the implementation of the press, 
had been instructing newspapers daily about anything, which in its opinion, could be harmful to 
the general public and national interest. 159 
 In addition to controlling the local press, the state prosecutors and police administration 
exercised control over foreign journalists who were coming into the country. They were also 
exploring the possibilities of importing and selling certain foreign newspapers in Yugoslavia.  
The final decision on this matter was made by the CPB and it was strongly influenced by 
the editorial viewpoints of foreign newspapers. The CPB would approve of those newspapers 
which didn’t focus on political issues such as the Hungarian cultural newspaper Lahatar. Other 
newspapers were judged by their location and in some instances, by the nature of their country’s 
relationship with Yugoslavia. For example, the CPB approved of the Bulgarian newspapers Dnes 
and Utro as they were from a country seen as “friendly” to Yugoslavia). For a better 
understanding of this department’s extensive work, please look at the table below with 
information extracted from the annual report on the work of CPB in 1936.  
 




Types of sheets and their scope Approximate number of pages  
 
daily newspapers  1 800  
weekly and twice in month issues 3 168  
weekly and twice in month issues in1/4  922  
Twice in month and monthly in 1/8 1 658  
Radio lectures typed on the machine 1 200  
Oral newspapers typed on the machine 96  
                                                 
158 Interesting are the cases that have occurred in Croatia, especially when the prosecution had taken entire 
paragraphs from some articles and newspapers. They were published afterwards with the same text and instead of 
the extracted information, there was empty space. With those actions, editors of the newspapers had pointed to state 
repression and stifling freedom. 
159 For more examples see AY, 38-88. 




Different reports for the newspapers 450  
books in various foreign languages in 1/8            4 000 
 
This strenuous work was performed every day from 9am until midnight and special shifts 
were organized to review all kind of papers, regardless of the printed language. Different proof-
readers participated in the examination of foreign newspapers.161 This department published a 
daily bulletin on its activities from which one could see the editorial opinions of newspapers and 
their attitude towards the important state issues. 
At the beginning of 1936, the Information Department founded the department for 
national political propaganda. The main goals of this department were to increase the propaganda 
activities and increase the influence over the press at home and abroad. They had to give 
newspapers plenty of information on a daily basis on issues ranging from political, economic, 
financial, cultural and tourist.  
By establishing this department, the CPB expressed the desire to influence the 
newspapers to write “in the spirit of national ideology and policy of the Royal Government” and 
using them to gain influence over people. The department of National Political propaganda 
supplied newspapers with both unified and more specific material depending on the profile of the 
newspaper. Special in-depth articles were recorded on the occasion of major celebrations and 
national holidays like Unification day (1st December) and the birthday of King Peter II (5th 
September). In 1936, the department submitted news and reports to almost 80 newspapers, which 
published a total of about 20,000 different articles.162 
As an example on how the Central Press-Bureau influenced public opinion in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, please look at the table below, which consisted of information 





                                                 
161 They were proofreaders for: Russian, English, Hungarian, German, French, Bulgarian, Czech, Polish, Romanian 
and Slovakian languages. 





Usage of CPB’s data by the different media in 1936 
 
Media Delivered Used in percentage 
Radio 1 460 780 53% 
 Avala Agency 1 800 1 500 83% 
Samouprava 1 050 950 90%  
Vreme 1 050 700 67%  
Pravda 1 000 700 70%  
Politika 900 400 44%  
Provincial press 5 700 4 000 70%  
Table prepared by the author based on data from the CPB, Report of annual from 1936, p.19  
 
As one could note above, the largest percentage of CPB data, 90%, was used by the 
government party newspaper Samouprava (Yugoslav Radical Community – JRZ).  After this 
data was published, Samouprava published 266 issues and from this data, one could tell the 
enormous influence that the CPB had on it. The newspaper Pravda was similar to Samouprava, 
but it was not influenced as much by CPB data. On the other hand, the newspaper Politika, 
which tried to be neutral and objective, used only 44% of CPB material, the least out of all media 
outlets. This data clearly stated the extent to which some media outlets were close to the 
government.  
Another innovation from the CPB in the Stojadinovic government was the establishment 
of the U.S. Service immigrant press within the department on the National political propaganda. 
This service followed all Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian newspapers and even the newspapers of 
Bulgarian-Macedonian emigrants in the United States, Canada, Argentina and Chile.  
This service had two tasks. One was to monitor the separatist propaganda, both Croatian 
and Bulgarian-Macedonian. Secondly, the service was encouraging and helping those 
newspapers that were on the “border of national and state unity”. These were sent various 
articles, photographs and materials that expressed the “real” situation in the distant homeland.163 
                                                 
163 Some titles of the articles best described the tendencies: “For United Yugoslav State”, “The Ideal is Achieved”, 
“We Will Defend Her and Succeed”, “Macek and Pavelic”, “Gustav Percec has Shamed Even his own Kin”, 
“Croatian Perpeetum Mobile”. 
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The report on the activities of the service, in addition to praising their own work, listed some 
problems and made suggestions for improving the service.  
There was an interesting report, which stated that “separatist” and “federalist“newspapers 
were more “skilled” than “patriotic”. This was explained by the fact that they obtained material 
mostly from Europe and had more educated editors.164 
 The foreign policy of the Balkan countries, which needed some sort of clarification, 
created additional problems for the correspondents abroad. These clarifications asked, from time 
to time, for exceptional efforts. In some cases, besides the text of the Prime Minister’s speech, 
the correspondents were given special instructions, which varied from one country to another.  
As an example, it is important to mention Stojadinovic’s address to the National 
Assembly of 9 March 1938. The correspondent from Paris received instructions to put special 
emphasis on the “standing ovations” and “applauses” after the mention of France, whereas the 
correspondent in Berlin was told that “great applause” followed the mention of the German 
Reich”. Naturally, the “positive” reception of France was left out of the second instruction for 
the Berlin correspondent.165  
In addition to the activities of the correspondents at home and abroad, special attention 
was paid to co-operating with the foreign correspondents that were, permanently or temporarily, 
staying in Yugoslavia.  
Special efforts were made to create the best possible relations with them. The 
correspondents were offered all sorts of “benefits” in order to make them more susceptible to 
“suggestions” and to gain as much control over their work as possible. The process of attempting 
to gain a foreign correspondent’s approval was manifold, e.g. organizing of tea parties, 
excursions into the inlands of the country, receptions with the heads of the departments and the 
receptions were held by the chiefs or the directors themselves when it came to very important 
journalists.  
Foreign correspondents were offered all the material that they needed to do their jobs 
properly. The propaganda institutions had standardized articles which dealt with different issues 
regarding various aspects of daily life and the history of the country. However, relations with 
foreign correspondents were not always smooth. There were cases when their reports were put 
                                                 
164 Same as footnote 162. 




on hold until they were changed into something which was regarded as “acceptable” for the 
government of the host country. This occurred with a Reuter’s correspondent in Belgrade on the 
day of the parliamentary elections, 11th December 1938.166 
The results of the propaganda institutions were not insignificant, but they were not 
always completely successful. This could be claimed of the Yugoslav case in particular. 
Although the whole propaganda machinery was set up for the benefit of Prime Minister 
Stojadinovic167, he was re-elected with a considerably smaller margin than expected in the 
parliamentary elections of 1938. This, amongst other things, brought about his eventual 
downfall.168 
The Political Service of the Central Information Department of the CPB dealt exclusively 
with the area of reporting internal and party politics. Its main task was to inform the public about 
the work of the National Assembly and Senate169 and to draft reports on the work parties. This 
department kept records, archives and statistics of the complete political history of the all parties 
in Yugoslavia. 
The Central Press-Bureau had its own Photographic department in order to make its 
propaganda more convincing and striking. This department had extensive archives, with tens of 
thousands of negatives. Their content was not only political and cultural, but historical and 
touristic.  
With by far the largest photo archives in the country, the CPB was in a dominant position 
in relation to the competition provided by the photo services provided by other newspapers. They 
submitted material to the large number of domestic newspapers. This was especially appropriate 
for the provincial press in a part of the country that was poor and under-equipped and didn’t have 
                                                 
166 AY, 38-93, Izveshtaj predsednika CPB-a Koste Lukovica predsedniku vlade o radu stranih novinara za vreme 
izbora [The Report of the Chief of the CPB, Kosta Lukovic, to the vice-president of the Government on the work of 
foreign journalists during the elections]. 
167 For details on propaganda during the rule of Milan Stojadinovic see: P. Lazetic, ‘Milan Stojadinovic i 
predizborna kampanja 1938’ (Milan Stojadinovic and election campaign in 1938), Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije  
No. 25, Belgrade 1988, pp.117-139; J. Opra, ‘Izborna kampanja Milana Stojadinovica 1938.godine’ (Election 
campaign of Milan Stojadinovic in 1938), Arhiv Year II No.2, pp.171-185; the MA Thesis of the author, 
Propaganda Milana Stojadinovica  1935-1939 [Milan Stojadinovic’s Propaganda 1935-1939]. 
168For further details on the descent of Milan Stojadinovic from power see: Lj. Dimic, Istorija srpske drzavnosti  
[The History of Serbian statehood], III, Novi Sad 2002, p.182;  D.Biber, ‘O padu Stojadinovićeve vlade’ (About the 
fall of Stojadinovic's Government), Istorija 20.veka, Zbornik radova VIII, Belgrade 1966, pp. 5-66. и D. Tesic, 
Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica 1935-1939 (Jugoslav Radical Community 1935-1939), Belgrade 1997, pp.389-
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its own photo-service. This photo material from the CPB was often the only one used in those 
newspapers.  
Very soon after the establishment of the regime party JRZ, this department found itself in 
party services. It photographed important party gatherings and rallies and also made resized 
photos of party leaders, primarily Stojadinovic, but also others like Korosec, the Interior Minister 
and leader of the Slovenian wing of the JRZ and Spaho, who was leader of the Bosnian wing.170 
During the period of Stojadinovic’s government, there was strong economic recovery in 
Yugoslavia after the economic crisis that adversely affected the country in early part of the 
1930’s. The role of giving information to the domestic and international public about the 
government’s work in this area was the responsibility of the micro department of Economics and 
Finance. Its tasks were performed by a group of domestic and foreign journalists who were 
involved in the development of CPB's publications, lectures, radio, etc. They were also involved 
in the preparation of various presentations associated with the opening of new factories or plants 
and these were common during that period.  
Although the work of this sub-section was very important, one potentially misleading 
piece of news could cost the country millions, there were only a small number of employees. In 
addition to the chief of this sub-section Vladimir Skerl, there were only a few clerks171 and when 
one considered the importance of the economy to the Stojadinovic government, this was a 
surprise. Skerl had asked for more employees and for this sub-section to become a department 
because its lack of “organic contact” with the press and the authorities, but this request was 
refused.172  
This sub-section had an active role in the propaganda actions for the loans registrations 
that were connected with government’s new economic program. Considering its working 
conditions, the sub-section of Economy and Finance had recorded solid results, especially in 
collecting information from its domain.173 
 There were three main tasks of the Publicity department. Firstly, it had to inform the 
public, directly or indirectly through a correspondent on the situation in the country. Secondly, to 
                                                 
170 Of all photos made during the 1936, 26% were about JRZ foundation and organization. CPB, Report…, 77. 
171 AY, 38-1, in one moment, there were only three clerks, The annual report of Sub-section of Economy and 
Finance for 1937. 
172 AY, 38-1, the letter of Vladimir Skerl to Kosta Lukovic from  19. February 1937. In this letter, he referred to his 
previous unsuccessful attempts to reconnect with others important factors in the area. 




prepare material for journalists and foreign correspondents and thirdly to collect data on cultural 
life and minority issues and make a bulletin based on the monitoring of foreign and local press 
on a daily, weekly and monthly basis.  
However, one of the most important duties of this department was to create special 
publications of the Central Press-Bureau. Every year, a large number of newsletters and 
publications were published in relation to political and cultural issues. Special effort was 
addressed to the publications that were published for the anniversaries of the Stojadinovic 
government. By the instructions that he received from the Prime Minister, Kosta Lukovic in 
1937, these were sent to the ministries who were asked to submit data on what had been done in 
their domain. Such letters were sent several months before the anniversary dates.  
The main reason for this was the time that the CPB needed for additional work on the 
material and later for the transfer of this material to domestic and foreign journalists and 
correspondents. The result of this action was the publication of a book called “Two Years of 
Milan Stojadinovic’s Government”.  
The following year, preparations were even more systematic and progress was made 
during 1938, which was the year of the general election. This included collated data of almost 
500 pages and brochures issued by the same title containing full data, high quality photos, charts 
with the success and progress in every field in the country.  
At the time, these luxury publications reached certain standards that even nowadays 
deserve some respect. In the brochures, photographs were carefully chosen where the Prime 
Minister was the center of attention. They published his photos with all the major foreign 
politicians whom he met over the years. There were also photographs of people taken during his 
talks with the workers and peasants, of his time in Parliament, on the foundation of a new 
hospital, factory or any new facility etc. 
 In addition to the material in the Serbian language, they also wrote propaganda articles in 
foreign languages. After three years of the Stojadinovic government, these consisted of fifteen 
articles in French and German, three in Italian and two in English.174 These articles were 
adjusted to suit the readers of that specific country.  
                                                 
174 AY, 38-1. 
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According to official Government statistics, Stojadinovic’s government increased the 
budget of the CPB in 1936-37 by 1,700,000 dinars.175 Although this seemed a big increase, one 
must be bear in mind that some new items were introduced to the budget and that the increase 
was less in real terms.176 
At this stage, it is important to mention the relationship between the Prime Minister 
Stojadinovic and the Central Press-Bureau. Stojadinovic was a politician who knew the 
importance of the state and its own personal propaganda and during his time in office, he made 
many improvements in this area. In addition, he was advising the CPB chief regularly as well as 
creating articles about both himself and the activities of the government.  
The interest of Prime Minister in the propaganda activities of the Central Press-Bureau 
could be explained by the fact that there was more political freedom in the country than in 
previous years and therefore it was easier to gain the trust of the people. In addition, the success 
of propaganda in a totalitarian state was seen as very beneficial for the Prime Minister who, 
during his time in office, often used the CPB to achieve his own personal ambitions as Prime 
Minister. 
Sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between Stojadinovic promoting himself in his 
role as Prime Minister and promoting the state. This tendency increased with time and 
Stojadinovic gained more power as a result of these circumstances. 
 After the fall of the Stojadinovic government in February 1939, The Central Press-
Bureau continued its propaganda work. The key tasks in this period were the formation of the 
Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement177 and the defense against hostile propaganda from abroad. The 
second task was more complicated as the situation in Europe deteriorated with the outbreak of 
World War II. The attitude of the government and its policy of “strict neutrality” were 
increasingly difficult to maintain as the number of countries who participated in World War II 
increased. Activity abroad was severely interrupted as a result of the war. 
                                                 
175 Earlier budget was 18 million dinars. According to one earlier report, it stayed unchanged until Stojadinovic’s 
government. 
176 It was about the items related to purchase of free railway tickets for the staff and some difference in the curse of 
the dinar that was previously conduct by the Ministry of Finance. 
177 The agreement between Stojadinovic’s successor Dragisa Cvetkovic (Драгиша Цветковић) and leader of Croat 
Peasant Party, Vladimir Machek (Vladimir Vlatko Maček) was made in August 1939. New Banovina Croatia was 
formed from earlier Sava and Primorska plus some parts of other banovinas. Machek also agree to participate in 




In 1940, there were some organizational changes in the CPB. These included the 
department for the implementation of press legislation, which was handed over to the Interior 
Ministry. This stripped the Central Press-Bureau one of its most important functions.178  
During the same year, some of their offices abroad were closed: in Paris, Brussels and 
Geneva. A correspondent from Paris was relocated to the Vichy, the center of Marshal Petain’s 
government. A new bureau was opened in Moscow as a result of improved relations between 
Yugoslavia and Russia. In the internal organization, the CPB Service for Minorities was formed 
and new correspondents in the border areas were located in this area. These special 
correspondents had a role to monitor what was written in the press so that it belonged to the 
representatives of minorities.  
This change was caused by the ambitions of the revisionist states in the region and the 
justified concerns that the Yugoslav regime had about these states. In this period, the institution 
of the Central Press-Bureau continued to gather information about the newspapers, press in 
general and journalists. They monitored 107 local newspapers, 25 daily and 82 others, while the 
clips from the press were taken from a total of 139 different newspapers.179 Before the end of its 
activity in the country, the Archive of CPB contained about 2,670 files of people and institutions 
as well as 7,000 in their newly formed library.180 
As explained earlier, The Central Press-Bureau preformed the role of The Ministry of 
propaganda in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, without officially being recognized for performing 
these tasks.  
 
Its role was carried out in two principal ways. Firstly, it controlled the press and radio and 
practiced censorship. These roles were actively carried out in co-operation with the Prosecutor's 
Offices and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Secondly, the CPB not only took responsibility for 
key political issues, but also for day-to-day non-political issues such as informing the public on 
all matters of national interest.  
                                                 
178 One of the regulations from Ministry of Foreign Affairs even predicted the transfer of the CPB’s correspondents 
abroad to this institution. It was not clear that really happened, but complaints from the CPB were noted. AY, 38-1. 
179 Centralni Pres-biro, Izveshtaj o radu za 1940.godinu, [Central Press-Bureau, Annual report for 1940], 
Administrative Section, p. 6. 
180 Ibid, p. 4. 
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Besides the Central Press-Bureau, there was the Press Office of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Party Press Bureau of JRZ. Those two institutions did propaganda work, but their 



























                                                 
181 More about Party Press Office of JRZ: B. Simic, ‘Partijski presbiro Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice’ (Party 






The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the 19th century. One 
of the key steps in that direction was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency 
(BTA) in 1898. The Office for the Press was first founded on  5 December  1913, with the 
mandate to coordinate propaganda activities in Bulgaria.182 In this period and later, in the 
Twenties main focus was on the foreign propaganda which was the result of the lost war and 
teritories that were considered bulgarian’s. At the beggining of the 1930’s main propaganda 
institutions were under control and supervision of the two different ministeries, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Ministry of Railways, Posts and Telegraphs  
 
Direction for the Press    Radio      
Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency   Distribution of the Press 
Press Department 




Important changes in the organization of the Bulgarian state  propaganda occured after a 
number of considerable political changes had taken place during the thirties.  
 
Significant change in propaganda organization came with the change of the regime in 
Bulgaria in 1934. Political circle Zveno came to power by military coup.183 State propaganda was 
one of the priorities of the new regimes and construction of one central propaganda institution 
                                                 
182 In the period in question the head of the Office was the journalist I. Herbst; the associates were young educated 
people who excelled in command of foreign languages. See I. Ilcev, Rodinata mi – prava ili ne [My real Motherland 
or not], (Sofia, 1995), p.148. 
183 More about Zveno see: V. Zadgorska, Krugat Zveno: 1927-1934 [The Circle “Zveno” 1927-1934], (Sofia,  2008); 
V. Migev, Utvarzdenie na monarhofashiskata diktatura v Balgaria 1934-1936 [Consolidation of the monarcho-
fascist dictatorship in Bulgaria 1934-1936], (Sofia, 1977), pp.25-75. 
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soon followed. Directorate for Social Renewal (Дирекция на обществената обнова) was 
established on 6 June 1934. It was subordinated directly to the Prime Minister. Its tasks were 
explained in the decree that followed three days later: a) to manage spiritual life of the country in 
the direction of unification and reconstruction and in the service of the state and nation, b) to 
work on raising the prestige of the nation, to follow the spiritual life abroad and inform about 
development and the needs of the Bulgarian material and spiritual culture, c) to participate in the 
organization of people in a one ideological nationwide group.184 
                                                 




The act of establishing the Directorate for Social Renewal published in State’s Journal on 9.June 1934. 
 
Above mentioned decree stipulates that the Directorate is funded from the budget which 
should be arranged to certain rules that should be subsequently adopted. This and the special 
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rules that precisely define the organization of the Directorate should be made by the government. 
The Directorate is managed by a Director, representing it in its relations with all state and 
municipal offices and directors of departments and forming a Standing Committee appointed by 
the Prime Minister. The selection and appointment of regular and part-time staff is the 
prerogative of the Director-General who shall submit separate applications for approval of the 
Prime Minister. The Directorate consists of a Secretariat, Internal and Foreign Service 
department with following functions: 
 
I Internal Service Department: 
a) Section 1 – Guiding the press: clarifying matters of government to the press to enable 
it to properly enlighten the public on the manifestations of state power. 
b) Section 2 – Control over the press; Pre-emptive censorship of all published material, 
stopping everything that undermines public order, security and morality. 
c) Section 3 - Public education: to penetrate with their forces in all environments, to 
cultivate a new spirit in the midst of sports and other organizations, to organize 
lectures, meetings, radio lectures, films and theater plays. 
 
II Foreign Service Department (Press Directory): 
a) Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA); 
b) Press and Information; 
c) Newspaper “La Bulgarie”.185 
 
Beside capital’s office there were some regional sections headed by directors. 
Those directors are also appointed directly by Prime Minister.186 Their tasks were to follow main 
instructions that were coming from Sofia. 
That, which characterize Directorate as a modern propaganda institute at the time is 
significant effort to educate and re-educate people. As an illustration we can see the following 
instructions found in the Prime Minister’s personal archive: 1. To impose in the minds of the 
citizen a new conceptions of state and government as the only ones who will push for progress; 
                                                 
185 Darjaven vestnik [State’s Journal], 9. June 1934, number. 54, p.938. 
186 Balgarski darjavni institucii 1879-1986 [Bulgarian State Institutions 1879-1986], (Sofia, 1987), p.80. 
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2. To impose and fortify faith in the creators of the state; 3. To suggest ways to achieve the 
spiritual content of the new citizen and the implementation of the new state. 4. To create the 
perfect image of this country to make this image a Fontana of inspiration, creativity and desire to 
creativity,  in ordinary life of the citizen, either in the concepts of creative cultural elite of the 
nation. 5. To suggest internal grouping of the citizens, submitting them to the spiritual renewal in 
order to create a creative and militant force of the new age. 6. To show the enemies of the 
National Revival - their methods and leaders.187 Along with the resurgence of cultural 
institutions, theaters and associations and distribution of printed propaganda materials, the 
primary role of the “spoken word” (agitators) was demanded, whom have to use as channels of 
propaganda “personal meetings, radio and traveling cinema of Ministry of Education”.188 
Although Nazi Germany model has its influence, the claim that the control over the press, 
radio, film and publishing was copy of Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry is at least questionable. 
According to Kiril Chukanov formulations such as “ideologically unified nationwide group” give 
some basis for reflection in this direction, but in reality, as will become clear in the one-year 
period of its existence, the Directorate is being built as a state institution with a relatively modest 
capabilities (but largely fully adequate for the Bulgarian conditions) mainly for domestic 
propaganda.189 The creators of the Directorate clearly found its role model primarily in Nazi 
Germany and in the Soviet Union. That is obvious in the document about the supervision and 
development of cinema in Bulgaria. Author of the text stresses the importance of propaganda in 
the film, points to the experience of Germany and the Soviet Union and requires supreme control 
over the development of this industry, very modern at the time.190  
It should be noted that throughout the period of the existence this propaganda center did 
not particularly moisture high human and financial resources. The number of the staff in capital 
and at regional level cannot be established with the precision, but in January - February 1935, 
when the institution was fully consolidated, did not exceed 140 - 150.191 
                                                 
187 Iz lichniya arhiv na Kimon Georgiev [From Kimon Georgiev’s personal Archive], edited by Anchova. K, 
Todorakova M, (Sofia, 2008),  p.71 
188 Ibid, p.71-72. 
189 K. Chukanov, Balgarska nacionalna propaganda i neinata institutionalizaciya (1934 – 1947 (Bulgarian national 
propaganda and its institutinalization from 1934 to 1947), unpublished BA, p.28. 
190 Centralen darjaven istoricheski arhiv [The Central State Historical Archives] (further on in the text CDA), fund  
232к, the unit of description 1, archival unit 20, pages 12-19. 
191 CDA, 232k-1-20. 
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Directorate for Social Renawal during its relatively short existence changed a few 
directors which indicate some changes in the ruling groups. The first director of the institution 
was Penchev Petko (Петко Пенчев), a longtime journalist, lawyer by profession and one of the 
founding member of the Zveno. In one of his first statements after taking the office Penchev 
clearly revealed the government's intentions and objectives of the new institution. On that 
occasion, said that “the Directorate has the task to create a new state of the new citizen.” On the 
question how that will be done he replied: “in the spirit of the state of discipline and social 
prosperity.”192 
Directorate from the very beginning formed with two separate parts. At the head of two 
were chiefs who answered the director of the institution. The first part, Department for the press, 
covered the propaganda, the domestic press, the organization of intellectual cooperation, the use 
of radio, film, books and all cultural organizations should organize Directorate (Press 
Department, Culture Department of the Ministry of Education, etc.). At the head of this 
directorate was Georgi Kulishev (Георги Кулишевь), an experienced journalist, director of 
several newspapers (Slovo, Svobodna rech, Makedoniya).193  
The second part, Department for Education and social reconstruction, had to do a more 
difficult work whose aim was organized people in one ideological group that will accept and 
spread new ideas of the regime. The head of this department was the writer Vladimir Polianov 
(Владимирь Поляновь).194 
Already established leaders in the Directorate have set certain rules of conduct. What 
particularly attracts attention is the definition of what is critic and what kind of criticism is 
allowed. At a meeting with all newspaper’s editors Penchev said that the criticism will be 
allowed but not destructive criticism but “loyal and constructive”. 195 By that clearly and 
unambiguously any possibility of critical writing were abolished. Writers and journalist were left 
only with a possibility to give suggestions for improving and expanding the impact of 
governmental propaganda. As a measure of control and a way to put aside any questions about 
what and how to write special meetings were scheduled every Thursday between the journalist 
and head of the Press Department, Kulishev. 
                                                 
192 Utrо, 14. June 1934. 
193  Ibid. 
194  Ibid. 
195  CDA, 232k-2-4/49 
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In September 1934 there was a change of name of Directorate and certain changes in its 
organization and function. Institution has received short name Renewal. New-old goal was to 
“prepare and organize a Bulgarian citizen, women and youth in the spirit of the new national 
conditions and social life.” Proclaimed objective should be achieved in the following ways:  
a) Education and organization of the Bulgarian citizen, citizen and youth in the spirit of 
selfless service to the state and nation, 
 b) Control of society's development, encouraging renewal and 
 c) The propagation of ideas and explanations of the new state.196 
The name change was accompanied by shift of directors. New head of the Renewal was 
Colonel Krum Kolev, manager of the Military Academy. Arrival of Kolev was justified by the 
fact that the Directorate required reorganization to become more active and more suited to 
perform the previously set objectives. After only a month he was substituted for Petar Popzlatev 
(Петър Попзлатев), reserve army major, the most influential head of Renewal in its history.  
He was very active and ambitions man also known as a good speaker. He introduced 
military discipline and put the sign on his office doors: “I do not have more than two minutes for 
any visitor”.197 In one of his speeches he stated apotesis of the regime: “The accomplishment of 
19th May is holy deed. Our goal is heroic, noble and lofty: to inspire the Bulgarian spirit to unite 
the Bulgarian people in a spiritual whole, to enable the maximum manifestations of spiritual and 
material forces of the Bulgarians, to perpetuate, finally, our Bulgarian historic mission.”198 
In one of his reports to the Prime Minister Toshev (Андрей Тошев) he explained his 
understanding of propaganda and work that has to be done by his institution: 
She, propaganda becomes more necessary today, in building a modern state system, 
where the hedge is transferred to an age to enter another state where men must have the 
courage and the courage to make something unpopular. Unpopular has to be prepared on 
time, and precisely formulated to be understandable by the people. To put nation before 
major events and challenges, is not a sign of wisdom and foresight. Therefore, people 
must be prepared not only politically and economically, but also psychologically to face 
the new facts of life.199 
                                                 
196 Darjaven vestnik [State’s Journal], number 161,  16. October 1935, p. 2433. 
197 P.Chinkov, Sega shte chuete nashiyt komentar [Now, You’re Going to Here Our Comment], (Sofia, 2001), p.266. 
198 P. Popzlatev, Volyata na naciyata [The Will of the People], (Sofia, 1934), p.47. 
199 CDA, 284К, description 3, archive unite 42, p. 5. 
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We can see that Popzlatev is well aware of the new tendencies in modern Europe. 
Propaganda is pretty much seen as a weapon which can be use to achieve goals of the new 
regime in Bulgaria like in some other, especially fascist countries. 
Organization gained his final shape in October 1934. The structure was as follows: 
 
I. Secretary 
II. Section “Propaganda” 
III. Section “Control and guiding of the press” 
IV. Section “National education” 
V. Section “Organization of the professions” 
VI. Section “Organization of the youth”200 
 
From this new structure we can see that new aim for Renewal was not only to spread 
regime’s propaganda but also to try to organize people in the different groups. As we can see 
special attentions is paid to the youth which was some kind of the trend in the contemporary 
Europe and neighboring countries.201 
During its short existence Renewal developed significant activity. Accents were both on 
printed and spoken word. There were published several propaganda brochures like speeches of 
the Prime Minister Kimon Georgiev’s “19. May and New State” and Popzlatev’s “New State and 
Workers” and “The Will of the Nation”. In one campaign in July, 70.000 sheets with the slogans 
were spread over the Sofia and province and even on city trams were placed propaganda 
boards.202 Renewal founded new newspapers like Novi dni (New Days) and Plamak (Flame) as 
instruments in the hand of the new regime.  
Lots of efforts were put in recruiting and instructing special orators and agitators. 
According to the some data available to the press in 1934 Renewal organized 3.062 meetings. Of 
these 2.527 with local speakers (82.5%) and 535 with speakers that are for the opportunity send 
from capital, Sofia (17.5%). Total costs of the organization were 127.838 levas, ie. the first 
group of 36.500 (28.5%) and for another 91.338 levas (71.5%).203 Special attentions were paid in 
                                                 
200 Darjaven vestnik [State’s Journal],  number 161,  16. October 1935, p.2433. 
201 For the Greek case see: M. Petrinaks, The Metaxas,  pp.18-26. 
202 K.Chukanov, Balgarska nacionalna, p.32. 
203 CDA, 232k-2-4/50. 
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the character of the new agitators. For them were to be selected only those: “who fanatically 
believe in new ideology, ones that have lively and passionate speech, in whom have been 
awoken the temper of fighter, and one who is ready to wear with all obstacles and difficult 
circumstances of our reality, the new cross apostleship.”204 
Considering that Bulgaria was mostly agriculture society Renewal made some plans for 
work in the country. It was planed that activist with the help of every mayor form action 
committee which supposed to consist of people of “competence” like: medics, teachers, priests, 
agronomists, representatives of patriotic organizations etc.205 
During 1935, The Renewal tried officially to establish cooperation with the Italian 
Ministry for Press and Propaganda. The Bulgarian propaganda institution was especially 
interested in the organization of radio and film propaganda206, but the cooperation didn’t have 
time to develop because the Renewal soon ceased to exist and their plans for future activities 
were terminated. 
According to official data the budget of Directorate was 5.306.000 levas. Of that for: 
salaries 860.919; for material expenses 789.327; and for office expenses 1.727.204 levas.207 We 
can say that were not huge foundation but we have to bear in mind that Renewal was institutions 
in the development and new for Bulgarian society. 
By the Order of 1 July 1935 the Directorate for Renewal has ceased to exist. That fact 
was explained by the need of the reorganization of this institution. The institution is abolished 
and its responsibilities are divided between various different institutions. The division was as 
follows: The organization of the youth was placed in the Minister Council; the Office for the 
Press and control of the Press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of national 
propaganda in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; Care about publics reading rooms, library, theater 
and cinema in the Ministry of National Education and care of professional organizations the 
Ministry of National Economy.208 We could conclude that Renewal was dissolved, at least partly 
because its foundation and work was tied to the Zveno political group that was overpowered in 
mid 1935 by the King Boris III. 
                                                 
204 K.Chukanov, Balgarska nacionalna, p.36. 
205 Ibid, p.35. 
206 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MinCulPop), Propaganda presso gli stati 
esteri 18.7, busta 38. 
207 Darjaven vestnik [State’s Journal], 8 October 1934 , number 154, p. 2348. 
208 Darjaven vestnik [State’s Journal], 1. July 1935.  
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With the above mentioned order it was has officially ceased to exist in a single 
centralized organization that is concerned about the organization of state propaganda in Bulgaria. 
Only at the beginning of the Second World War, the establishment of the Directorate, and then 
the Ministry for national propaganda actions related propaganda to return to an institution. 
Despite lacking of central propaganda institution in Bulgaria from 1935 to 1941 we 
cannot speak about lack of state’s propaganda influence. Indeed, the Council of Ministers did not 
had central institution, which combines functions of propaganda, ideological control and 
influence, but no one can speak o institutions and certainly not the “emptiness” of the impact of 
propaganda. All functions of Renewal had been taken by other government institutions, mostly 
inside of Ministry of Foreign affairs and Ministry Interior. There were among others Office for 
the Press, The Press Control, and Section “D” inside the Ministry Interior.  Using those 
institutions Council of the Ministers was able to filter information, not only by using of 
censorship, but with the selection of provided information, preventive and repressive 
surveillance of the information’s content, limited distribution of articles, advertisements and any 
other printed works. In the following pages it will be explained functions and structure of the 
most important propaganda institutions of the period. 
From second half of 1935 up to the begging of the World War Two the most prominent 
propaganda institution and with the most influence was Office for the Press, like in the early 
thirties. Its main task was foreign propaganda but influence over the domestic public opinion 
cannot be overseen. Beside Office for the Press there was also Press Control which main task 
was to oversee the press in the Bulgaria. 
 
 The structure of the Office for the Press was determined in 1937 by the Internal Manual 
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 Director of the Office for the Press was appointed by Minister of Foreign affairs and his 
direct link to the press. He was in charge of all activities of the institution and responsible for its 
work. The Secretariat and Departments had their own chiefs who were subordinate to the 
Director.  
 As we can see Office for the Press consisted of four departments: The Secretariat, 
Department for Information and Documentation, Department for the Press and Bulgarian 
Telegraphic Agency.210 While Secretariat was in charge of usual type of administrative business, 
the most important section of the Office was Department for Information and Documentation. Its 
main tasks were: a) to supply Bulgarian royal legacies and consulates abroad with the 
propaganda material: articles, brochures, books, photos, records, notes etc; b) to supply all 
individuals with necessary material, Bulgarians or others, who are writing, lecturing or do any 
other work for Bulgaria abroad; c) To take care of publishing and spreading of various 
publications which are meant to enlighten foreigners about Bulgarian society, Bulgarian culture 
and all development in the Bulgaria; d) to participate in making various international, collective 
or individual efforts, concerts, theatric production and similar, abroad; e) to follow Bulgarian 
cultural actions abroad, and foreign cultural actions in Bulgaria, and to give help, where is 
necessary; f) to carry necessary correspondence and to support relations with Bulgarian 
                                                 
209CDA, 325-1-162, Vnutreshen Pravilnik na Direkciya na pechata [Internal Manual of the Office for the Press]. 
210 More about Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency in the following chapter. 
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participants at the international congress abroad, likewise to international participants on in the 
Empire’s international congresses.211 
In addition, Department for Information and Documentation took over the archives and 
conducted Print Management: Political Archive, which has gathered in the foreign press, printed 
materials on Bulgaria and other important foreign publications in the field of international 
politics; Cultural Archives, where the stored information about cultural activities in the world of 
Bulgarians and foreigners in Bulgaria, and systematize information about the cultural activists 
who participated in important cultural events in the country, and the Biographical Archive, 
which collected personal data, both Bulgarians and foreigners, among others: politicians, writers 
and artists.212 
Wide range of powers that Department for Information and Documentation had in the 
sphere of state institutions of cultural diplomacy, like in today's promotions department and 
cultural institutes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also gave her specific tasks propaganda 
and espionage. Not surprisingly, therefore, that collected at the service of Information and 
Documentation of the database could be used not only in soft diplomacy. 
Third Department entitled Department for the Press had main task to follow on regular 
basis foreign press in the all matters considering Bulgaria. In the addition it had to publish 
following issues: 1. Review of the foreign press (cuts or short summaries of articles); 2. Official 
review of the foreign press (documents of foreign governments or high officials); 3. Reports on 
Balkan’s states; 4. Weekly report on Bulgarian capital and province press.213 
The institution during the thirties went in pace with time and improved its structure. The 
fact that the correspondents received orders to monitor and report on how the neighboring 
countries organized their propaganda structure implies that this was a matter of considerable 
importance. They were mostly asked to gather and send information on the technical 
organization of the institutions, means of control, the organization of the press and its 
activities.214 
 The activities of the Office for the Press were financed from the budget which was a part 
of the funds allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Attaches for the press who were 
                                                 
211 Same as footnote 208. 
212 Ibid, pp.4-5. 
213 Ibid, p.7. 
214 CDA, 325-1-162-254, The Order of the director of 6 November 1936 and AY, 38-141, Naredjenje shefa CPB 
Pov.C.P [The Order of the Chief of the CPB] No. 2322. 
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situated abroad received their salaries from the funds of the embassies and legations that 
employed them.  
During the 1930’s, the Office for the Press had five different directors: Ivan Popov215 
(Иван Владимиров Попов, 1925-1933), Todor Hristov216 (Тодор Христов, 1933-1934), 
Dimitar Naumov217 (Димитр Анастасов Наумов, 1935), Nikola Balabanov218 (Никола М. 
Балабанов, 1936-1938) and Georgi Serafimov219 (Георги Константинов Серафимов, 1938-
1940). All of the directors were well educated and with significant experience gained abroad and 
as one could see, the directors didn’t have a precise mandate and they were change according to 
the will of the ruling circles. For two of them, Balabanov and Naumov were the people that the 
King’s trusted most according to one report.220 It was important to underline that the directors of 
the Office for the Press were also directors of the official news agency, BTA.  
 
 The Press Control had a budget of round million levas per year. 
 
 
                                                 
215 Ivan Popov (1890-1940) was a diplomat and journalist.  He studied philology in France and Germany and law at 
the University of Sofia. Popov was a press representative in Bucharest (1923), worked in the Bulgarian Embassy in 
Budapest (1933-1935), was an ambassador in Belgrade (1937-1940), the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religions 
(1940-1942) and ambassador in Budapest (1944) where he committed suicide. His property was confiscated by the 
tribunal of the Socialist Bulgarian. Popov was rehabilitated in 1996. 
216 Todor Hristov (1890-1940) was a diplomat. He finished classical high school in Varna and was a teacher from 
1909 to 1912.  After finishing law, Hristov became an advocate in 1923. His started his diplomatic career in Vienna 
(1923-1924) and later continued in Berlin when he was press secretary and an attaché. In 1934, Hristov was the 
main secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934 and an ambassador in Berlin in 1935. Next year, he was 
transferred to Ankara. His diplomatic carrier and life ended while serving as an ambassador in Moscow in June 
1940. 
217 Dimitar Naumov (1893-?) was a diplomat. He finished French school in Istanbul and law in Sofia. From 1920, 
Naumov was one of the secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 1922 to 1924, he was secretary to the 
King’s office. From 1936, he was an ambassador in United States. 
218 Nikola Balabanov (1886-?) was a lawyer and diplomat. He finished law in Montpelier (France) and Sofia. From 
1912 to 1921, Balabanov was a judge in one of Sofia’s courts. He was a government agent to the Italian-Bulgarian 
Court of Arbitration in Rome from 1923 to 1930. Balabanov worked at embassies in Rome and Paris (1931-1935). 
In the second half of the 1930’s, Balabanov was an ambassador of Bulgaria in Prague (1938), Paris (1939) and 
Ankara (1943).  After the Second World War, he immigrated to the United States. 
219 Georgi Serafimov (1890-?) was a Bulgarian diplomat. He finished high school in Sofia and law in Nancy 
(France). He worked in one of the Sofia courts in 1920 and after one year, he went to Rotterdam (Netherlands) for 
diplomatic service. From 1940, he was secretary to the government, chief of staff to the Prime Minister from 1940 to 
1943. In 1944, Serafimov was chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He resigned at the beginning of 
1945. 
220 Arhiv na Balgarska telegrafska agenciya (BTA), box 1, Spravki za BTA, materiali za istoriyata na BTA…, 
Report made in  May 1952 for the account of the new socialist regime in Bulgaria.  
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The budget for Press control 1936-1939221 
 







  According to the claims of the correspondents of the CPB there was a considerable 
difference between financial means spent on activities regarding the propaganda in the country 
and abroad. The Government of the Prime Minister Kjoseivanov financed two daily papers 
(Dnes and La Parole Bulgare) and a few smaller provincial ones. Subventions to Dnes amounted 
to 100.000 levas per month.222 The financial means came from the special dispositional funds.223 
During the year of 1937 those expenditures amounted to 6 million levas.224 On the basis of the 
data offered, as well as on the basis of the structure and activities of the Office for the Press we 
can conclude that the Bulgarian authorities at the time focused more on propagandistic activities 
abroad. The propagandistic work of somewhat lower intensity in the country could, perhaps, be 
explained by the fact that the authoritarian regime in the country was already consolidated by the 
mid thirties.225 
                                                 
221 Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], 
(Sofia, 1937-1940), p.640. 
222 AY, 38-141, Izveshtaj dopisnika CPB Boshka Radovanovica od 15. januara 1937. godine [The Report of the 
CPB Correspondent Bosko Radovanovic of 15 January 1937]. The amount of these subventions grew to 120.000 
levas during 1937.   
223 According to the Kukolecin’s Leksikon the term dispositional fund is defined as follows: ,,special financial means 
proscribed by the budget in gross amount, with the order-issuing authority (the President, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, etc.) having a right  to manage the means freely for the purpose of achieving certain goals in accordance 
with their position. They are not obligated by law to answer for the public, or, in some cases, to anyone (secret 
dispositional funds)''. A. R. Miletic, ‘Zloupotreba budzeta u Kraljevini SHS’ [Abuse of the budget in the Kingdom 
SHS], Korupcija i razvoj moderne srpske drzave, (Belgrade, 2006), p.104. 
224 AY, 38-141, Izveshtaj dopisnika CPB Boshka Radovanovica od 15. januara 1937. godine [The Report of the 
CPB Correspondent Bosko Radovanovic of 15 January 1937]. 
225 For further details see V. Migev, Utvrzdavane na monarho-fashiskata diktatura v Balgaria 1934 -1936 [The 
Consolidation of the Monarcho-fascist dictatorship in Bulgaria 1934-1939], (Sofia, 1977). 
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 The Bulgarian Office for the Press, in comparison with Central Press-Bureau, had fewer 
employees. During 1936 their number was 77 and that number remained unchanged a few years 
later.226 The Press Control had only 19 clerks in 1939.227 This, no doubt, had to do with the 
difference in size of the two countries in question, as well as with a somewhat more difficult task 
that lay ahead of the CPB. 
 The proof that the obligations of the correspondents were far from insignificant is the 
extensive order of the head of the Office for the Press of the time, Nikola Balabanov, of 26 April 
1938 in which he enumerates the duties of the correspondents in detail on no less than five pages. 
It is interesting that the first of their various duties to be mentioned is learning foreign languages 
as a basic precondition for the fulfillment of the given tasks. Those orders were more developed 
instructions that were written in the above mentioned manual.228 Director Balabanov also 
stressed that every correspondent should be strictly obedient to the consul or representative of 
Bulgarian embassy and their action should be “always with the permission” of the later.229 The 
director also was seeking for ways to improve efficiency of his institution. In his order to all 
correspondents from 6. November 1935 he asked for data about foreign counterparts. In the order 
were specifically asked information about: a) how many directions and office press has in the 
country and who is in control of them; b) their organization (chief, personal, condition of the 
work etc.); c) what kind of publication they have; d) do they have secret press reviews. At the 
end he asked for one example of their publications.230 
 Although the Direction for the Press ardently fulfilled its duties throughout the thirties 
initiatives appeared for the establishment of a separate Ministry for Propaganda. The project of 
Venceslav Protic (Венцеслав Протич), the director of the government’s newspapers Dnes and 
La parole bulgare, of 22 November 1938 was made for Prime Minister Kjoseivanov. At the 
beginning he explained the propaganda organization in Italy, Yugoslavia and Romania. One 
could say that he didn’t have complete knowledge of the three countries organizations but his 
information was very reliable.  He assumed one institution with the three different sections: 
Organization of city and country youth, Section for national propaganda and culture and Section 
                                                 
226 Balgarskite darjavni, p.40. 
227 Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], 
(Sofia, 1937-1940), p.628. 
228 CDA, 325-1-162-44/48. 
229 Ibid, p.45. 
230 CDA, 176-20-56-254 
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for tourism. The most important part of this new direction would be Section for national 
propaganda and culture that should be divided in: press, radio, cinema and spoken word.231As a 
main ideal of government Protich saw nationalism which should “serve as opposition to 
communism, estate and partisanism”.232 Project also states that Office for the Press and BTA 
should be part of the newly founded institution. This suggestion mirror both personal initiative 
and a certain level of dissatisfaction with the work of propagandistic institutions, as well as the 
desire for their constant improvement and adapting. 
 Similar idea with could find also in the project of  Petar Lungov, president of capital’s 
journalist organization, in the following year. He also explained propaganda organizations in the 
contemporary Europe and expressed his regrets that Bulgaria “is one of few countries that didn’t 
build its propaganda organization.”233 In his paper he pointed out some flaws in the existing 
propaganda service especially the way of using radio and cinema. His suggestion was that new 
telegraph and news agency must be founded, formally independent but practically service of the 
government. He points out examples of Germany and Poland.234 It is interesting that he also 
praised the polish propaganda organizations in the sector of film making, underlining the role of 
the Polish Telegraph Agency. At the end he concludes that:  
Propaganda is now becoming weapon, equal in its force to the military and economic 
pressure. In the complicate system of this weapon, which one should be armed one 
nation, for to become victor in contemporary world crisis, spiritual weapon should not be 
forgotten. This weapon is forged by the service of propaganda. It is used not only to 
outside of the state, but also inside – and one, who do not forge that in time, risks losses, 
and both on internal and external front.235 
 All those suggestions did not take to immediately change of propaganda organizations 
but their impact could not be overseen. Lungov’s suggestions were given after the 
German/Soviet attack on Poland which only stressed necessity of change in propaganda 
organization. After only short period, as it is said earlier, did occurred, and state’s propaganda 
went to the higher level. 
                                                 
231 CDA, 176-20-56-46/50. 
232  Ibid. 
233 CDA, 176-20-56-46/1 
234 Ibid., p. 2. 
235 Ibid, p.7. 
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 The Service for Press Surveillance was established by the special decree in 1938. Basic 





 After the Second World War broke out the organization of propaganda in the three 
countries went through a considerable transformation. In the Poland we had even brief 
experiment with the Ministry of Information and Propaganda (Ministerstwo Informacji i 
Propagandy) which was formed on 2. September 1939. Head of the Ministry was Michal 
Grazynski (Michał Grażyński). Only dozen days before Nazi/Soviet occupation. There was no 
time for this institution to develop and work in the full capacity. After the occupation of 
Yugoslavia in 1941 the CPB ceased its operation in the country, which can be practically 
considered as the end of its work. The propagandistic organization which operated by the Royal 
Government in London, regarding the circumstances and the conditions, was considerably 
different. On the other hand, Bulgarian state propaganda became much better organized and got 
an even more prominent place in the state hierarchy. The Direction for National Propaganda 
(“Дирекция на националната пропаганда”) was founded on 4 April 1941. During 1944 it 
developed into the Ministry of Propaganda.236  The change of the state organization and social 
structure of the countries after the Second World War brought the organizational structure which 







The organization of the state propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 
1930’s was complex and somewhat difficult for a historian to construct due to a lack of sources. 
                                                 





In the state propaganda of the countries in question, one could find many similarities, but even 
more differences.  
Propaganda apparatus functioned in the two main directions: at home and abroad. The 
main task of internal propaganda was probably the control of information to the public. That was 
accomplished firstly by “filtration” of the news and secondly by censorship. As we saw control 
of information and censorship were part of the state propaganda of three countries. One could 
say that that was the primary objective of the propaganda organization. This task wasn’t easy 
because of existence of opposition that had been active in the whole period under the 
examination. Even under difficult circumstances, the opposition was very strong and that was 
true, especially during some period of time (Yugoslavia in 1938, Poland and Bulgaria in 1935). 
An even bigger problem for state propaganda was perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of 
interest within the ruling circle, from top to bottom, from government members to basic clerks. 
Vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were serious problems for the functioning of state propaganda 
organizations in these countries. In times of limited and restricted democracy, those problems 
were more acute and more frequent.  
One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the 
fact that key propaganda decisions were made within small groups of people, often within 
informal groups. The existing propaganda structures were only present to legalize decisions that 
had already been made. They were well financed and their job was one of the most valued in the 
administration.  
Offices for the Press existed in the countries under review and this was commonplace in 
contemporary Europe, as one could see in the preceding chapter. They were present in the every 
important ministry, but the important ones were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Interior Ministry. During this period, changes occurred that made all 
three countries different. Poland had the most autonomous press offices in the Council of 
Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of War until the end of this period. In 
interwar Yugoslavia, there was the creation of the Central Press Bureau and this meant that the 
press offices within Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry Interior became less important. 
Bulgaria was somewhere in between. At some point, Bulgaria had a central organization and 
offices for the press that functioned separately in the different ministries. 
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The Office for the Press within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled most of the 
foreign propaganda together with the embassies’ employees, foreign press correspondents and 
one of the national telegraph agencies. Judging by the budget levels, that couldn’t be fully 
established in my study due to secrecy from the governments, Poland spent the most money on 
foreign propaganda during the 1930’s. That was understandable, not only because Poland was 
the biggest of the three examined countries, but also due to a complex situation that was dictated 
by its geographic position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. 
There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in contemporary Germany and Italy. It 
was correct to say that some of the ideas and structural types in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
were copied from Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for 
Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry for National 
Culture). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such as 
cultural differences and that specific state’s political background. It is my personal opinion that 
fascist copies were made mainly because they seemed to work in practice in Germany and Italy 
and less for the political likes or dislikes of those regimes 
The tendency towards increasing centralization of the state propaganda organizations in 
Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also apparent in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 
1930’s, had a logical ending in the creation of separate propaganda ministries in Poland and 
Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, that ministry already unofficially existed in the 
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A news agency is basically a group of journalists, established to supply news 
organizations (newspapers, magazines and radio) with news. The oldest news agency was 
established in France in 1835 by a Parisian translator and advertising agent, Charles-Louis Havas 
as Agence Havas. Two of his employees, Bernhard Wolff and Paul Julius Reuter, later set up 
rival news agencies bearing their last names in Berlin (1849) and London (1851) respectively. In 
1853, in Turin, Guglielmo Stefani formed the Agenzia Stefani and this became the most 
important agency in the Kingdom of Italy and a set example was soon followed by the other 





THE NEWS AGENCIES IN 1930’s EUROPE 
 
 
 Over the years, news agencies became increasingly important and thus became more 
attractive to the governments. Generally in Europe in the 1930’s, one could find three different 
systems of relations between the news agencies and states: 
1. The system of free press, in which there were all private telegraph agencies, some of 
which were subsidized by the government and they had their own correspondents and special 
envoys in the publishing companies. Central government offices, which were additional to the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs only, had limited direct contact with the agencies. This applied to 
countries such as France, England, USA and Belgium. 
2. The system of controlled press in which the agencies operated as semi-governmental 
official agencies and their correspondents were located in major capital cities. The government 
authorities had an impact on the press and this system of controlled press was applied by such 
countries as Romania, Hungary and Turkey. 
3. The system of the led press. Institutions of news agencies were subordinated to the 
discipline of press exercised by the government and ruling parties. Members of the ruling circles 
                                                 
237 Chronologically the second world agency was American Associated Press established in 1848. 
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were the officials in the agencies and the agencies were instruments in the hands of the 
government. This was the case in the countries such as Italy, Germany, Soviet Union and 
Spain.238 
Over the years, news agencies began to cooperate with one another and it was necessary 
to define more precisely their obligations. In the late 1920’s and in the 1930’s, there were as 
many as thirty news agencies, in as many countries and these functioned as an unofficial World 
League of Press Associations for the exchange of news. Most of them were European countries 
except for USA, Canada, Japan and China.239 The majority of the countries represented in the 
world alliance had one or more news agencies in addition to their main agency, e.g. Great Britain 
had seven and Italy four other agencies240 and the exceptions were the smallest countries or 
countries where agencies were made official or semi-official.  
Initially, each agency was restricted to the sale of news entirely in its own country or in 
defined territories. At the London meeting in 1932 between the representatives of Reuters, 
Associated Press, Havas and Wolff241 agency, that arrangement was liberalized and any one of 
the agencies was permitted to sell its services independently to any newspaper or other clients 
wanting it in a country normally served by one of the other member agencies.242 
The four biggest agencies had arranged coverage for most of the world in the following 
way, with the exchange of news among them: 
Associated Press – United States, Central America and South America in co-operation 
with Havas; 
                                                 
238 E. Rudzinski, Informacyjne Agencje Prasowe w Polsce 1926-1939 [The Information News Agencies in Poland 
1926-1933], (Warsaw, 1970), pp.42-43. 
239 Members of the World League of Press Associations were: Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle (Austria), Agence 
Telegrapique Belge (Belgium), Bulgarska Telegrafska Agenciya (Bulgaria), Canadian Press, Ltd (Canada), Reuters, 
Branch of British Agency (China), Ceskoslovenska Tiskova Kancelar (Czechoslovakia), Ritzaus Bureau, Dansk 
telegrambureau (Denmark), Eesti Telegraafi Agentuur A.S. (Estonia), Finska Notisbyran (Finland), Agence Havas 
(France), Deutsches Nachrichten Buro G.m.b.h (Germany), Reuters, Ltd. (Great Britain), Agence d’Athenes 
(Greece), Magyar Tavirati Iroda (Hungary), Agenzia Stefani (Italy), Domei Tsushin Sha (Japan), Latvijas Telegrafa 
Agentura (Latvia), Agence Telegraphique Lithuanienne (Lithuania), Algemeen Nederlandsch Persbureau 
(Netherlands), Norske Telegrambzra (Norway), Polska Agencja Telegraficzna (Poland), Agence Havas, Branch of 
French Agency (Portugal), Telegrafnoje Agentstwo Ssojusa, TASS (Soviet Union), Agencia Telegrafica Fabra 
(Spain), Tidningarnas Telegrambyra (Sweden), Agence Telegraphique Suisse (Switzerland), Anodolu Ajansi 
(Turkey), Associated Press (U.S.A), Agencija Avala (Yugoslavia). 
240 Other British agencies were: British United Press Ltd, Central News Ltd, The Central Press Ltd, Exchange 
Telegraph Co. Ltd, Press Association Ltd, British Continental Press, London General Press and Italian were: 
Agenzia di Roma, Agenzia Volta, Agenzia Telegrafica Orientale, Radio Nazionale. 
241 Wolff became known in 1933 as the Deutsches nachrichten Buro (DNB). 
242 R.Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, (New York, 1937), p.68. 
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Reuters – Great Britain and the British Empire, the Netherlands, the Far East, Near East 
in co-operation with Havas; 
Havas – France, the French Colonies, Romanic countries of Europe, South America in 
the co-operation with the Associated Press and Near East in co-operation with Reuters; 
DNB – Germany and Austria.243 
The majority of news agencies in the 1930’s Europe were official or semi-official and the 
examples of official agencies were Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. In those countries, 
opposition or unwelcome views almost never received any publicity unless it was in the regime’s 
propaganda purposes as the news agencies were in fact the agencies of those governments.  
The situation with the semi-official agencies was a bit different but in many cases, it was 
not that diverse from the official ones. Most of the semi-official news agencies were tied to a 
government and subsidized by them and even the agencies that were declared as independent 
were at least partly propaganda organizations.  
All news agencies at some point co-operated with the government out of national loyalty 
and the agencies on occasion received exclusive news releases from their governments and in 
return, they provided the governments with advance copies of incoming foreign dispatches 
before distribution. This sometimes gave governments the opportunity to revise dispatches in 
accord with the official viewpoint and, in some cases, to withhold the news completely until a 
time that seemed more suitable for its release.244 
During the 1930’s, very few agencies could claim that they were free from the local 
governments and in his book from 1937, about the press and news agencies, Robert W. Desmond 
concluded that throughout the world, there were only twelve countries where newspapers “were 
free to speak without government permission, and from which foreign correspondents could send 
dispatches without official approval, however hidden or indirect. These countries were the 
United States, Great Britain, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa”.245  
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The organization of Bulgarian state propaganda started as early as the XIX century while 
the country was still under the rule of the Otoman empire. One of the key steps in that direction 
was the establishment of the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency (BTA) in 1898 and this was founded 
by the decree of King Ferdinand in the government of Konstantin Stoilov.246  
Initially, it was only the agency for delivering the telegrams about events abroad and the 
first bulletin was published on 16th February. The Agency was based on the model of the Russian 
Petersburg Telegraph Agency and unlike most news agencies at the time, which were private; 
BTA had the status of a special department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions 
(MVRI).  
In the early years, its purpose was to provide the Bulgarian media with information on 
domestic and international events. The main part of the items was evidence of life in European 
royal courts, crime news, and trade and exchange messages. In addition, the Agency provided 
information on events in the country to foreign telegraph agencies where initially, there were 
only five employees: director, his deputy, press clerk plus two collaborators in the technical 
area.247 
After the First World War, the BTA signed new contracts with the most important news 
agencies like Havas, Reuters, Wolf and Stefani. The main tasks in that period was to: to maintain 
contact with Europe’s largest agencies, to protect the Bulgarian national cause abroad, to fight 
against negative foreign propaganda about Bulgaria and to inform the foreign press about the 
situation in the country.248 To ensure that the aforementioned measures were taken from 1921, 
the BTA published two bulletins, one in Bulgarian and the other in French. 
The situation in the BTA in the late 1920’s was not satisfactory. Some concerns were 
expressed in a note written by the director for the Press in December 1929 as Director Popov 
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urged for the separation of the BTA and to formally make it a private agency on commercial 
grounds with the aim to improve its role in the state propaganda. Besides the obvious reasons, 
Popov stated one other reason: “Especially for one small and weak country like ours, this is of 
great importance, because, when a telegraph agency is official, the responsibility for all its 
telegrams which are unfavorable for some countries lies with the official government…”249  
At the end of the passage, Popov asked a very interesting question: “How many times has 
the BTA missed an opportunity to publish some interesting and useful news because it was 
unpleasant to this or that neighboring country! Is this a weakness?”250 From the point of view of 
state propaganda, this was a valid point.  
At this time in Europe, state propaganda tasks were becoming increasingly more 
demanding and complicated and the official news agencies were always marked and sometimes 
treated with distrust. Nevertheless, Bulgaria didn’t follow the proposed measures and remained 
one of the few countries with a state news agency during the Interwar period. 
In 1930, the BTA was one of the three sections of the Press department, together with the 
sections for the Press and Documentation. One positive was made when the self writing radio 
receiving set “Hal” was formed in 1932 and those sets were rented from agencies like Reuters, 
Havas, GTA and Stefani. The Press department was renamed the “Press section” and it 
functioned within the framework of Ministry of Foreign Affairs with three separate departments 
– BTA, Press and information and Documentation where the number of employers varied from 
16 to 39 people.251  
After the coup d’état in 1934, official censorship was introduced which was reflected by 
the short existence of committee of censors within the BTA.252 In 1936, the BTA was 
reorganized again where the Office for the Press was re-established with three sections – the 
BTA, Press service and Information and documentation and the only formal change was the 
renaming of the Documentation section into “Information and documentation”. 
Important changes in the organization of the Bulgarian state  propaganda took place after 
there were a number of considerable political changes during the 1930’s. This resulted, amongst 
                                                 
249 Arhiv na Balgarska telegrafska agenciya (BTA), box 1, Spravki za BTA, materiali za istoriyata na BTA…, Iz 
dokladna zapiska na direktora na pechata do glavniya sekretar na Ministerstvona Vashnite raboti [From the note of 
director for the Press addressed to secretary general of Ministry of Foreign Affairs], p.2. 
250 Ibid. 
251 I.Kalcheva, Balgarska telegrafna agenciya (1898-1944) [Bulgarian Telegraph Agency 1898-1944], unpublished 
BA thesis from Faculty of Journalism, (Sofia, 1975), p.54. 
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other things, in the BTA’s switching its subordination to the Office for the Press and the 
structure and the obligations of this instituition were set by the Book of Regulations from 1937, 
which organized the division into the Secreteriat, the Department for Information and 
Documentation and the BTA.  
 




OF THE OFFICE 













With this structure, the institutions lasted until the fall of the Monarchy in September 
1944 and the number of employees increased to 77.253 
In 1937, the BTA issued three bulletins per day in both languages – Bulgarian and French 
and since 1938, the agency issued supplements like the “Daily news” and “Economy 
informational bulletin”. From 1937-1938, information from the TASS (the Soviet Telegraph 
Agency) was accepted only after explicit order and new regulations of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ Press Department were introduced in 1937. All sections reported to a press director who 
reported the more important problems to the Minister of foreign and religious affairs and carried 
out the orders given by the minister. 
The director maintained contact between the ministry and local press and gave 
information to the foreign correspondents in Bulgaria. According to the new regulations, the 
BTA should inform the government, press and its subscribers of events taking place abroad and 
in addition, it had to spread the news from Bulgaria to other countries throughout the foreign 
agencies, its correspondents, the Bulgarian diplomatic services and to provide financial and 
economical news to its subscribers.  
 The BTA’s staff consisted of a chief and redactors working in two shifts. The press 
director, by common consent, with the chief of the service assigned a senior redactor for the 
                                                 
253 Balgarskite darjavni institucii, p.39. 
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redactor of BTA bulletins and the latter had to manage the work of his shift, to redact the bulletin 
and to supervise the work of the redactors. In 1938, the BTA extended the number of foreign 
agencies with whom it had links and in 1942, a new transformation of Press Department was 
made and as a result, the Department was charged with additional tasks referring to foreign 
propaganda.  
As a proof of the development of the BTA, one could find one letter from 1937, probably 
written by the director of the Press Office. In that letter, the author explained the need for 10 
more clerks due to the increased workload for the Press Office and BTA. According to the 
director with the existing number of BTA clerks, it was “not possible anymore to follow all 
transmissions and use them for BTA bulletins”.254 In this letter to the Budget department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, many reforms of the organization were proposed, but some of them 
weren’t accepted like increasing the number of shifts for BTA that remained at two; day and 
night. 
The Radio service of the BTA was of crucial importance for the work of this institution 
and for regulating obligations of the employees, one manual was published in May 1938. This 
manual stated working hours of 20 hours per day, from 07:00 until 03:00 the next day and the 
service was carried out in three shifts, from 07:00 to 13:00, from 13:00 to 19:00 and from 19:00 
to 03:00. One could see that the third shift was the longest and lasted 8 hours against 6 hours for 
the previous two shifts. Documents from the late 1930’s showed a very busy schedule of the 
BTA telegraphers and in some cases in 1939, there were receptions of transmissions from 7 pm 
until 4:15 am with the most transmissions being from Havas, Reuters, DNB and Stefani and 
according to telegraphers, Havas had the best quality of sound reception.255 
The new manual for the Press Office was issued in July 1937 and this regulated the 
position and the tasks of the BTA (articles 21 to 31). According to the first article dedicated to 
the BTA, its tasks were: to notify government, press and subscribers about the situation abroad, 
to spread news from Bulgaria by foreign news agencies and with its own correspondents and 
state’s consulates, and to give economic and financial news to its subscribers.256 The main 
obligation of the BTA was to usually publish three bulletins per day, at 13, 19 and one hour after 
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midnight and these bulletins were in Bulgarian and French. In the holiday period, its numbers 
were reduced to two and on Sundays, only one bulletin was published. During the whole year, 
there were only three days when the BTA was not supposed to publish bulletins: 1st January and 
the first days of Christmas and Easter.257  
The number of pages of the BTA bulletins constantly increased during the years as 
illustrated in the table below: 
 
BTA bulletins during the 1930’s (number of pages per year)258 
 










The BTA also published the special bulletins that were secret and limited to a small 
group of people. In 1934, the top secret bulletin named T-4 was published and only four people 
were supposed to receive this bulletin: The King, Prime Minister, Director of Office for the Press 
and for the Archive. This was similar to the bulletin T-3 which was published in the late 1930’s 
for the King, Prime Minister and Archive of Office for the Press. However, the T-3 content was 
unpleasant for Bulgaria as it was received by radio and published in the press.259 In 1935, the 
Hors bulletin was founded in which unfavorable telegrams concerning Bulgaria were published. 
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The economic service of the BTA was one of its important tasks and this was taken on a 
higher level in September 1938 when the daily publishing of the “economic bulletin” was 
initiated. This bulletin contained the most important news from foreign markets and bursas and 
at the same time, the bulletin Daily News (Дневни вести) was founded.260 
In 1939, the BTA arranged to receive its news from the Soviet Union agency TASS, but 
this was not used very often due to mistrust between the two governments. The situation, of 
course became significantly different after 1944 when a Communist regime was formed in 
Bulgaria. 
The budget of the BTA was difficult to determine because of the lack of sources, but it 
was known that this was part of the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religions. The 
ministry was, of course very cumbersome and complex with 412 employees in 1939 compared 
with 70 at the BTA.261 
During the 1930’s, the BTA reported to the Office for the Press and that meant that the 
chiefs of the Office for the Press were also heads of the BTA. Of the five directors, the most 
important ones were Balabanov and Serafimov who headed the office in the second half of the 
1930’s and the most important changes and improvements were made to both offices during this 
period. 262 
 The Bulgarian Telegraph Agency remained part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even 
in the Communist Bulgarian until 1951 when it became an independent institution. Under the 









                                                 
260100 godini Balgarska telegrafska agenciya [100 Years of Bulgarian Telegraph Agency], (Sofia, 1998), without 
page numbers. 
261 Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], 
(Sofia, 1937-1940), p.640. 






  The Yugoslav Avala Agency was formed in September 1919 after the foundation of 
Yugoslavia (at that time known as the Kingdome of Serbian, Croatians and Slovenians). Initially, 
French journalist Albert Mousset was in charge of this organization263 and he was a friend of 
King Alexandar Karadjordjevic. He remained in this position until 1927 when he left under 
suspicious circumstances.264 From 1920, the agency began to receive news from some European 
capitals (Paris, Bern, Athens, Madrid) and started to develop its international network. In the first 
phase of its development, Avala was under the Press Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and French was the official language of the agency. 
In the late 1920’s, the news agency in Yugoslavia, like in Bulgaria, started to fall behind 
the leading European agencies and this was proved by the letter written in 1929 which urged for 
the necessary changes in the work of the Avala. As mentioned earlier, alongside Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had state news agencies that were inappropriate for efficient state 
propaganda. About the situation in Avala Agency in the late 1920’s, the report said:  
“As an official agency, Agency Avala is not capable of satisfying the all needs of modern 
journalism, and even less so in the service of state propaganda. This agency is at the 
bottom, while other agencies, even officials, have their statutes and programs, agency 
Avala does not have any statute, program, and no specified duties. Agency Avala is, 
because of poor expertise and slow control carried out on its work, doomed to be late 
with the news and this is why other agencies are often unsatisfied with its work”.265 
 
                                                 
263 Albert Mousset (Paris, 1883-1975) was a journalist and historian. In 1908, he finished the school for archives. He 
was a librarian trainee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of the Committee for the publication of 
documents relating to the origins of the war of 1870-1871 and in charge of courses at the l'école des Hautes études 
hispaniques, attached to the Embassy of France in Madrid. In addition, he was the founder and editor of the 
magazine Affaires étrangères (Foreign Affairs). 
264 According to the Yugoslav writer Vuk Dragovic, Mousset maintained some relations with the French military 
and one letter considering that matter was found. V.Dragovic, Srpska stampa izmedju dva rata, Osnova za 
bibliografiju srpske periodike 1915-1945 [Serbian Press between Two Wars, Basis for Biblograpfy of Serbian 
Press], (Belgrade, 1956), p.380. 
265 AY, Personal Collection of Vojislav Jovanovic Marambo (335), box 74. 
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Remarks made in letter weren’t far from the truth. The reorganization of Avala began in 
June 1929 when the agency left the jurisdiction of the Press Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and become a joint stock company with capital of 5 million dinars. The state 
bought the vast majority of stocks, 9,540 out of a possible 10,000. Others were bought by the 
administration of the biggest newspapers in Yugoslavia266, but the reorganization was not easy 
task. The contract between the state and the agency was signed in May 1930 and the first 
payment was made in April 1930.267 The contract regulated relations and proscribed obligations 
between them and the first four articles were about the obligations of Avala: 
1) To do its information and journalistic services regarding the general public interest of 
the state; 
2) To publish official declarations, to deliver them to the newspapers in the country and 
abroad, 
3) To make denial for all writings harmful for the state’s interests, with the right to 
underline its jurisdiction whilst doing it; 
4) To deliver its bulletins to the government members, free of charge.268 
 
The most important obligation of the state was to pay five million dinars to the agency for 
the costs of its operations. The contract was signed for five years with the automatic renewal for 
another five if one of the parties chose not to cancel it. The manual of the work of the Avala 
agency defined the structure and functions of the company and it was interesting to note that the 
contract was signed on the government’s behalf by Milan Marjanovic, chief of the Central Press-
Bureau. This fact only underlined already mentioned things about the importance of the CPB as 
the central state propaganda institution in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia. 
The central propaganda institutions were tightly connected with the state telegraphic and 
press agencies where the Yugoslav agency Avala ceased to operate under the authority of the 
Office for the Press of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it became a joint-stock company in 
June 1929.   
                                                 
266 Najnovija faza u razoju Agencije Avala [The Newest Phase in Development of Avala Agency], (Belgrade, 1937), 
p.7. 
267 Until 1st April 1930, the Agency managed to spend 3,750,000 dinars of the original capital invested by the state.  
268 AY, 37-75-37, The Contract between the Yugoslav state and Avala Agency A.D. 
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However, this transformation was regarded more as a formal than as a real one as the 
state owned more than 90 % of the overall stocks.269 The cooperation of the Agency with the 
CPB was, in the words of its general manager at the time, “extensive” and “harmonic”.270  
The difference in organization between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian institutions was 
mirrored by the fact that the correspondents of the Office for the Press were at the same time 
correspondents of the BTA, whereas the Avala agency had its own correspondents. Nevertheless, 
the number of these correspondents was reduced and, after a period of time, the majority of the 
remaining ones were, after all, those of the CPB.271  
It might be interesting to mention that both agencies published their own bulletins three 
times per day in their official languages and in French. If we leave aside certain differences in 
structure, one could, nonetheless, discern common activities and goals of the news agencies and 
of the central propagandistic institutions in question. In the aforementioned report of the director 
of the Avala Agency, Svetislav Petrovic, wrote that “even in those exceptionally rare cases when 
disagreements occur, they are always resolved in an easy and friendly manner between the Chief 
of the Central Press-Bureau and the director of the Avala Agency. 
The work of agency was intensive and constantly growing over the years. The following 
table illustrated the level of activity during the 1930’s: 
 
Avala Agency - The number of received words per year 
 






Source: Izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije Avala (The report of Governing Board of Avala Agency), p.33. 
 
                                                 
269 Najnovija faza..., p. 6. 
270 Ibid, Izveshtaj direktora Agencije Avala Svetislava Petrovica iz 1937 godine [The Report of the Director of the 
“Avala” Agency, Svetislav Petrovic, from 1937]. 
271 The correspondent from Vienna was recalled in 1937; the following year, the same thing happened to the 
correspondents of the “Avala” Agency from Sofia and Paris. Godishnji izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije 
„Avala” А.D. o radu u1937. godini [Yearly Report about the work in 1937 to the Governing Body of Avala Agency 
A.D.], (Belgrade, 1938), p.34. 
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According to the same data, the number of the words in the first three months in 1938 
was 3,151,000 and that was sign of improvement considering what happened in previous years. 
It was important to mention that, in comparison to the CPB, the Agency did not have the 
instruments to ensure that the newspapers published the received information.  
At this point, one had to examine the structure of the Avala during the period under 
review. The stricture of the agency during the late 1930’s consisted of a headquarters in Belgrade 
and special sections in Zagreb, Ljubljana and Novi Sad. For a clearer picture, see the illustration 
below: 
 
Avala Personnel at the beginning of 1938 
 
HEADQUARTERS (BELGRADE) 
Director   1 
Editor in chief   1 
Editors    4 
Acting editors   2 
Chief of sections  1 
Relocated correspondents 2 
Acting chief of services 1 
Secretary   1 
Associates   16 
Treasurer   1 
Administrative clerks  10 
Typists   11 
Radio telegraphers  2 
Chief of personal  1 
Additional personal  22 
Cleaning stuff   2 
Total    87 
ZAGREB 
Editor in chief   1 
Associates   2 
Clerk    1 
Typists   2 
Radio telegraphers  4 
Additional personal  5 
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Total    15 
LJUBLJANA 
Acting editor in chief  1 
Associates   1 
Clerks    1 
Typist    1 
Radio telegraphers  3 
Additional personal  1 
Total    8 
NOVI SAD 
Editor in chief   1 
Associate   1 
Clerks    1 
Typist    1 
Radio telegraphers  2 
Additional personal  1 
Total    7 
 
CORRESPONDENTS FROM ABROAD 
Correspondent from Tirana 1 
 
TOTAL   118 
 
From the above table, one could see that 87 of the employees (74%) were based at the 
headquarters in Belgrade. One could also conclude that the agencies outposts were the only 
services at the specific locations. In different areas of the country, these outposts also had 
different responsibilities and having been only responsible for the territory of the Drava 
Banovina, the section in Ljubljana published and delivered all of its material in Slovenian. This 
was due to a fact that all the leading newspapers in Slovenia were published in that language.272 
In Novi Sad, the city with the largest number of newspapers in languages of minorities, 
its section had specific duties and responsibilities. The city was capital of the Danube Banovina 
where six daily newspapers in languages of minorities were published and this gave this Avala 
section a special, “national and promotional” mission. Agency staff noted that the developed 
minority press often delivered news from foreign sources in the absence of domestic information.  
                                                 
272 Ljubljana six daily newspapers in languages of minorities had four daily newspapers in Slovenian: Jutro 
(Morning), Slovenec (Slovenian), Slovenski dom  (Slovenian Home) and Slovenski narod (Slovenian Folk). 
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This was not in the interest of the government so an effort was made to upgrade the work 
of Novi Sad’s Avala section. This progress could be illustrated by the fact that the quality of 
reporting operations in 1935 was deemed to be” primitive”, but in 1937, this service had been 
deemed in every way to have reached the “required standard”273. In total, the bureau had only 
nine subscribers, of which five were minority press (three Hungarian and two German), one was 
a newspaper in Serbian, Dan and three government institutions. 
 In addition to the existing outposts in the country in 1937 one was also formed in Skopje, 
the capital of Vardar Banovina. The service was provided only by one editor, one associate, one 
radio telegrapher and one servant, but this bureau ceased to operate after only four months 
because it did not meet “certain expectations”.274 Although the specific reasons were not 
revealed, one could assume that financial reasons were the most important issues. 
 In the late 1930’s, several correspondents from abroad were withdrawn due to financial 
reasons and during 1937, correspondents from Paris, Vienna and Sofia were also withdrawn. As 
one could see above, the only remaining foreign correspondent was left in Tirana, the capital of 
Albania, which could be linked to some suggestions made by the CPB correspondent.275 
The director of agency had very important and multiple duties, but he had three main 
tasks:  
 1) Chief of finance;  
2) Editor in chief (especially in the political news area) and  
3) Literally, the corrector of all bulletins.  
This unusual concentration of duties with one person made the post of director vital for 
the agency’s work. During its existence, Avala (1919-1941) had eight different directors and all 
of them were journalists with Albert Mousset being the longest serving director from 1919-1927. 
Other directors were Serbs, the most prominent of whom being Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the 
director in 1937 and 1938. Jovanovic was a highly experienced journalist who was, amongst 
other things, the Chief of the Publishing section of the CPB, founder and editor in chief of 
                                                 
273 Izveshtaj UO AA, Izveshtaj dopisnishtva u Novom Sadu, p.73 
274 Ibid, p.35. 
275 AY, 38-22. CPB correspondent from Tirana made several suggestions about the necessity that Avala must 
attempt to achieve the broadest influence in Albania and to counterpart rising Italian influence. 
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several important newspapers like Vardar or Samouprava, the main organ of the government 
party.276  
Under his management agency, finances were stabilized and there were recorded 
improvements in the other working activities of Avala. During this period, the agency became 
the key source for information coming from abroad and in his report from 1938, Jovanovic 
proudly underlined that Avala was the sole source of news for the domestic press regarding the 
Prime Minister Stojadinovic’s visit to Germany in January 1938.277 It became clear how 
important this was for the state propaganda to be the only source of the news for domestic public 
opinion about sensitive events such as the official visit to Hitler’s Nazi Germany.278 
The financial aspect of the Avala work was one of the most fragile points of its affairs 
and for a clearer understanding of the way the Avala Agency did business, one should examine 
its accounts: 
 
Balance of Avala Agency on 31
st
 December 1937 
 
Table of outcome 
 
Expenses   
Payment at headquarters 2,703,313.97  
Fees 191,556.00  
Telephone expenses 181,116.00  
Telegraph expenses 44,146.50  
Payment of correspondents abroad 376,288.08  
Telegraph and telephone expenses of correspondents 23,203.90  
Expenses of radio service 4,925.50  
                                                 
276 Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic (Smederevo, 1898 – Belgrade, 1966) was raised by his uncle, whose surname 
Stoimirovic he took gratefully. Jovanovic began his journalist career in the most important newspaper Politika in 
1919. He was editor in chief of Samouprava (1921-1923) and press attaché in the Yugoslav embassy in Berlin. 
During the 1930’s, Jovanovic was publisher and editor of Vardar and worked in the Central Press Bureau. Before 
the Second World War, he was chief of the Political Section of Council of Ministers. In the short April war in 
Yugoslavia, he was a common soldier and during the occupation, he was a director of State Archive and editor in 
chief of the newspaper Obnova (Renewal). He was sentenced for 15 years imprisonment by the new Communist 
government. Jovanovic left a lot of unpublished work that is currently kept by the Archives of Matica srpska in Novi 
Sad and the Archives of the city of Smederevo. 
277 Godishnji izveshtaj Upravnog odbora Agencije „Avala” А.D. o radu u1937 godini [Yearly Report about the 
work in 1937 to the Governing Body of Avala Agency A.D.], Belgrade 1938, p.14. 
 
278 During the visit, Jovanovic, as well as the chief of the CPB Lukovic, was highly decorated by Hitler himself. 
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Office material 189,828.58  
Subscription to foreign agencies 399,215.27 4,113,593.80 
Expenses of outposts   
Zagreb 597,092.36  
Ljubljana 425,835.87  
Novi Sad 208,395.45  
Skopje 126,216.12 1,357,539.80 
Bonuses of the Boards and travelling expenses   
Watching duties of members of Governing Body 66,000.00  
Sessions of Governing Body 83,900.00  
Travelling expenses of Governing Body 39,053.00  
Sessions of Supervisory Board 9,600.00  
Clerk’s travelling expenses 98,240.15 296,793.15 
Various expenses   
Rent, fuel, power, official taxes, hospital taxes etc.  906,186.04 
State and communal taxes  193,500.00 
Write-off   
10 % of radio station and furniture  183,085.80 
Losses from 1936  376,164.94 
Total  7,426,863.53 
 
 
Table of income 
 
Subscription   
Contract with Yugoslavian state  5,000,000.00 
Income of Headquarters   
Bulletins, different courses and subscription in Belgrade 
for news 
 930,554.25 
Income of Outposts   
Zagreb 513,070.00  
Ljubljana 250,799.50  
Novi Sad 190,252.00  
Skopje     40,500.00 994,621.50 
Loss  501,687.78 
Total  7,426,863.53 
 Source: Report of Overseeing Board of Avala Agency, pp.116–117. 
 
From the numbers above, one could see that the loss of 376,164.94 from 1936 grew to 
501,687.78 in 1937.  Making losses was linked especially to the outposts where one of those 
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outposts, Ljubljana had doubled the amount of expenditure over income while in Skopje, Avala 
had tripled the amount of expenditure over income. Nevertheless, the overall state income of five 
million dinars remained unchanged. 
As stated earlier, Avala only delivered its confidential newsletter to those people 
approved by the government. In the late 1930’s, that decision was made by the Prime Minister 
Milan Stojadinovic and from one document, one could see that Stojadinovic delivered a list of 
names to the president of the Supervisory Board Stijepo Kobasica and from that list, one could 
also see what institutions and what people the Prime Minister considered to be crucial for the 
functioning of the state.  
On the list were regents, several ministers and chiefs of staff, plus representatives of the 
General Staff and the CPB and279 it should be noted that among them were four military officers 
- Chief of the General Staff, the King's aide, Chief of Intelligence Department and head of the 
Operational department. It is interesting to say that the Stojadinovic confidential bulletins were 
delivered to the both the heads of his cabinets Jovan Gasic and Dragan Protic.280 
For this work, it is also important to note how the profit that came from the Avala agency 
work was to be used. The profit was used in the following ways: 
- 1/3 for the promotion of tourism, as decided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry;  
- 1/3 for general advertising purposes, according to the decisions of the Central Press 
Bureau; 
- 1/3 by the conclusion of the Governing Board at the General Assembly - primarily for 
economic propaganda. 
From these figures, the role Avala gained an, but in addition, part of the income was 
required for propaganda funding. As one could see, one-third of the income was directed for 
propaganda, especially economic propaganda. 
One of the biggest problems for the agency during this period was the issue of import and 
distribution of foreign newspapers and magazines at home. That concession was sought and 
received from the state in 1932 and according to the license of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry; the agency was required to establish a special department for the import of foreign 
                                                 
279 The list has 17 names. 
280 Gasic was the chief of cabinet of the Prime Minister and Protic chief of cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
which was Stojadinovic from 1935 to 1939. 
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magazines and newspapers with separate accounting. Since the newly established department 
recorded only losses, it was decided to reorganize it along with the society Putnik.  
For this goal, it formed a separate department which was supposed to lead the Governing 
Board and which composed of seven members. Those members were both directors of Avala and 
Putnik, one of the members of Governing board of both societies and representatives of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry plus the Council of Ministers. The new established department 
was named the Department for Transport of Foreign Newspapers and Magazines and it was 
officially formed in March 1933.281  
In addition to the Avala problems, there was also dissatisfaction with the allocation of 
profits between the agency and Putnik and the battle for changing the existing contract lasted 
several years. After resuming the place of the agency's director Milan Jovanovic, Stoimirovic 
immediately started the process to review existing contracts and in his address to the Assembly 
of the agency, he requested the return of the concession or to terminate the contract. 282  
In his words, the realized profit agency received only a sixth part and that this contract 
represented more harm than good and long-term efforts in this direction were only completed in 
1940 when the contract was terminated, thus the harmful contract was valid during the whole 
period under review. 
During this period, a publishing company Hachette had a monopoly over almost the 
entire French press, thus Avala was obligated to conclude a contract with it for the import and 
distribution of all newspapers and publications in French and English, including those issued in 
those countries. The contract was concluded in December 1932 and according to Avala, the 
agency received very little from this contract, but was heavily obligated. In his report, the lawyer 
of Avala Andrija Petrovic Njegos characterized the contract as “a series of Hachette’s rights and 
of numerous responsibilities of Avala”.283 Despite these complaints, the agency continued its 
relations with the French company over many years.  
In order to comprehend the amount of the potential impact of the importation of foreign 
newspapers, the following information was very useful. During 1937, the total number of 
imported newspapers was: 197 daily and weekly political newspapers, 531 illustrated and other 
                                                 
281 Najnovija faza…, Izveshtaj advokata Avale A.D, pp.95-96. 
282 Istorijski Arhiv Smedereva [Historical Archive of city of Smederevo], Zaostavshtina Milana Jovanovica 
Stoimirovica (The letters of Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic), box number 10. 
283 Ibid, p.96. 
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magazines and 217 journals of various modern journals. Most newspapers were imported from 
Germany, France and Austria. From the table below, one could see what the import from each 
country was separately. 
 
 
Imported Newspapers and Magazines in Yugoslavia during the 
1937 
 











United Kingdome 93 
Other 26 
Source: Izveshtaj UO AA, Izveshtaj Odeljenja za promet stranih chasopisa, p.93. 
 
One could assume therefore that after the Anschluss in 1938, the co-operation with 
Germany (now including territory of former Austria) was even stronger and that the number of 
imported newspapers and magazines from Germany was by far the largest, which coincided with 
the growing economic and political co-operation of the late 1930’s. The number of magazines in 




The biggest problem of Avala throughout its existence was due to finance and after 
assuming the role of director in 1935, Svetislav Petrovic complained to the Assembly that he 
found the agency in deep debt. Although that he hinted in his reports about the consolidation of 
the company under his leadership, the reality was different and his successor Stoimirovic stated 
that when he took the post of Director, he found out that there was only 1,500 dinars in cash and 
that “debts were on all sides”.284 His investigations into the finances shown a number of 
irregularities, such as tardiness, sloppy bookkeeping, unpaid taxes and more and the measures 
that he had taken, improved the financial situation, but losses were still made in future years.  
Agency Avala formally ceased to exist after the German occupation of Yugoslavia and 
the announcement of the liquidation had been published (for the third time) in the Opshtinskim 















                                                 
284 Izveshtaj direktora Avale podnesen IX redovnom zboru akcionara 30.aprila 1938 [Yearly report of the director of 
Avala to the Assembly of shareholders in April 1938], Godishnji izveshtaj UO AA o radu 1937.godine, p.10. 







The Polish telegraph agency (Polska Agencja Telegraficzna, PAT) was founded last of 
the three in December 1918, shortly after the new state was proclaimed. The agency was to be 
subordinated to the Council of Ministers as an official press and news agency. 
According to the regulations, the main tasks of the agency were as follows:  
a) Informing the Polish society of all forms of political, social, cultural and economic 
development; both at home and abroad, and providing reliable foreign news about Polish 
affairs; 
b) Posting in their own newsletters and exclusive broker to the posting of official 
publication toll, non-commercial institutions and state enterprises, or acting under government 
control in all national and international journals, as well as the exclusive placement of 
advertisements in all kinds of the above-mentioned state institutions through posters, ads, film, 
photography, etc. 
c) The exclusive agency in making films and photos of buildings of the premises and 
offices and the state institutions in the state properties.286 
To achieve the following goals, the PAT used different methods, the most important of 
which was the publishing of the daily bulletins with information. It was difficult to present a full 
range of editorial activities because of the large number of organizational changes during this 
period. During 1934 as an illustration, the PAT published a dozen different bulletins each day 
and the content and aspects of the mentioned bulletins were clear by their names and it was not 
necessary to elaborate on them any further. 
 
1) General Political Bulletin; 
2) Economic Bulletin; 
3) Bulletin of the Stock Exchange; 
4) Sports Bulletin; 
                                                 
286 AAN, PRM. 33-5, Letter of the director Starzynski from June 1930. 
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5) Bulletin of the Cultural and Artistic; 
6) Parliamentary Bulletin; 
7) Illustrated Bulletin; 
8) Newsletter of the Economic, Social, Artistic and Sports (in French); 
9) Feature Photography; 
10) Information Service  “Polpat”, given three times daily via radio signal to foreign  
agencies.287  
  
During the following years, the number of the daily bulletins increased and in 1938, this 
increased to 13,288 further proof of the increased business of the PAT in the late 1930’s. 
  The structure of Polish agency was more complex than the previous two mentioned 
agencies and during the 1930’s, the PAT consisted of the following parts: 
 
1. Information Office 
2. Publications Office 
3. Advertisement Office  
4. Film Office 
5. Film Institute 
6. Printing Headquarters 
7. State Printing 
8. P.A.T. branches 
 
Informing the Polish society about all kinds of manifestations of political, social, 
economic and cultural life, both at home and abroad, and providing overseas news on the whole 
of Poland was the main aim of the Agency and that was mainly the task of the Information 
Office. Other offices among other duties had the task to provide funds to cover the operating 
expenses of providing the relevant information. 
The Information Office of PAT provided the following services: 
                                                 
287 W.Grabowski, Polska Agencja Telegraficzna 1918-1991[Polish Telegraph Agency 1918-1991], (Warsaw, 2005), 
p.97. 
288 Rydzinski, Informacyjne…, p.199 
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1) Information for the daily press; 
2) Information for foreign agencies and PAT’s correspondents; 
3) Information for public authorities; 
4) Illustration of publications; 
5) Information for the Polish ships at sea (Patoceana).289 
 
The main objective of the PAT was to maintain the level and range of information “from 
the Government’s point of view and the interests of the State” (w myśl wskazań Rządu i interesu 
Państwa) 290 and the influence of the information provided by PAT was significant and important 
to the state propaganda. For achieving the aforementioned tasks, the PAT needed a huge number 
of subscribers and clients. Among the subscribers during the 1930’s, the PAT had more than 
hundred daily newspapers with an increasing trend: 106 in 1935 and 113 in 1936.291 
The year’s efforts of the agency resulted with more increased business and the statistics 
below illustrated the increasing the amount of information sent to the press:  
 
The Information Sent to the Press by Information Office292 
 
YEAR 1934 1935 1936 
NEWS (daily) 200 210 230 
NEWS (annual) 73,000 76,460 81,000 
WORDS (daily) 20,200 22,900 26,000 
WORDS (annual) 7,300,000 8,400,000 9,100,000 
 
As one could see, the slow but constant increase of work was apparent and this progress 
was vital for the state propaganda efforts of the PAT. The position of the agency as the state 
agency guaranteed that the news was government approved. 
Besides the daily news bulletins, the Polish Telegraph Agency had several special regular 
publications. 
                                                 
289 AAN, 8-21II, p.7. 
290 AAN, 8-21II, p.2. 




In 1936, those publications included the following items: 
1) Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) - Polish Republic Journal; 
2) Zbiòr Wyrokòw najwyższego Trybunału Administracyjnego (Reports of Judgments of the 
Administrative Supreme Court) - a quarterly; 
3) Gazeta Lwowska (Lvov Newspaper) – daily; 
4) Biuletyn Gieldowy (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) – daily; 
5) Wiadomości Porty Gdyńskiego (the Gdynia Port News) - a monthly, the authority of the 
Maritime Office in Gdansk; 
6) Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy (Political-Economic Yearbook); 
7) Special Releases: Arcade, list of State offices and institutions, etc. 
 
 The aforementioned publications had different public and propaganda significance for the 
state propaganda and probably the most important was the Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) 
which was established in 1918 as the official legislative paper of the new Second Polish 
Republic.293  
The publication had traditionally consisted of two sections, the governmental and non-
governmental. The first included orders and decrees and the latter contained varied material and 
because of the nature of the published material, it was important for state propaganda to have 
numerous subscribers for the Monitor Polski. In 1936, that number was 283, and from that 
figure, 238 went to the state and local institutions and 45 copies went to the individuals. 
According to the official PAT’s report, the number of the subscribers decreased over the years 
and this was also reflected by the income generated by advertisements.294 
The Daily Biuletyn Gieldowy (Bulletin of the Stock Exchange) was the most important 
source of information for the economic world and the number of subscribers was high and 
exceeded 700 in 1935 where the figure was 794.295 Compared to its Yugoslav agency equivalent, 
that had barely reached 100 (service in Belgrade and Zagreb put together), that number was 
                                                 
293 From September to December 1939, the government section was published in exile in France. The gazette was 
resumed in 1945 and since 1950, it had been published by the office of the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers) to announce legislation of Parliament (Sejm). 
294 AAN, 8-21II, p.10. 
295 AAN, 8-21II, p.11. 
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One of the most interesting publications from a propaganda and historical point of view 
was beyond any doubt the Rocznik Polityczno-Gospodarczy (Political-Economic Yearbook). 
This treasury of data provided information on all aspects of public life in the Second Polish 
Republic and this publication was, of course, similar to the ones published annually in most of 
the European states during this period. The edition Mały Rocznyk Statystyczny (Small Statistical 
Yearbook)297 was basically the concise version, for example, the 1936 Small Yearbook had 311 














                                                 
296 AAN, 8-21II, pp. 43-44. 
297 For an illustration, the 1938 yearbook consisted of 23 different sections. The sections were as follows: 
1.Geographical location. Hydrography. Meteorology; 2. The surface, administrative division, population; 3. The 
movement of population; 4. Buildings. Flats; 5. Agriculture, forestry, farming, fisheries; 6. Businesses, business 
associations; 7. Mining and Industry; 8. Internal Trade, consumption; 9. Foreign trade; 10. Communication; 
11.Money and credit; 12. Prices; 13. Jobs; 14. Social Care; 15. Public Health. Sport; 16. Insurance. Fires; 
17.Education. Learning outside the formal school; 18. Cultural life. Entertainment. Association; 19. Administration; 
20. Sejm and Senat; 21. Public Administration; 22. Arboriculture, crime, prisons; 23. The finances of the Treasury, 
the Treasury of local Silesian government. 
298 The difference between the two editions was actually not that big because Mały Rocznyk Statystyczny was 
















At this point, it is interesting to analyze the business results that the PAT’s sections 
illustrated in the line of the assigned work. The following table from 1936 data illustrated a 







Profit and losses for the year 1936 (in Polish zlotys) 
 
Sections Outcome Income Balance 
Information Office 1,689,345.83 917,496.78 - 771,849.05 
Publication Office 849,295.77 1.833,893.65 + 984,597.88 
Advertisement Office 1,693,919.15 2,128,601.59 + 434,682.44 
Film Office 486,776.52 442,419.06 - 44,357.46 
Film Institute 190,976.94 170,553.58 - 20,423.36 
Printing Headquarters 3,777,849.98 3,900,023.42 + 122,173.44 
State Printing 3,170,381.65 3,639,429.41 + 469,047.76 
Source: AAN, 8-21II, p. 31 
 
As one could see from the table above, the Information Office made the biggest loss, 
along with the Film offices, but on the other hand, the Publication and Advertisement sections 
made significant profits for the agency along with the two printing sections. However, the loss 
made by the Information Office was somewhat excepted due to the nature of their work, which 
was gathering information from home and abroad.  
The most important thing, from a financial point of view, was that the sections concerned 
with printing and advertisement had made a profit, but that profit decreased in 1936 due to some 
additional costs. In the first place, there were expenses for the PAT branches of 269,575.60 
zlotys, taxes of 271,922.72 zlotys and for the purchase of inventory which totaled 134,386.08 
zlotys, but when some other expenses were added, the total loss was only 27,734.53 zlotys.299 
                                                 
299 AAN, 8-21II, p.31. 
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On the other hand, the Publication Office made losses compared to previous years and 
this was due to factors already mentioned such as: unexpectedly large increase in taxes, 
increased printing prices, the reduction of advertisement prices, etc.300 
The most interesting PAT’ section was the Film Institute, formed in 1935 where the main 
task of the institute was to make films of educational characters for the various schools. Until 
1938, it delivered 130 film cameras to schools, gathering 600 scientific and entertainment films 
and 60 full-length movies.301 
According to reports, the PAT made constant losses and this negative trend corresponded 
with the beginning of the World economic crisis in 1929. In 1937, after major analysis, the 
management of the institution made the following conclusions about the reasons for their losses:  
1) A general decline in turnover and  
2) The excessive burden made by taxes which had to be paid to the Treasury.302 
Just by looking into these figures, one could agree with these conclusions. The second 
reason was especially valid for 1936, namely the total contribution for the Treasury in 1936 was 
745,322.56 zlotys compared to 1933 when it was only 292,939.03 zlotys.303 A significant 
increase of the taxes surely affected the business of the PAT which was reflected in the increased 
losses made by the institution. 
During the 1930’s, the position of the PAT’s director was occupied by Roman Leon 
Starzyński304 (1929-1933), Konrad Libicki (1933-1938)305 and Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski 
                                                 
300 AAN, 8-21II, p.11. 
301 Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy 1939, p.584. 
302 AAN, 8-21II, p.2. 
303 AAN, 8-21II, p.3. 
304 Roman Leon Starzyński was born in Warsaw in 1890 and died in 1938. He finished philosophy at Jagelonian 
University and Senior Military School, as the rank of major. He had several different positions in the Military like 
chief of the First Section of General Headquarters and the chief of the Organization Department of Ministry of War. 
Starzyński is the author of publication Agencje informacyjne (News Agencies, 1935).  
305Libicki, Konrad (1891-1980). Since 1911, he was in the Rifles Association, the Polish Military Organization, in 
the Military Free School in Warsaw. He served in the Brigade as a company commander in the Warsaw battalion. 
During 1923-1924, he completed a course at the Military Academy as a major chartered. From 1927, he worked in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he was head of the Press Department and in the years from 1929-1934, he 
worked as a deputy in Estonia. He was also a military attaché in Finland. In Warsaw, he became the chief director of 
the Polish Telegraphic Agency, the director of publications and newspaper printers and Managing Director of the 
Polish Radio until the outbreak of World War II. He evacuated all the movable property of the institution to France 
at the disposal of the government in exile. Libicki worked in the editorial Reuters. He was one of the founders of the 
Pilsudski Institute in London and editor of the first volumes of “Independence”. 
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(1938-1939)306. All three directors were highly ranked and experienced operatives within the 
state propaganda machine during the Second Polish Republic and this was no surprise due to the 
importance of the PAT’s director position. 
In the late 1930’s, the Polish Telegraph Agency had around 1,000 employees307 which 
was by far the largest of the three countries under the review. The agency had various 
correspondents abroad and the most important cities, from a Polish point of view, which had 
permanent correspondents were: Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, Wien, Riga, Rome, Geneva and 
New York.308 
 The most significant difference between the number of the employees in Poland’s agency 
on one hand and those in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was illustrated in the Advertisement Office of 
the PAT which employed 75 people, more than in the whole Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency. This 
difference corresponded with the budgets of the institutions, but also with the quality and 
quantity of work that was completed. 
                                                 
306 Mieczysław Stanisław Obarski was born in 1899. He participated in the war in 1920 as ensign. Later, he was 
director of the Telegraphic Agency Express (Agencja Telegraficzna Express, ATE). He was a relative of Bogusław 
Miedziński, one of the most important Sanacja men for propaganda. 
307 Polska Niepodległa [Indipendent Poland], (Warsaw, 2008), p.521. 
 





The PAT’s network during the 1930’s 
 
 
One more indication illustrated the difference between the PAT and the other two 
agencies under review and that was the number of the correspondents, both at home and abroad. 





Number of PAT’s correspondents in 1935 and 1936 
 
Year Correspondents in Poland Correspondents abroad Total 
1935 160 83 243 
1936 179 69 248 
 
The number of correspondents, as illustrated above, increased from 243 to 248 with an 
interesting change in the structure as the number of correspondents at home increased by 19, but 
the number of correspondents abroad decreased by 14. So from these figures, one could conclude 
that the regime wanted to concentrate its propaganda efforts more towards a domestic audience. 
These numbers compared favorably to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as most of the time, they didn’t 
have any correspondents abroad (as one could see, the Avala had a sole correspondent in Albania 
for a while).  
The job of correspondent was well paid, especially in Poland where the directors received 
about 1,800 zlotys, deputy director and chief editor between 1,200 and 1,500 zlotys; editors 
received 1,000 zlotys, but the foreign correspondents, if they were employees of a fixed place: in 
Berlin, they received between 2,900 to 3,500 zlotys, in Paris they received around 3,000 zlotys 
and in Moscow, which was obviously considered the “toughest job”, from between 3,500 and 
4,000 zlotys.309 
The number of correspondents revealed that the PAT was one of the top agencies in 
Europe during the 1930’s with between 150 and 180 correspondents at home and between 70 and 
100 abroad. This was equal to or even better than, some of its bigger agency rivals, e.g. one of 
the most important world agencies Havas had 100 correspondents abroad while German Wolff 
had only 50.310 These statistics illustrated just how serious the Polish state was about propaganda 
during the period under review. 
After September 1939, the PAT operated in exile; initially in Paris and later in London, 
where, after the war was over, it functioned as a governmental news agency for the Polish 
government in exile. In 1991, it was symbolically connected with the Polish Press Agency.311 
                                                 
309 Rydzinski, Informacyjne…, p.187. 
310 Ibid, p.185. 
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The news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were, in many ways similar but 
also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency, Avala Agency and the Bulgarian 
Telegraph Agency had the same main responsibilities which were to inform domestic public 
about what was happening abroad and to inform the foreign public about the situation at home. 
Those main tasks were no different than ones that other agencies had performed during this 
period all over the world. The agencies had an obligation to informing the public at home and 
abroad “in accordance to the public state interest”, making the official announcements, the 
import and distribution of foreign newspapers and journals. Nevertheless, their most important 
role was to transmit official information which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so 
everybody knew that the information released was official and “checked”. 
The three agencies were different in size, their relationships with the government, their 
structures, levels of funding and several other none less important things. The BTA, Avala and 
PAT were formed as governmental institutions with the aim to inform, but propaganda was, 
beyond any doubt, one of the main responsibilities of the agencies.  
Nevertheless, the three agencies had different organizational forms within their own 
governments. Initially, the BTA was part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but over time, its 
position became weaker and during the 1930’s, the agency even became part of the Office for the 
Press subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its budget was part of the Ministry budget 
and its directors were directors of the Office for the Press. 
Although a state agency, the PAT was in different position as from its early years, the 
PAT was structurally an independent institution with various additional tasks and functions. One 
could therefore conclude, judging by the existing documents, that the PAT was considerably 
better organized than other two agencies. Movie making, independent publishing work, wide 
range foreign correspondent network, highly functional advertisement offices was only tied to 
the Polish agency during the 1930’s.  
The case of the Yugoslav counterpart was different to the other two. The agency started 
as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but that changed after a decade when the Avala 
Agency, according to common European practice in the Interwar period, was transformed into a 
joint stock company, but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital as it owned over 
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90% of stock capital. Therefore, the transformation of the agency basically meant a structural, 
but not a core change and Avala remained an instrument of the state propaganda and a state 
controlled institution throughout the whole period of its existence. 
The Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies received an annual donation from the state and in 
the case of Avala, this donation amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its 
needs. The finances were often not spent purposefully, so Avala, almost constantly, worked with 
losses and the BTA was totally dependent on the state funding and the income generated from 
subscribers was not enough to match the costs of both the agencies’ work.  
The only of the three agencies that was almost self-financed was the PAT as the income 
gained from advertisements and especially from sold publications and movies was significant 
and important. However, even those incomes were sometimes insufficient to cover the growing 
costs of the Polish news agency organization and it’s well developed business. 
The difference between the three agencies under the examination was maybe best 
illustrated when one considered the number of employees. With around 1,000 employees, the 
PAT was by far the biggest of the three, almost ten times larger than Avala and more than 
thirteen times larger than its Bulgarian counterpart. This difference was also apparent when 
considering the correspondent network so whilst the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian agencies had 
none or few correspondents abroad, the PAT had a very highly developed organization which 
was similar to that of a leading global agency. 
Judging by the above data, one could also conclude that the Polish Telegraph Agency had 
a more significant role in the state propaganda than news agencies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
The PAT had more responsibilities like publishing official data such as books and magazines and 
making the films that were, in the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the responsibility of other 
propaganda institutions. Those assignments were well beyond the common news agency job 
scope, which only underlined the statement expressed above about the Polish Telegraph 
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In this chapter, the development of the media in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and 
their role in the creating and spreading of the state propaganda during the 1930’s will be 
discussed and analyzed. Particular attention will be paid to the dominant media of the period: 






The press was the most powerful tool in the hands of the regimes in Poland, Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria in the Interwar period. This was mainly due to the poor development of radio and 
cinema (television was only at the beginning).  
The press was the more diverse and traditional way of informing the masses as well as 
being the most economic. The governments were well aware that controlling and influencing the 
press was the one of the most important steps to controlling public opinion. The ruling circles in 
these countries put a lot of effort into controlling the transfer of information in order to control 
what was to be published in the press. This was accomplished in various ways from hard 
censorship to bribery. In this part of the chapter, we will examine the development of the press in 
Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1930’s, its freedom and how the press was used as a 
weapon of the state propaganda. 
At this point, we must examine the state of press in the countries. Poland had the most 
newspapers because it was the largest country. According to official data for the Interwar period, 
the number of journals in Poland was being constantly increased. Only in the period of the Great 
Depression was there a period of stagnation. During the 1930’s, the number of journals was as 
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follows: 1931 (2,406); 1932 (2,503); 1933 (2,572); 1934 (2,566); 1935 (2,854); 1936 (3,043) and 
1937 (3,592).312 There is no official data for 1938 and 1939. 
As one could see, the number of newspapers grew from year to year, except in 1934. The 
press in Poland was not as equally spread across the country, like in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
The capital Warsaw was the center of journalism. Together with the central Polish duchies, 
Warsaw had published in total 49.5% of the magazines in 1931 and in 1938, this figure was 
52.6%. These figures were significant, especially when compared to the Eastern duchies’ 6.4%, 
Western duchies 22.2% and Southern duchies 18.8%.313  
For a clearer picture, one should examine the last recorded data on the number and type 
of newspapers in Poland: 
 
 
Magazines in Poland on 31. XII 1937 
 
Type of Magazine Number % 




Issued by the youth 
(including school) 

































Total 2.692 100,0 
*“Mały Rocznik Statystyczny” 1939, p. 345 
 
 The statistical data did not show the differentiation between information, literature and 
art, but we could conclude that this information, plus the government’s official newspapers, 
constituted a significant percentage of the total number of newspapers. That was of major 
                                                 
312 T. Jedruszczak (ed.), Historia Polski [History of Poland], volume IV, 1918-1939, part 4 (1935-1939), (Warsaw, 
1978), p.748.  
313 Ibid, p.751. 
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importance for state propaganda. However, on the other hand, a shortage of publishing data 
meant that it was difficult to draw accurate analysis. 
 
 It was also interesting to see in which language the journals were published:  
 
Magazines in languages in Poland on day 31.XII 1937 
 






















Total 2,692 100,0 
*“Mały Rocznik Statystyczny” 1939, p. 345 
 
 
With the dominance of the Polish language press, one could notice a large number of 
Jewish, Ukrainian and German newspapers. Those minorities had different goals in the Interwar 
Poland and after the war, they suffered different fates. 
During the period under discussion, the development of the press in the Kingdome of 
Yugoslavia was very dynamic. A lot of new newspapers and magazines were published but on 
the other hand, a significant number of existing newspapers ceased to exist due to financial or 
political reasons. The overall number of newspapers, however, was at a high level and was 
constantly increasing, but it was difficult to determine the exact number due to the 
aforementioned reasons above. As an illustration of the period and the number of newspapers, 










Number and intensity of publishing newspapers and 




















Periodic  Total 
Drava 6 39 22 133 13 1 5 24 244 
Drina 2 6 2 21 2 2 1 0 36 
Dunav 8 97 12 46 3 0 3 25 220 
Moravа 0 9 3 4 1 0 0 0 17 
Primorska. 2 8 1 14 2 0 0 3 31 
Savа 13 83 41 194 29 1 1 25 389 
Vardar 0 12 1 5 1 0 0 0 20 
Vrbas 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 
Zeta 0 9 1 4 0 1 0 1 16 
Belgrade 2 45 23 129 14 3 5 20 246 
Total 33 310 106 588 65 8 15 98 1.223 
Source: Statistical yearbook for Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p. 392. 
 
 
From the table above, one could see a huge difference in the number of newspapers that 
were published in some banovinas.314 Thus, in the Sava Banovina (Croatia and Slavonia), there 
were 389 newspapers and magazines but in Vrbas Banovina (Western Bosnia), there were only 
4. This was just one of the indicators of the cultural and economic difference that existed in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. To determine their purpose and field of interest one could use the 





                                                 





Newspapers and magazines by profession in the Kingdom 














Drava 5 27 13 40 4 37 12 17 9 53 27 244 
Drina 1 2 3 11 - 1 - 3 - 5 10 36 
Danube 8 57 6 31 - 37 10 20 3 24 24 220 
Morava 1 8 - 2 - - - - - 2 4 17 
Primorsk
a 
2 8 - 6 - 2 - 5 1 1 6 31 
Sava 2 86 13 45 12 35 13 25 7 79 72 389 
Vardar 2 1 1 2 - 8 - 1 - 5 - 20 
Vrbas 1 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - 4 
Zeta - 4 1 3 1 2 - 1 1 1 2 16 
Belgrade 15 26 11 12 9 28 10 15 8 67 45 246 
Total 37 220 48 152 26 151 45 97 29 238 190 1.223 
Source: Statistical yearbook Kingdom of Yugoslavia 1938–39, p.394. 
 
From the list of newspapers and magazines that covered political issues, one could 
include those under the official label, as well as those labelled as political, i.e. a total of 257 
newspapers, which constituted 21% of all newspapers and magazines. That meant that political 
content constituted only a fifth of all the news content in the newspapers. This told us more about 
how the government tried to restrict the distribution of sensitive news to the cooperative media, 
and less about the diversity and development of the press in the Yugoslavia during the period 
under review. 
One of the key tools of Stojadinovic’s propaganda was the press. It was not free in this 
period and it was under the supervision and control of the ruling classes. Notwithstanding this, 
the number of papers constantly grew and this number varied because many of them were 
banned permanently, some were reformed and the number of the newspapers in the different 
banovinas was also different. 
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In general, the press in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia was biased towards the government, 
except the newspapers in the Sava and Primorska banovina (Croatia). In Drava and Dunav 
banovina, the majority of newspapers were controlled by the Slovenian part of the government 
and national minorities and they tended to follow the general government line about defending 
the individual’s needs and desires. In the four banovinas Morava, Vrbas, Zeta and Vardar, the   
press was restricted in number and with serious financial problems so their influence was 
reduced in comparison with the northern banovinas. Censorship existed in practice and this 
hindered the existence of many newspapers so one could conclude that the pressure of the 
censors was not spread equally across the whole country. The Belgrade press was under more 
scrutiny than anywhere else in the country. 
 
In Bulgaria, the newspaper industry was not as well developed as it was in Poland and 
Yugoslavia, but it was no less interesting. As illustrated below, one could see the situation at the 
end of the observing period: 
 
1936 – 843 (Newspapers – 470, Magazines – 373); 
1937 – 875 (Newspapers – 512, Magazines – 363); 
1938 – 912 (Newspapers – 531, Magazines – 381); 
1939 – 906 (Newspapers – 513, Magazines – 393).315 
 
It was important to note that according to the same statistics, the number of newspapers 
marked as political was less than 4% (33 in 1936 and barely 22 in 1939). This clearly meant that 
regime didn’t encourage the foundation of new political papers and even, as one could see, some 
of the already existing newspapers were terminated. 
 
Nevertheless in Bulgaria during the 1930’s, there were several important and good selling 
daily newspapers and in the aforementioned table, one could see their monthly circulation:  
 
 
                                                 
315 Statisticheski godishnak na Balgarskoto Tsarstvo 1939 [Annual Statistical Survey on Bulgarian Kingdome 1939], 




Newspapers in Bulgaria on June 1939316 
 
Newspaper Published Sold 
Utro 2.220.000 1.908.000 
Zora 2.172.000 1.904.000 
Zarya 735.000 538.000 
Dnevnik 661.000 529.000 
Dnes 614.000 476.000 
Slovo 309.000 240.000 
Mir 271.000 197.000 
 
According to the data, one could conclude that in mid 1939, Utro dayly published more 
than 74,000 copies and Dnes more than 20,000 copies. 
One of the important events for the development of the press in Bulgaria was the 
foundation of the society Strela (Arrow). The society was part of Society of capital’s journalists 
(“Дружество на столичните журналисти”). This society had exclusive right to spread journals 
and periodicals in Sofia and in the provinces. One representative, delegated by the Prime 
Minister, was entered into the governing body of the society317 and this government decision 
made it easier to spread propaganda to more people in more places. In 1935, the Society had 
11,000 subscribers318 and Strela retained its monopolistic position in Bulgaria, even after the 
Second World War. Due to the monopolistic position of the Strela society, one could trust the 
accuracy of the data from the table above.  
One of the characteristics of the Bulgarian press in the 1930’s was the small number of 
journalists working in the newspapers. The main pro-government papers were Dnes and Utro, 
which only had 25 and 18 full time employees respectively. Zora had the highest number of 
journalists with 30.319  
                                                 
316 CDIA, 176k-20-19, Report of Strela on 29. July 1939. 
317 Darjaven Vestnik [State’s Journal], Nr.161, 16.October 1934, pp.2434-2435, “Naredba-zakon za razprostranenie 
na vestnicite i periodichiskite izdaniya” [Order-law for Spreading the Journals and Periodicals], art. 8. 




It was important to analyze the 1930’s legislation in all three countries under review in 
order to obtain a better understanding of how their press operated. Before 1938, press legislation 
in Poland was not completely unified as the western duchies had more liberal legislation than the 
central and eastern duchies.  
However, all differences were eliminated with the new legislation as the “Press law” 
from 1938320 placed greater responsibility onto the editors of the newspapers. The publishing of 
the official press statements of the government, president and members, were now obligatory for 
the press. Every newspaper had to publish the statement on its front pages and a minimum length 
of that was also fixed by the law (article 30). The closure of the papers could be final or 
temporary, from six months up to five years (article 39) and these papers could not appear under 
a similar name or context. As a result of this law, the fines for the “press guilt” were higher than 
before, in some cases up to 5,000 or 10,000 zlotys (articles 43 and 37) and there was a long 
discussion between the Interior Ministry and the Press Department of the Council of Ministers 
that seemed to have this initiative in the making before this law was formally declared. 321 
Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria passed very restrictive legislation regarding the press, 
which remained in existence throughout the 1930’s. The legislation regarding the press in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia was passed in 1929 and though, according to the Article 1 of the Law on 
Press, the press was formally given freedom from any pre-emptive editing, in practice, this was 
not the case. Namely, according to the Article 14 of the same law, the newspapers could be 
closed for the smallest infraction, and after three such instances the publication of a paper could 
be stopped indefinitely. Due to such strict regulations, the editorial boards, either willingly or 
unwillingly, made a habit of bringing proofs of their issues before a release to the state organs 
could be approved. This was a form of pre-emptive censorship, which gave the press very little 
freedom. In areas outside of Belgrade, this job was done by the state prosecutor’s offices or by 
the head of the police in towns which did not have these offices. All censorship was carried out 
according to the directives and daily instructions of the Central Press-Bureau.  
The Bulgarian legislation regarding the press set up a new registration system for all the 
newspapers which had to pass a series of inspections prior to distribution and this seemed 
particularly harsh. The decree of 12th June 1934, which held legislative power, ordered that 
                                                 
320 Press law was declared in the form of a President’s decree on 28th October 1938. 
321 AAN, PRM 63-13. In this box, we have numerous pages that contain opinions of the aforementioned institutions 
and their suggestions for the most of the articles from the law. 
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following a period of ten days after its enactment, all newspapers and journals in Bulgaria should 
be re-registered.  
For the papers that would not sign up to this procedure, the law proscribed a permanent 
banning (the Article 2). Those editors who tried to publish newspapers without a permit faced a 
term of three year imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 levas (the Article 4).322  The additional 
pressure on the newspapers was an order on 15th April 1938, which established supervision and 
pre-released proofing of all printed materials with a right to ban or stop publication 
permanently.323  
On 6th April 1938, several decrees were introduced about control over the press. Control 
was preliminary, which meant that no material could be published before approval.  For that 
approval, one would need to provide the following data: name of newspaper, financial sources, 
name, age, education, birthplace and address of the editor. It was obligatory that the editor was a 
Bulgarian citizen age of 30 or more (for newspapers) and 21 (for magazines). It was underlined 
that editors could not be convicted for treason and betrayal, debauchery or corruption, crime 
against dynasty and for crimes punishable by the “Law for Protection of the State”. Sanctions 
included fines, confiscations and seizures but from 1934, there was no imprisonment for 
comparing with decree.324 The aim of the ruling class was to financially cripple the power of the 
opposition press with high fines and taxes. 
Since the early 1930’s in Poland, the scope and extent of harassment and interference 
from various censorships, largely driven by the administrative authorities, steadily deepened and 
this most severely affected the political newspapers of the opposition. In Poland in 1931, the 
number of seizures was 2,100, in October 1935, this figure decreased to 1,626 seizures and in the 
same period of 1936, 1,869 seizures were made and this data also included the confiscation of 
periodic publications.325 
With World War Two about to begin, state pressure on the press was more radical. In 
1937, there were 2,848 seizures across the country.326 The editors rarely filed complaints against 
the seizures due to the flexibility of the laws, the possibility of defeat and additional costs. In 
                                                 
322 Slobodata na pechata v Balgariya [Freedom of the Press in Bulgaria], (Sofia, 1992), p.151. 
323 R. Daskalov, Balgarskoto obshtestvo 1918-1939 [Bulgarian Society 1918-1939] , II, (Sofia, 2006), p.485. 
324 I. Dimitrov, ‘Diktaturata i Pechat’ [Dictatorship and Press] in: Politicheskata cenzura v Balgaria [Political 
Censorship in Bulgaria], F. Panaitov (ed.), (Varna, 2003), p.102. 
325 M. Pietrzak, Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce 1918-1939 [Regulation of the freedom of the press in 




1937, the courts revoked about 10% of seizures ordered by the administrative authorities and 
prosecutors.327 This situation had not improved after the law from 1938. A lack of data for the 
last two years of the Second Polish Republic did not allow the exact numbers to be recreated, but 
it was possible to assume that number of seizures at least was the same, if not larger. 
After the April Constitution of 1938 in Poland, the principle of freedom of the press had 
lost its constitutional nature328, not only theoretically, but practically too. After the new 
Constitution was formed, any legislation considering the press was passed onto the ordinary 
legislation where press law from 1938 basically legalized the practice that had already existed in 
Poland under the Sanacja. 
Seizures brought serious material damage to the newspapers. Large financial losses 
occurred, which entailed frequent seizures held by Sanacja authority in the interpretation of an 
additional punishment for opposing journals. They also allowed the appearance of “voluntary” 
preventive control on which some editors were forced to prevent the collapse of the magazine. A 
“voluntary” preventative control had been recognized by the Supreme Court to be compatible 
with the provisions of the “March Constitution”, which was valid until 1935.329 
The press in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia, as we mentioned earlier, was not free and was 
under the control of the government and state organs. This was primarily related to the transfer 
of political information on the government, as well as related to news concerning the ruling party 
and the Royal House. Nevertheless, the press in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was diverse and 
disparate.  
Stojadinovic’s government controlled the papers in two ways. Firstly, regarding the pre-
emptive censorship and secondly, regarding the banning of papers, if it was concluded that its 
writing was harmful for the interests of the President, the Government or the Party in power. The 
reasons for closing most papers were Communist tendencies or contents. It was especially the 
case with the Croatian papers, but other regions were not spared this common practice, either. 
Control and supervision of the newspapers was carried out, in addition to various 
pressures such as blackmail and bribery, in two ways. Firstly, as we have already said, the 
preventive censorship was carried out by the CPB, the state prosecutor's office and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and secondly, newspapers were closed if their writing was judged to be 
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detrimental to the interests of the government and the ruling party. There were papers that were 
obliged to come to preventative censorship and there were those that were exempted from such 
obligation. That could be also related to the objective circumstances, such as the lack of a 
sufficient number of reliable censors.330 The severity of censorship could be illustrated by fact 
that the Split daily newspaper Jadranski dnevnik was banned 23 times in the period March-June 
1938.331 That meant that every third number was banned and as we have said, censorship was 
stringently applied to newspapers in Croatia.  
Sometimes the censors went so far as to ban newspapers even when they did not publish 
what they received from the propaganda institutions. So on 24th June 1938, Split’s newspapers 
Jadranski dnevnik (Adriatic Journal) and Novo Doba (New Age) did not release any news related 
to the government anniversary and they were banned. This ban was the result of anger, and also 
the inability of the government’s representatives in the Primorska banovina. A similar situation 
occurred with a list from Novi Sad, Dan (Day) on the same day because their report on the 
anniversary was not published on the front page. That was described, in the opinion of the state 
prosecutor, as an “insult”, to “Mr. President”.332 
Censorship sometimes banned newspapers, even when they brought the official press 
release about an event. The reason for this was when official communications were not issued in 
their entirety and therefore in the opinion of the censor, these could lead to arbitrary 
interpretations. Sometimes this “mistake” was unintentional and due to a lack of space, but 
mainly because newspapers were deliberately obliged to publish official announcements. This 
happened, especially in cases of commenting on politically sensitive issues like the opposition 
agreement in Farkasic333, Concordat334 etc. In addition to the overall official press releases, for 
which the agency Avala was responsible, newspapers had to print these additional comments. It 
                                                 
330 Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic complained that even he was requested to submit Samouprava to the preventative 
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was clear that these comments were pro-government and were adjusted to suit the government’s 
needs and political interests. 
The prosecution has its censorship duty to perform every day. For example, in the State 
Prosecutor's Office in Ljubljana, there were four officers who dealt with that business. They said 
prosecutors worked on the daily shifts, so that each worked an average of two days a week.  
However, there were cases that even the prosecutors’ influence on the newspapers was 
not in the interests of the then government. So it happened that, despite instructions to the CPB 
to publish an article about Stojadinovic’s visit to Italy, what was offered by Avala “in the 
Slovenian press articles only gave comments on these visits”.335 In a report on the work of the 
prosecutors, it was alleged that only one of these four prosecutors openly supported the JRZ, 
which was seen as a problem. This case revealed that, during the implementation of censorship, 
there were some problems, and even more when it was revealed that the CPB, in certain 
situations, was viewed as superior to the prosecution.  
There were cases when the state prosecutors received orders for special surveillance 
under the guise of some newspaper and those prosecutors who received this special status could 
be forced to delete what someone suspected they were doing.  
Both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had central institutions in charge of the press and 
publishing information. Yugoslavia had the Central Press-Bureau and Bulgaria had the Office for 
the Press. These institutions were in charge of deciding which information was “acceptable”, as 
well as controlling their publishing. Similar institutions existed throughout Europe and these all 
basically shared the same functions.336 
The section of the CPB that dealt with the preventative examination of the press was 
responsible for monitoring the local newspapers, magazines and newsletters too. This newsletter 
included a review of all minority newspapers in the Hungarian, German, Czech and Slovak 
languages and this was located in Review 27 of the daily newspapers, of which there were four 
German and Hungarian and 125 weekly newspapers.337 These were all published from the 
newsletter which showed the political orientation of each newspaper. In addition, there were 
                                                 
335 AY, fond 37, folder 73, pages 333/335, Report on the work of prosecution in connection with preventative 
censorship. 
336 Some information on the organization of these institutions in European countries during the 1930’s could be 
found in the reports of the CPB correspondents from abroad. AY, 38-141. 
337 CPB, Report…, p.41. 
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specially created files, which permanently gave information about the editor and his associates as 
well as giving information relating to the whole journalistic profession in the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. 
There was one significant report from the British Consulate in Belgrade from 1938 
relating to the freedom of the press in Yugoslavia: “Censorship of the press in Yugoslavia has 
become increasingly harsher towards the end of the year. Some headlines, even whole editions, 
were excluded, often without any good reason where Belgrade’s newspapers especially were 
obligated to publish all the information that the Central-Press Bureau wanted. In September, 
publication of the Belgrade Pravda, which received material for its news from Czechoslovakia 
and France, was terminated by an order from the Interior Ministry. In the official statement, they 
stated that there were some damaging accusations about the highest officials from the head 
offices of this newspaper. One month after the termination, the newspaper was published once 
again.”338 
Even the Prime Minister Stojadinovic was involved in the censorship. In the case of the 
newspaper Javnost (Public), which was under the suspicion that it received money from 
Czechoslovakian government, he made the following statement: “if any, even smaller thing 
could be found which is not along the basic line of our foreign and interior policy the newspaper 
should be terminated “according to the law”.339 In the case of Zagreb’s journal Novosti (News), 
he urged for the dismissal of 10 journalists in order to stop this paper from having “leftist-
communist tendencies.”340 
Instructions, on the implementation of censorship in specific cases, could be issued from 
the bans. In their field, they had some kind of autonomy, and were thus able to censor writing 
about the phenomena that had a regional character, and for which CPB didn’t give specific 
instructions. Marko Natlachen, of Drava banovina issued an order to the press that banned 
criticism of the teachers’ transfer in Slovenia that was often in this period.341 With the same 
                                                 
338 Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Godisnji izvestaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu [Brits about Kingdome of 
Yugoslavia, Yearly Reports of British Consulate in Belgrade], II, (Zagreb, 1986), p.683. 
339 AY, 37-46-542, Letter of Stojadinovic to the Minister of Interior Anton Korosec on  21st December 1937. 
340 AY, 37-14-279, Letter of Stojadinovic to the Minister of Finance Dusan Letica on 27th June 1937. 
341 The teachers in the Interwar Yugoslavia were transferred from one place to another as an act of punishment if 
they didn’t collaborate with the government’s officials. 
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order, any articles about some property transfers that were going at the time in his party were 
forbidden.342 
Some journals and editors received special treatment. There were situations in 
Yugoslavia where prosecutors were instructed to pay particular attention to some newspapers. 
On those occasions, they deleted even some lines that could be interpreted differently from the 
official line of the government’s propaganda.343 
The newspapers and editors fought their war against censorship in any way that was 
possible. There were examples, especially in Croatia, of state prosecution officials censoring the 
whole passages of given texts and newspapers publishing them with empty space in place of the 
censored sections.344 This was a tactic that the editors of these newspapers used to draw attention 
to the state repression and to the suppression of freedom in the country.  
The director of the Bulgarian Renewal Petar Popzlatev, on his meeting with the capital’s 
journalists, made an interesting statement about the advantage of censorship. He said “Today’s 
regime of censorship has the advantage of liberating editors of all responsibility, after the 
newspaper passes our control. We could eliminate censorship, but do you imagine how much 
more difficult your job is, when you intentionally step outside the limitations and enter under the 
sanctions of the law? Now is better, because, once your newspaper is controlled by censors, you 
are free from any future responsibilities…”345  
One of the most interesting articles about the press and its role in the state was published 
in Asen Bojinov’s (Асень Божиновь) book Press in the New State (“Печатьть вь новата 
дьржава”). These articles were published by Zveno and one could assume that this was 
government approved. In this book, Bojinov explained, from his point of view, the relationship 
between state and the press where he urged for an elimination of every subjectivity in journalism 
(“personal, party, partisan, pathological and traitor”).  
The book consisted of several different sections that treated various problems. The names 
were as follows: Press – a Factor or Agent; Policy of the News; Totally Objective Journal; New 
State – New Press; Press and Criticism; Press and Education; Press and National Cause; Office 
for the Press; Press Secretary; Organized Internal Press; Press and Preparation; Press and 
                                                 
342 AY, 38-5, Telefon report of CPB’s correspondent from Ljubljana on 10th January 1936. 
343 Oral testimony of Lazar Atanackovic, editor in chief of Dan in: D. Popov, Srpska stampa u Vojovodini 1918-
1941 [Serbian Press in Vojvodina 1918-1941], (Novi Sad, 1983), p.382. 
344 For examples see AY, 37-11. 
345 Iz lichniya arhiv, p.261. 
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Censorship. It was obvious that the publication was supposed to be a manual guide for the 
editors and journalists. 
The main role model was found in contemporary Germany, Italy and Soviet Union and 
Bojinov said that the press should be aware of its new role of “re-educating the whole nation”. 
He expressed his belief that the “new state” should have the “new liberty of the press” where this 
liberty should be “organized” liberty. In practice, that “liberty” meant that the regime could not 
be criticized and that the press should have been an instrument of the government and by 
extension, its people. Bojinov demanded reform of the press that would “make the press simpler 
as it could pass from the present chaotic situation to a state of organized internal press under the 
command of the state”.346  
Soon after the press law in Bulgaria in 1934 was set up, the first bans on newspapers 
were imposed where in the first phase of restructuring, 14 different journals were banned. Four 
of these were communist supporting newspapers: Rabotnik (Worker), Edinstvo (Unity), Zvezda 
(Star) and Rabotnicheska Misal (Workers Thought).347 On 29th June and 3rd July, 20 more 
journals were banned (ten on each day), amongst them were some military papers who wrote 
against Zveno, “yellow” newspapers and even one Jewish Evreiski vesti (Jewish news) paper.348 
On the other hand, around 120 journals were given permission to trade; amongst them were 
newspapers loyal to the regime as well as some apolitical papers. 
At the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, some weaknesses of censorship in 
Bulgaria were becoming noticeable. This was a product of the change of regimes and the King’s 
circle tried to find the most appropriate policies for the country.  
After a brief period, their control over the press were strengthened once again and in the 
analysis of the Society of the capital’s journalists, one could see a clear indication about the 
situation with the press in Bulgaria: “1935 – hard on journalists, outgoing censorship, limited 
unemployment, promises about the termination of censorship are not fulfilled; 1936 – partial 
liberation but only from time to time and they were dissatisfied.” On a couple of occasions, 
Kjoseivanov gave promises about less censorship, but instead new, harsher measures against the 
press were introduced; “1937 – regime of control over press did not change, it became more 
                                                 
346 A. Bojinov, Pechatat v novata darjava [Press in the New State], (Sofia, 1934), p.51. 
347 Darjaven Vestnik (State’s Journal), Nr. 69, 27. June 1934, p. 1195. 
348 Nowosad, Wladza i media, p.225. 
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strict, not only on internal but also on external affairs; lack of instructions, no one knows what is 
permitted to be published and what is not permitted.”349  
As in the case of Yugoslavia, there were many reasons for the termination or suspension 
of some journals. These included not only articles written against the interests of the ruling 
circles, but also articles that were not written in its favor. In July 1934, the newspaper 
(Macedonia) was suspended for one month because it didn’t publish one Prime Minister’s 
speech.350 
The historian Ilcho Dimitrov (Илчо Димитров) underlined the difference in the 
censorship of different newspapers where left wing communist and democratic newspapers were 
more likely to be banned whilst opposition and right wing newspapers were usually suspended 
for some period of time and then re-instated.351 
One of the most important institutions for controlling the press was the Bureau “Presa”, 
which was formed in 1927. At the beginning, this was used as a weapon against the increasingly 
powerful leftist press. During 1931, the leftist newspaper Eho (Echo) was confiscated 74 times 
and one of those acts resulted with one member of the left receiving a three year prison 
sentence.352 
After the cancellation of the Direction for Social Renewal, there were 3 different sections 
responsible for dealing with the press: Department for Overseeing the Press in the Council of 
Ministers (one chief, ten controllers in Sofia and four in province – Plovdiv, Burgas, Ruse, 
Varna), the Press direction with special service for the press in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Section “V” for the press in the Interior Ministry.353 
The aforementioned Bureau “Presa” was subordinated to the Section “V” and the chief of 
the bureau sent monthly reports to the chief of the section about the writings of the domestic and 
international press.354 According to the official statistics before the “reform” in 1933, there were 
281 political papers but in 1935, there were only 96 and this number was falling. 
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However, the government did not always win. In 1938, we noticed one, not insignificant, 
victory for democratic forces in Bulgaria. The Parliament, with a narrow margin, refused to 
accept credits for machines and other materials for the pro-government newspaper Dnes. One of 
the deputies even said that he would not vote for the newspaper in the service of propaganda and 
the aims of government, with anti-parliamentary and anti-social points of view’’.355 This was the 
case that the remaining democrats had to be strong enough to block some authoritarian laws, 
even in Parliament.  
In the following part of the chapter, we will examine the most important pro-government 
newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The other newspapers will be mentioned only to 
explain details relating to the pro-government press.  
 
The newspapers in Poland that were affiliated to the government were numerous. Some 
of the most important newspapers in the late 1930’s were the Gazeta Polska (Polish Newspaper) 
Kurier Poranny (Morning Courier) and Polska Zbrojna (Polish Military). The Gazeta Polska 
was the semi-official newspaper of the government from 1929. That did not mean that Gazeta 
Polska was under the same newspaper management though.  
 
                                                 




The first page of Gazeta Polska on the 1.September 1939 
 
It was quite common that editors and staff were under the influence of different groups 
within the government. In the early 1930’s, the newspaper was under the control of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and during 1935 and 1936, this newspaper was firstly under the influence of 
President Moscicki’s group and afterwards, Marshal’s group. The last one was obvious at the end 
of 1937 when Gazeta Polska became the official newspaper for OZN.356 The newspaper had 
three editors in chief during the 1930’s and all three were important Sanacja members. The first 
was Colonel Adam Koc, who was later the chief of OZN and he was editor in chief until 1931. 
The second was one of the most important Sanacja journalists Boguslaw Meidzinski and he 
remained in his position until 1938 when he took a high position in the “Sejm”. The last editor of 
Gazeta Polska was Mieczyslaw Starzynski (Mieczysław Starzyński). 
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Kurier Poranny was one of the most widespread pro-government newspapers. It was 
founded in 1877 and from the start it was very loyal to Pilsudski. This was very significant as in 
the 1930’s, its editor was the unofficial minister of propaganda Wojciech Stpiczynski (1931-
1936). In its final years, Kurier Poranny supported Sanacja right wing (Rydz-Smigly, OZN) and 
had an average of 25,000 copies daily, but German occupation meant the end of its publishing. 
The newspaper Polska Zbrojna (Polish Army) was even an unofficial organ of the 
Ministry of War and this was not only meant for military purposes, but for all citizens in Poland 
and its influence grew over time. At the beginning of the 1930’s, Polska Zbrojna printed only 
6,000 copies, but in later years, this number grew to between 25 and 30,000 copies on the eve of 
World War Two.357 After the death of Pilsudski, the newspaper strongly supported Rydz-Smygli 
and was one of its strongest supporters. Foreign policy was one of the main issues on the pages 
of the Polska Zbrojna where this newspaper had its correspondents posted in many countries like 
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Romania and Palestine. Polska Zbrojna with a price of 10 grosz was 
cheaper than many other newspapers (Gazeta Polska was 20 grosz) and this also increased its 
popularity. Each issue of the newspaper had a front page quotation of Marshal Pilsudski entitled: 
“Jozef Pilsudski speaks” (“Józef Piłsudski mówi”). That was one of numerous ways to develop 
and spread the cult of Pilsudski in Interwar Poland.358 
In total, five pro-government newspapers were published in Warsaw (Gazeta Polska, 
Czas, Kurier Polski, Kurier Poranny and Polska Zbrojna), but none of these exceeded 100,000 
copies daily. That was not something that government was especially proud of because at the 
beginning of the 1930’s, the sole Kurier Poranny had 50,000 copies.359 That was also a small 
number comparing to the most popular newspaper in Poland Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny 
(Illustrated Daily Courier) that was sometimes published in 200.000.360  
However their influence could not be underestimated and the aforementioned newspapers 
were amongst the most important weapons of the state propaganda in the Second Polish 
Republic. Of other pro-government newspapers, one could mention Kurier Wileński (Courier of 
                                                 
357 Paczkowski, Prasa Polska,  p.158. 
358 More about the cult of Jozef Pilsudski in Poland see: H. Hein-Kircher, Kult Pilsudskiego i jego znaczenije dla 
panstwa polskiego 1926-1939 [The cult of Pilsudski and its meaning for Polish society 1926-1939], (Warsaw, 
2008). 
359 Paczkowski, Prasa Polska, p.158. 




Vilnius), Slowo (The Word), Kurier Czerwony (Red Courier), Glos Prawdy (Voice of the Truth) 
and Droga (The Road). 
The most important papers which were in charge of spreading Stojadinovic’s propaganda 
were the Vreme (Time) and the Samouprava (Self-government). The Belgrade newspaper Vreme 
was practically owned by Stojadinovic himself, since the main shareholders were members of his 
family or his friends. It was a widely read paper, second only to the Politika when it came to the 
number of copies sold. Considerable means were invested into the founding of this newspaper 
and the most modern printing house in the Balkans, equipped with German and American 
machinery was built for these purposes. The Prime Minister himself took part in creating the 
recognizable visual images and the contents of the paper and, according to one of his associates, 
he spent a few hours every day with its editing.  
The Vreme was supposed to represent a model newspaper and to bring Stojadinovic’s 
outlook on the political reality both in the country and abroad, since events in Europe started to 
influence the situation in the country more and more. In the 1930’s, Vreme was one of the largest 
newspapers in the country (more than 130,000 copies in 1937) second only to Politika 
(150.000).361 Though attempts were made to represent the Vreme as a neutral paper, it slowly 
gained the label of the Government’s paper, which heavily contributed to its drop in sales. 
The Samouprava was the main Party newspaper and all the other papers were under its 
control in the hierarchy of the Party press. This very title, which was taken from the old Radical 
newspaper, was meant to imply that the newly founded JRZ was the only real inheritor of the old 
Radical Party from the time of the Kingdom of Serbia. Although it had low sales (couple of 
thousands per day), the importance of this paper was not insignificant, since its articles were 
taken over and published by many provincial papers throughout the country.  
Amongst the other newspapers which spread the propaganda of Milan Stojadinovic, the 
most important were the Vrbaske novine (Vrbas Journal) from Banja Luka, the Vardar from 
Skopje, the Narodni list (People’s Newspaper) from Cetinje, the Narodna samouprava (People’s 
Self-government) from Kragujevac and the Drzava (State) from Split.  
 The Party Press-Bureau of the JRZ was closely connected to the press. This Party organ 
was founded in 1936 and its main task was to be the central institution of all the Party and 
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“friendly” papers. It sent information to be published to the provincial press and often sent the 
complete texts and the Press-Bureau ensured that the sent articles were being published on the 
covers of the papers, as well as synchronizing their appearance. The number of papers it 
cooperated with was around 35, but they published almost everything they received from the 
Press-Bureau. The head of this institution was Milan Jovanovic Stoimirovic, the editor in chief of 
the Samouprava. The Press-Bureau shared its premises with the Samouprava almost until the end 
of 1938 and the same associates worked in both institutions.362 
The most important newspaper of the new regime in Bulgaria was Novi dni (New Days). 
This newspaper was published from 24th June 1934 until 28th June 1935 and it was published by 
the Direction for Social Renewal where the government’s achievements were glorified and 
emphasized every day. In the section titled “Facts that should not be forgotten”, people were 
reminded about the glorious past. Novi dni was the main instrument of the regime for creating 
“new people” for the “new state” and this newspaper lasted until the change of regime, but this 
regime change did not mean the end of the “press law” in Bulgaria. This law lasted until 1943, 
thus covering the whole period under the review in this study. 
In the second half of 1930’s, the most influential daily newspapers in the service of the 
state propaganda were: Dnes (Днес, Today), Utro (Утро, Morning) and Vecher (Вечер, 
Evening) and La Parole Bulgare (The Bulgarian Word).  
From 1936-1944, Dnes was the one of the most important newspapers for state 
propaganda in Bulgaria. Its director was Dino Bozkov (Дино Божков)363 and the editor in chief 
was Simeon Gruev (Симеон Груев).364 In the first issue of Dnes, the main tasks of the 
newspaper were underlined on the front page: “To start one informational unified newspaper, 
which will fill the absence of exact and documented facts from the area of the state’s and 
society’s life and to help, in its own way, to stabilize life in the country, with the aim of bringing 
Bulgaria better days, which it has every right to expect after all its suffering”.365  
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The formulation of helping the country in practice clearly meant helping the government. 
That was from its early days until the end the one of the primary tasks of the Dnes. Later in the 
1940’s, the newspaper officially became the government’s messenger under the Prime Minister 
Bogdan Filov (Богдан Филов).366 
The newspaper Utro was founded in 1911 and lasted until the fall of the Bulgarian 
monarchy in 1944. Its director was Atanas Damyanov (Атанас Дамянов)367 and its editor in 
chief after 1918 was Stefan Tanev (Стефан Танев).368 The newspaper never entered into any 
conflict with the governments and always remained faithful in the hands of every regime. For 
that, Tanev had an interesting explanation: “It is not good that one journal tied its fate with one 
regime. That is the case of Utro. It supported not only one government, but also one regime and 
it supported all of them for the time while that regime had sympathy and majority. They had no 
majority in the ruling class, but were popular with the majority of people”.369 Utro was geared 
towards the masses, as their articles were similar to “folk language” that was closer to the minds 
of the masses, the main consumers of propaganda. That was the reason why, in some circles, it 
was known as the “people’s journal”.370 
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university in Venice, Paris and Geneva. Damyanov worked as a prosecutor and judge. He was remembered most by 
his publishing work in journalism. Aside of Utro, he was the founder and co-founder of Echo d’ Geneve, Dnevnik 
and Zarya. 
368 Stefan Tanev (Turnu Magureli, Romania 1888 - Sofia, 1952) He was the law student but when he was very 
young, he became a journalist. Most of his life was dedicated to the newspaper Utro which was very popular in the 
country until 1944. After the World War Two, he was sentenced to life time imprisonment from the new communist 
regime. He died in jail. 
369 S. Tanev, Dnevnik (Diary), (Sofia, 2005), p.7 




The first page of newspaper Utro from the 7.May 1938 
 
It was important to mention La Parole Bulgare, the Bulgarian newspaper that was 
published for foreign propaganda. It was published in French and was financed by the 
government. La Parole Bulgare was published weekly and this cost the government around 3 
million levas per year.371 
At the end of this section of the chapter, we could conclude that the press was the most 
important propaganda tool of state governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 
1930’s. The press was the most diverse and heavily used instrument for these government’s 
propaganda purposes in the period under review. With restrictive legislation and various methods 
of pressure, the ruling circles in these countries tried to control public opinion. Many 
                                                 
371 CDA, 176k-20-12/21 Document from 1940, which covered the period from 1st September to 31st December. This 
told us the total costs for publishing were 1,246,947. Of these, only 155,000 of these costs were gathered from 
subscribers, commercials and foreign orders. We could also see that in 1940, there were also Italian and German 
versions of the newspaper. 
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newspapers, willingly or otherwise, reported the activity of the governments and interpreted 
events in the light of official positions.   
In the event of disobedience, the governments did not hesitate to use bans, fines and 
threats. Nevertheless, the most important tools for state propaganda were the newspapers that 



























The first regular radio broadcasts372 in Europe started in the first half of the 1920's. One 
of the first radio stations of this type was set up in the UK in 1922. It was  the British 
Broadcasting Company (later Corporation), known as the BBC. This station, as well as the 
others founded afterwards, were associated with the territory of the mother country. The first 
international radio station was Radio Holland, which started bradcasting in 1927.373 This year 
was of immense significance since it was the year when the short wave broadcasting  began, 
which made transmission to long distance possible. 
Propaganda spread via radio broadcasting during the period in question and this had a 
significant advantage in comparison to propaganda spread by the press. It knew no geographical 
or state borders and it could be heard on different continents at the same time, where even the 
illiterate could understand. In addition, it had the indirect effect of making personal contact with 
the listener and there was also practically the unlimited possibility of broadcasting in other states 
since the jamming devices used at the time were quite primitive.374 
During the 1930's, radio broadcasting made a significant step forward. In 1937, radio 
stations in the world were divided as follows: Asia 161 (8%), Africa 19 (1%), Australia 130 
(7%), America 1.142 (62%) and Europe 408 (22%). When one considered the power of the 
aforementioned stations, a different picture emerged: Asia 579 kW (5%), Africa 118kw (1%), 
                                                 
372 Miroslav Jokic said the following about radio broadcasting: ‘’The term ‘radio broadcasting’ signified in the 
beginning only transmission of sound across distance, including also wireless radio-telegraphy (transmission of 
sound signals) and wireless telephoning (transmission of human voice). With the development of technologies for 
transmission of speech and music, the meaning of the term ‘radio broadcasting’ was broadened to the field of radio-
technology, which dealt with matters of ‘musical qualities of transmission of human voice’, i.e. with the highest 
quality broadcasting (microphone - transmitter) and reception (radio – receiver - speakers). The complete range and 
content of the term ‘radio broadcasting’ was set only with the tape recorder revolution, which generated the artistic 
approach that was the use of sound recording as a sound signal (signifier). By these means, the non-existent 
possibility of sound expression was accomplished. It became the key term in development of the new, ‘eight art’ 
called radio-broadcasting.’’, M. Jokić, Istorija radiofonije u tri epohe [History of Radiophony in three periods], I-III, 
(Belgrade, 2004), pp.7-8. 
373 N.Cull, D.Culbert, D.Welch, Propaganda and mass persuasion, A historical encyclopedia, 1500 to present, 
(Santa Barbara/Denver/Oxford, 2003), pp.331-333. 
374 First mass and efficient jamming of radio-broadcasts of foreign radio-stations was conducted by Germany during 
the Second World War. It was not completely successful, but it represented one of the first attempts of its kind, M. 
Oreč, Sloboda informacija i propaganda [Freedom of Information and Propaganda], (Belgrade, 1966), p.190. 
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Australia 271kw (2%), America 3.423 (27%) and Europe 8.096 (65%).375 Clearly America had 
the highest number of radio stations, but in terms of its power and development, Europe was way 
ahead. For further details, please see the table below of radio development in Europe during the 
1930’s: 
 
Radio- broadcasting in Europe during 1936 
 











Austria 6,7 1924 575 000 9 149 
Belgium  8,2 1925 757 000 16 41 
Bulgaria 6 1929 10 000 3 5 
Greece 6,2 1932 5 000 1 1 
Danmark 3,6 1922 625 000 3 75 
England 46 1922 7 700 000 29 858 
Estonia 1,2 1926 30 000 2 20 
Italy 41,1 1924 560 000 19 323 
Yugoslavia 14 1926 85 000 3 9 
Lithuania 2 1925 85 000 4 80 
Luxemburg 0,3 1932 22 000 1 150 
Hungary 8,6 1925 380 000 8 154 
Germany 66,6 1923 7 600 000 41 1015 
Norway 2,8 1925 208 000 16 193 
Poland 32 1925 540 000 11 217 
Portugal 6 1933 45 000 3 25 
Turkey 14 1925 9 000 2 12 
Romania 18 1925 101 000 3 62 
Switzerland 4 1923 426 000 8 257 
Sweden 6,1 1925 884 000 31 245 
Spain 22,7 1924 304 000 9 51 
France 41,8 1922 2 800 000 28 851 
Finland 3,6 1926 145 000 10 263 
The Netherlands 8,5 1925 950 000 6 295, 
Czechoslovakia 14,7 1923 859 000 8 101 
SSSR/USSR  128,1 1924 2 500 000 75 1600 
* Based on the data published in the magazine Radio Beograd [Radio Belgrade] of 20 September 1936. 
 
As one could see in the table, radio broadcasting in the Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
started about the same time as in the other European countries. Radio Warsaw (Radio Warszawa) 
                                                 
375 S. Miszczak, Historia radiofonii i telewizji w Polsce [History of Radio and Television in Poland], (Warsaw, 
1972),  p.147. 
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started in 1926. One year earlier, the society for control of the radio was formed (“Polskie Radio 
Sp.Akc”). Secondly, a radio station was formed in Cracow (1926). After that, several radio 
stations were formed: Katowice (1927), Poznan (1927), Vilnius (1928), Lwow (1930), Lodz 
(1931), Torun (1931), Warsaw II (1937), Baranowicze (1938) and the national radio network 
was created. In 1929, the Ministry for Post and Telegraph gave the aforementioned society a 20 
year concession for the use of radio until 1949. 
Radio broadcasting in Serbia began to develop during the First World War.376 The radio 
stations in question were temporary ones set up for military purposes with help from the 
French.377 Home radio stations started broadcasting regular programs by the second half of the 
1920’s. This was first done by the radio station in Zagreb in 1926, whereas Radio Ljubljana 
started broadcasting two years later. Only in 1929 did the capital get its own radio station. Radio 
Belgrade (Radio Beograd), which started its regular broadcasts on 24th March. The main 
transmitter was placed on the building of The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. In May 
1934, this building was moved to Makis.378 
The development of radio broadcasting in Bulgaria was a few years behind development 
in Poland and Yugoslavia. One of the most important steps in the development of radio in 
Bulgaria was the creation of Native Radio (Родно Радио) in 1930. In the same year, regular 
broadcasts began for a couple of hours per day. Only in 1936 was the national radio network 
formed when Radio Stara Zagora (Стара Загора) and Radio Varna (Варна) were introduced.  
Jurisdiction over radio in these three countries belonged to, at least partially, the Ministry 
of Post, Telegraph and Telephones or the local equivalents to that ministry. In Poland, radio 
started more as a private society, but over time, the state control of the radio grew. Initially, the 
state had only a 40% stake in the society for control of the radio. In 1935, that stake rose to 
96%.379 That meant that during the mid 1930’s, radio in Poland was completely under control of 
the ruling circle. 
                                                 
376 The first public transmission of an event to distance in Serbia was organized in the night of 29 January 1895. This 
was achieved by a larger number of telephones, installed for that occasion in Belgrade – Nis. The programme in 
question was a concert held at the premises of Kolarčeva pivnica, a beer-hall next to the house and foundation of 
Ilija Milosavljevic – Kolarac, Ibid., p. 75. 
377 See further in: Ovde Radio-Beograd, Zbornik pedesetogodišnjice, (Belgrade, 1989), p.11. 
378 D.Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939 [Yugoslav Radical Community in Serbia 1935-
1939], (Belgrade, 1997), p.197, reference 33. 
379 Polska Niepodległa (Indipendent Poland), (Warsaw, 2008),  p.505. 
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Jurisdiction over radio in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia was handed to several different 
ministries during the 1930’s. Radio was controlled by the Ministry for Post, Telegraph and 
Telephone before it was handed over to the Ministry of Civil Engineering from April 1929 until 
December 1930. The transfer of jurisdiction continued and from December 1930 until September 
1935, radio was controlled by the Ministry of Traffic. Only after that period did radio return 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Post, Telegraph and Telephone and remained there until 
the occupation of the country. 
  The main legislative characteristic in the field of radio diffusion during this period in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia could be summarized as follows: 
- Normal regulation of radio diffusion followed valid international conventions, but it was 
partial and this was confirmed by the fact that no integral laws on radio diffusion had 
been passed; 
- According to its character, the normative acts passed in this period could be classified as: 
acts regulating relations between owners of radios and the State and acts regulating 
between the State and prospective owners and founders of radio stations; 
- High levels of distrust and caution of the State towards new media – radio, where the 
State from being the leading promoter became its sole controller; 
- Numerous restrictive state measures towards “subjects” wanting to broadcast, but also 
listening to radio programs;  
- Insufficient dealing with copyright problems.380 
The Department for Radio-Broadcasting was established later in 1939 to complete the 
diverse tasks in relation to radio broadcasting within the Central Press-Bureau (CPB). This 
affected the standard division into three departments: Administrative, Informative and Publicist, 
prescribed by the Regulations on the work of 1931 and 1935.  
The new Department for Radio Broadcasting was divided into as many as ten sections: 
Secretariat, Editing board for the domestic program, Editing board for foreign programs, Editing 
board of the news in foreign languages, Editing board for overseas programs, office of foreign 
news broadcasts, Radio telegraphic office, Technical office, Information office – reportage, 
                                                 
380 M. Nikolic, Radio u Srbiji 1924-1941 [Radio in Serbia 1924-1941], (Belgrade, 2006), p.25. 
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Cultural propaganda and Music section.381 Understandably, the importance of radio broadcasting 
became much greater.  
Between 1937 and 1939, the mature program concept was presented and this was 
“mature” in every sense. This was designed by the first generation of creators who had been 
educated at the radio station and who clearly knew what could be done with radio. Since listeners 
of radio broadcasts were known, the author referred to a structured and differentiated auditorium 
in which target groups could be recognized. This “golden era” of Radio Belgrade finished with 
nationalization that was an essential reflection of the international socio-political situation.382 
In Bulgaria in the first article of the “Radio law” (1935), 383 it clearly stated that radio 
was the state’s monopoly and the state was the only one that was allowed to “build, control and 
use” radio stations.384 After that law in Bulgaria was passed, the situation in the radio industry 
developed as follows:  
- Bulgarian Radio was the property of Ministry for Information and it was run by the 
ministry; 
- Employees of the Radio were the state’s clerks; 
- Ministry for Information created all programs, members and duties of the committees and 
also conducted pre-emptive censorship; 
- In the Executive Committee, people could only enter if they were delegated by the 
government. In the Program Committee, they could enter independent intellectuals but 
only in consultative roles. Chief of this committee was delegated by the Prime Minister 
on the suggestion of the Ministry of Communication. 
- Radio was financed by taxes on radio and from commercials. The finances were 
controlled by the Ministry of Communication.385 
In the new regulation for the radio service from 1938, the Program Committee entered 
representatives from the following ministries: Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Ministry of War, 
Ministry of Education, Ministry Interior, Health Direction, Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry 
                                                 
381 AY, 38-1. 
382 Nikolic, Radio u Srbiji, p.91. 
383 First law considering radio in Bulgaria was declared in 1927. 
384 Darjaven Vestnik (State’s Journal) number 22 from 31.January 1935. 
385 R. Cholakov, Pravo na Radioteleviziyni organizacii v Balgaria [The regulation of  radio-television organizations 
in Bulgaria],  (Sofia-Wien, 2000), p.26. 
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of Commerce. Their mandates were for three years.386As one could see, the state put radio 
directly under its influence and propaganda tasks became the main function of radio in Bulgaria. 
It was interesting to note that the system created in the mid 1930’s remained almost unchanged 
under the communist rule in Bulgaria after Second World War until 1990.387 
During the 1930’s, Bulgarian Radio was organized in five departments: 
In the Music department, there were following sections: 
- Standard and Classical Music; 
- Folk Music; 
- Pop and Dancing Music. 
In the Educational and department were: 
- Drama, Literature and Art; 
- Popular science; 
- Health, Religious and Everyday Education 
In the Professional and Economic department were: 
- Agriculture; 
- Industry and Craft; 
- Commerce. 
In the Informational Department were: 
- General Information; 
- Foreign Information; 
- Internal Information. 
In the Propaganda Department were: 
- Internal Propaganda; 
- Foreign Propaganda. 
Internal Propaganda was divided into the following sections: everyday culture, state and 
society ventures, ideological and propaganda communications between cultural and economic 
organizations and national defense. Meanwhile, foreign propaganda looked after national 
propaganda, the export and tourism sections.388 At first glance, the extensive organization of 
                                                 
386 Nowosad, Wladza i media, p.232. 
387 Cholakov, Pravo na,  p.28. 
388 Nowosad, Wladza i media, p.233. 
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Bulgarian radio was in reality created with very few experts and employees and this will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
In general, the 1930’s were the period of rapid development of radio. The following table 
illustrated the number of radios in the World and more importantly, the number of radios per 
thousand habitants in each country: 
 
 










United States 22.500 24.269 - 190 
Danmark 609 652 704 190 
England 7.403 7.961 8.480 182 
Sweden 834 944 - 151 
Germany 7.193 8.168 9.087 136 
Netherlands 947 989 1.072 124 
Belgium 746 890 1.018 123 
Switzerland 418 464 504 122 
Norway 189 240 305 107 
France 2.627 3.219 4.164 99 
Austria 537 594 620 92 
Czechoslovakia 848 928 1.044 68 
Latvia 82 96 114 59 
Hungary 353 365 383 43 
Japan 2.372 2.711 - 39 
Poland 492 677 861 26 
Lithuania 27 35 48 19 
Italy 550 625 795 18 
Romania 127 163 216 12 
Yugoslavia 80 74 154 11 
Bulgaria - 40 62 7 
 
*Maly rocznik statystyczny 1938, “Główny Urząd Statystzczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej”, Warszawa 1938, p. 338. 




Of three countries under review, Poland had the most developed radio service. The power 
of Polish radio station grew significantly over the years. The following table illustrated the 
situation at the beginning of the World War II: 
 
Power of the Polish radio stations 31
st
 August 1939389 
 
Radio station 
(in alphabetic order) 
Power Range 
Baranowicze 50 kw 120 km 
Katowice 50 kw 160 km 
Cracow 10 kw 45 km 
Lodz 10 kw 45 km 
Lwow 50 kw 100 km 
Poznan 50 kw 100 km 
Torun 24 kw 60 km 
Warsaw I 120 kw 300 km 
Warsaw II 10 kw 45 km 
Vilnius 50 kw 140 km 
 
As one could see, the most powerful radio station was in the capital city of Poland 
Warsaw with a range of 300 kilometres. It was also interesting to note the station that was built 
in 1938 in Baranowicze near the border with the USSR. Obviously, this station was built to 
neutralize strong Soviet propaganda in the area at the time. 
 






                                                 
389 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii p.142. 
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Total Power of the Polish Radio Stations 1926-1938 
 
Year Number of Stations Total Power 
1926 1 10,0 kw 
1927 4 28,3 kw 
1928 5 28,8 kw 
1929 5 28,8 kw 
1930 7 31,8 kw 
1931 7 168,8 kw 
1932 7 168,8 kw 
1933 7 169.3 kw 
1934 7 183,8 kw 
1935 8 207,8 kw 
1936 8 275,8 kw 
1937 9 294,0 kw 
1938 10 378,0 kw 
*Data as at 31st December of the previous year390 
 
The development of radio broadcasting throughout the 1930’s in these two Balkan 
countries was slow and noticeably lagged behind the main European developments of the time. 
Very few radio stations existed in the Balkans during this period (four in Yugoslavia and three in 
Bulgaria) and the ones that did exist had a very weak transmission capability. The number of 
individuals who owned a radio was also quite low (during 1936, approximately 85,000 in 
Yugoslavia and approximately 10,000 in Bulgaria) with most of these people living in the 
cities.391  
Nevertheless, there was a growing tendency towards the use of radio. The number of 
radio subscribers grew considerably in Yugoslavia as the range and influence of the radio 
stations became greater. The situation in Bulgaria was rather similar. Sofia built a radio station 
with a transmission power in the region of the 100 kW level and the number of subscribers grew 
to more than 90,000 in 1940.  
Nevertheless, according to statistics released in 1938, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were 
listed amongst the lowest of all the European countries in terms of radio usage. For example, 
Bulgaria had only seven radios per 1000 citizens and Yugoslavia had eleven. The only countries 
that were behind them at this time were Greece and Turkey with 4 and 3 radios per 1,000 
                                                 
390 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p.148. 
391 Data taken from the periodical  Radio Beograd (Radio Belgrade) of 20 September 1936. 
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inhabitants respectively. The Third country under review Poland was higher, with 26 radios per 
1000 inhabitants, higher than its neighbor Romania (12) and even Italy, but lower than Hungary 
(43) or Austria (92). 
The radio program in these countries mainly consisted of music, but news formed a 
significant part of the radio output. In Poland during the 1930’s, radio output roughly consisted 
of 40% news and 60% music. The news aspect of radio was one of its key functions. According 
to data, the “word” radio program of Polish radio (main and local) in 1937 consisted of 56.5% 
news and only 16.6% of radio was devoted to literature. 392  
Due to an increasingly developed radio network, the number of the employees working in 
Polish radio grew during the 1930’s. In 1929, there were 180 employees, at the beginning of 
1936, 790 and in June 1939, there were 1,456 employees.393 
            In Bulgaria, music played a more significant part in the radio programs. During 1939, 
music had a share of 82% of total radio output while lectures had only 9.5% and news 5.2%.394 
Bulgarian documents provided us with interesting social breakdowns of radio listeners. During 
1938, the biggest group of radio listeners were clerks (33.7%) followed by free professions 
(29.1%) and merchants (22.4%). The majority of the listeners were in the cities, one third of the 
total number came from Sofia alone. In 1939, Sofia had 18,802 out of a total of 56,884 radio 
owners.395 The radio owners outside Sofia were mainly in the other major cities in Bulgaria 
while the use of radio remained rare in the villages during the period under review. 
The ruling circles in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria realized the importance of radio as 
a tool for the state’s propaganda and during the mid 1930’s, this became increasingly clear. 
Judging from the aforementioned indicators, it was clear that radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, 
at the time of Milan Stojadinovic’s Government coming into power in 1935 was at a very low 
level.  
Later in this study, the concrete Government measures in the field of radio broadcasting 
will be discussed and their achievements will be evaluated in greater detail. Stojadinovic was a 
politician who paid a lot of attention to propaganda and this was also manifested in this field. As 
early as the start of 1936, in a letter to a minister in charge, he stated his plans in the field of 
                                                 
392 Classical music only took 29% of the music part of the program. Dominant was “easy going” music 67% while 
the dance music had only 4% of the share. Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p.171. 
393 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, p. 83. 
394 V.Dimitrov, Istoriya na radioto v Balgaria [History of Radio in Bulgaria], II,  (Sofia, 1994), p.128. 
395 Ibid, p.102-103. 
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radio broadcasting. These plans involved setting up a new radio station, as well as enhancing its 
efficiency in the field of propaganda. Due to its exceptional importance, it was important to 
quote a part of the letter, which best summed up the place and importance meant by Stojadinovic 
for radio broadcasting in spreading the Government propaganda. In the letter, the following was 
stated:  
“Radio has played an immense role in state and foreign affairs, as well as in the social life 
of different countries, especially in the last few years. Therefore, great attention is paid to 
it in the countries with the highest level of culture as to a first-rate means of propaganda. 
It beats all the other means for spreading propaganda when it comes to speed, clarity and 
availability of the program. National propaganda uses all means available in far more 
powerful countries. It is also needed in our country to pay more attention to radio-
broadcasting, both as an unequalled means of spreading propaganda and as a media that 
can play the role which no-one else can successfully play in our lives. Radio-broadcasting 
is not divided into spheres due to this or that alphabet or dialect - it is available to 
everyone in the most effective way. The Belgrade Radio-station has always met the needs 
of the state and of the national propaganda, but these needs grow on a daily basis and the 
Belgrade Radio-station cannot satisfy them in a way which a radio station, organized by 
the Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, could.”396  
 
The realization of the aforementioned plans was initiated by forming the Short-Wave 
Radio-Station or Radio Belgrade II at the beginning of March 1936. This station was built by the 
Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone. However, the Central Press-Bureau was exclusively 
in charge of this program. Its original strength was 0.25 kW, but it was strengthened to 1 kW 
after only two weeks.  
The main goal of the newly established radio-station was to promote the Government’s 
politics, both home and abroad. The main part of the program of the Short-Wave Radio-Station 
was the news, which was also broadcasted in foreign languages. Apart from the political news, 
there were also lectures on Yugoslav culture, its natural beauties, economy and trade. The 
                                                 
396 AY, 38-116, The Letter of Milan Stojadinovic to the Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Branko 
Kaludjercic of 18 January 1936. 
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following table gave us an insight into the degree to which propaganda activity was intensified 
by setting up this radio-station: 
 
News broadcasts in the program of radio-stations (in hours per 
year) 
 
Radio-station 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Belgrade 280 301 277 274 
Zagreb 219 275 242 283 
Ljubljana 132 140 88 130 
Short-Wave 
Radio-Station 
0 1020 1371 1240 
TOTAL 631 1736 1978 1927 
*Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1934-1939). 
 
As many as 1,100 hours of additional news was broadcast, almost 300% more in 1936 
than in 1935. This clearly demonstrated the endeavors and tendencies of the Government. 
Concrete achievements in this field resulted in additional efforts, as well as additional finance for 
this purpose.397 In the budget for 1936/1937, five million dinars were allocated for the 
improvement of radio broadcasting.398 
 
                                                 
397 Loans that Stojadinovic took out to set up the new Short-Wave Radio-Station resulted in an increase of the set 
budget for 1938/39 by 553 728 dinars, AY, 38-116, The Letter of M. Stojadinovic sent to D.Letica, The Minister 
Finances. 
398 AY, 38-116, The Letter of Milan Stojadinovic to the Minister of Post Offices, Telegraphy and Telephoning, 




Propaganda material about development of radio in Yugoslavia 
 
Two Belgrade radio-stations broadcasted news from 7 am to 11 pm. At the Short-Wave 
Radio-Station, attention was paid to scheduling the news hours so that they were not broadcasted 
at the same time as those on Radio Belgrade. This created the feeling in which radio news from 
Belgrade was broadcast almost every hour and where it was practically ‘’prepared’’ in one 
center. The broadcast news had to be thoroughly checked in this case before it went onto the 
radio airwaves.  
Firstly, the news was gathered from reports from the daily press and from the CPB, i.e. 
from the materials that had already been censored. Afterwards, before the news was read by a 
presenter, they were “purified’ and adjusted” to the instructions once again. Apart from the news 
in Serbo-Croatian, the Short-Wave Radio-Station also broadcast news in Hungarian, Italian, 
Greek, Turkish, Albanian, French, German and English.  
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A report in 1936 showed that in the period from March 1936 to 31 December 1936, over 
17,000 pages of news were read in nine different languages.399 Regarding these details, there was 
no doubt that the top people of the CPB understood the importance of this media and that they 
considered its propagandistic possibilities very seriously. Broadcasting news in other languages 
was, above all, meant for Yugoslav citizens, but a certain level of exerting influence abroad was 
also considered important.  
The regime also paid a lot of attention to the popularization of the radio station itself. In 
the letter sent to correspondents in May 1936, Lukovic asked them to write as much as possible 
about the Short-Wave Radio-Station and its work in the respective fields. Certain progress in the 
field of radio broadcasting in the period of the Government of Milan Stojadinovic was noticeable 
when it also came to the number of subscribers.  
These increased from 66,504 in 1934 to 135,132 in 1938 and despite this development, 
new possibilities for broadening the field of operations were also investigated. This was reflected 
in the letter of Kosta Lukovic, which was sent to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, in which he 
urged that the restaurants, cafes and holiday resorts provided the highest possible publicity to the 
Short-Wave Radio-Station. Furthermore, the correspondents were  told that they needed radios 
for reception of short waves and not to broadcast programs of propaganda radio stations from 
countries with unfavorable attitudes towards Yugoslavia as it would lead them to confrontation 
with the authorities, who were asked to prevent broadcasting of this kind of program.400  
A similar letter was sent to the Department for state protection of the Ministry of the 
Interior. This proved that the Government wanted to secure a higher number of listeners for the 
program, even if it meant exerting pressure. It also showed how much attention was paid to 
pursuing that kind of activity. The aforementioned forms of pressure had less effect on the 
territory of the Primorska and Sava Banovina.  
In the reports of the correspondents of the CPB from Split, one could read that the 
inhabitants generally “did not care about that program’’ and that newspapers refused to publish 
the programs of the radio stations.401 The problems with disinterest and resistance to the 
broadcasts of the Short-Wave Radio-Station remained until the end of the aforementioned 
period, although the possibility of its reception was at a satisfactory level. In addition, the 
                                                 
399 The Central Press-Bureau, Report on the work of CPB for the year 1936, p.56. 
400 AY, 38-116, The Letter of Kosta Lukovic to the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
401 AY, 38- 11, The report of the correspondent of the CPB from Split of 6 March 1936. 
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problem of availability of propaganda arose and it could not be truly effective as everything that 
came from Belgrade was rejected in some regions.  
Realizing the importance of this media, Stojadinovic put considerable efforts into the 
development of radiophony in Yugoslavia. During his government, the capacity of Radio 
Belgrade was raised from 2.5 to 20 kilowatts. A new short-frequency radio station was also 
founded and it began broadcasting at the beginning of March 1936 and this became the center of 
the radio propaganda.  
The task of monitoring and editing its radio programs was taken over by CPB and 
throughout 1937, the broadcasting for abroad was initiated and starting from 1938, this became a 
regular activity. The main task of the short-frequency radio station was broadcasting the news. 
This radio station practically became the one to which all the others were subordinated when it 
came to political news.  
Considering the fact that this news was created “in the CPB’s kitchen”, their main aim 
was to serve, above all, the interests of the ruling Party and its president. Notwithstanding the 
advancement of the radio broadcasting in Yugoslavia, it was still listed amongst the lowest of all 
the European countries in this field of advancement, with one radio per more than 100 people. 
The only countries that lagged behind Yugoslavia in this field  were Greece, Turkey and 
Bulgaria (the last one only regarding the number of the subscribers).  
The ruling circles in Poland had the same opinion about radio and its propaganda role. 
One introduction in the brochure from 1939 was entitled “Radio in Service of the State and 
People”. This stated clearly that: 
 
“Broadcasting is an organism which must remain in the service of nation and 
state. Observing the development of the radio world, it is clear that with the rapid 
increase in importance and influence of radio, privately run broadcasting companies are 
being taken over in many countries by the state, and others are closely controlled by 
them. The organization of the modern state in the period, in which the radio was 
considered solely for entertainment, quite expensive and only available to wealthy 
people, must be considered as history. Over the years, the number of radios in terms of 
subscribers grew and in proportion to the decreasing price of radios, broadcasting has 
become more influential in society and is therefore responsible to shaping the psyche, 
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morality and division of our citizens. It is also responsible for and exploiting the 
dynamics of development of nations. Radio microphones have become an indispensable 
means of making direct contact with the masses of humans, impacting on their mood, 
directing their actions, mobilizing public opinion with accurate and timely information 
and informing the public about what is happening in the country and the world.”402 
 
The two most important officials in the second half of the 1930’s were the Polish 
President Moscicki and Marshal Rydz-Smygli and they addressed the nation by radio on 
numerous occasions. During the period between 1935 and 1938, the President made 12 public 
speeches on national radio whilst the Marshal made 20.403 Half of the president’s speeches were 
related to the propaganda lectures about the late Marshal Pilsudski (6 of 12). The second marshal 
spoke about various issues such as public, military and local holidays and it was possible that 
radio in the last years of Interwar Poland leaned more towards Marshal Pilsudski rather than the 
president. For example, in October 1938, his speeches were transmitted live on four occasions.404 
       On Polish radio, the news was broadcast three times per day until 1937 when this was 
increased to four times per day. In most cases, the sources of information were from PAT and 
pro-government newspapers. The most important one was Dziennik Wieczorny (Evening News) 
and they broadcasted at 20:45 each night. In the late 1930’s, there were roughly 200 hours of 
news for one year.405  
At the time, work on radio propaganda in Poland had three main directions: 1) 
propaganda of the whole radio program; 2) development of radiophony in the country and 
increasing the number of megaphones; 3) development of short wave radio stations. After the 
long explanation of how a certain part of the program should be presented, the author of the 
document concluded: “The Polish radio stream has a different spirit. All employees from the 
janitor up to the managerial stuff must have the only thought that they should work with 
                                                 
402 Radio w Polsce w latach 1935-1938 [Radio in Poland 1935-1939], (Warsaw, 1938), p.7. 
 
403 Ibid., pp.5-8. 
404 Ibid., p.8. 
405Ibid., p. 95. 
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enthusiasm and with a willingness and understanding of the role they should play in the State 
Radio”.406 
In 1939, when the outbreak and fear of war were eminent, leading circles in Poland 
expressed the need for the unification of radio programs. A document made in the Ministry of 
War set four main objectives: 1) Codification of the radio programs; 2) Control of an inferiority 
complex and restoration of historical traditions; 3) The struggle with the problem of life 
(individual and national); 4) The action primarily determined the character. Knowledge and 
talent were prerequisites, but not sufficient.407 It was obvious that new tasks were aimed to 
strengthen the moral of the Polish people and as the main objective; radio was considered a 
national defense. 
Initially, radio in Bulgaria was understood as a tool with commercial use, but in the mid 
1930’s, it became an instrument for education and state propaganda. Even in 1934, the 
newspaper Черно Море (Black Sea) provided the information that key representatives of state 
propaganda, Penchev Petko, the head of Renewal and chiefs of departments Polyanov and 
Kulishev, needed to make the decision to use radio as the main instrument for “national 
propaganda”.  
Later that year, a more developed plan was published in the semi-official government 
newspaper Novi dni (New Days). The article was entitled “The Radio and the New State” and it 
began with the assumption of complete control over radio by the state.408 
The propaganda offensive in radio area began with the Directorate for Social Renewal, 
which was created in 1934. In November 1934, the editor of Radio Sofia was named chief of 
radio propaganda. With this move, The Renewal took complete control over radio. From May 
until November 1934, 45 lectures were delivered by ministers and other important officials at 
Radio Sofia.409 In the second half of that year, the number of lectures increased significantly. 
There were 250 lectures relating to the ideology of new the state as well as the government’s 
measures, reforms and successes. Twenty-two of these lectures were delivered by either the 
                                                 
406CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Wytycyne propagandy 
Polskiego Radia”[Guidelines for the propaganda of the Polish Radio] from 4. VI 1938. 
407 CAW, Gabinet Ministerstwa Spraw Wojskowych, I 300.1.531, document entitled “Projekty do programu 
letniego”[Projects for the summer program] 1939 from 16. II 1939. 
408 Dimitrov, Istoriya na,  II, pp.124-125. 
409 CDA, 284k-3-42/51, Article by Petar Popzlatev, chief of Renewal. 
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Prime Minister or by members of his cabinet.410 In the same document, the new Renewal director 
Popzlatev stated about the future role of radio: “it (radio) will influence the spiritual and the 
material values which the Bulgarian nation has and this will be accepted by everyone”.411 Most 
of the information for Bulgarian radio was gathered from the domestic press and this was also 
the case for Poland and Yugoslavia. 
Another significant step in the development of radio was to organize a radio program for 
the American continent. In 1937, a radio program was broadcast for North America via Holland 
in Yugoslavia, and at the beginning of 1938, this became a regular practice as this program was 
primarily meant for emigrants.  
The first show of this type was broadcast at night between 31 March and 1 April and this 
program lasted for an hour and fifteen minutes with the transmission controlled by The Philips 
company. The opening speech to the country during the first broadcast was delivered by the 
Prime Minister Stojadnovic himself “to whom we have to be grateful for this connection through 
the universe”.412  
In the first months of 1937 when program was broadcast twice per month, introductory 
lectures were mainly delivered by ministers and other respected individuals.413 An important part 
of the program was ‘’the news from the beloved homeland’’. This aimed to inform the emigrants 
of the situation back home and the results that the Government had achieved.  
They stressed the great results that had been accomplished and Stojadinovic was depicted 
as a democrat with a Western emphasis and as the main implementer of an economic plan, 
similar to that in America. Furthermore, the dominant part of this overseas program was the 
broadcasts with cultural and music content. They were, of course, focused on news about the 
‘’faraway’’ mother land. The result was that this program could be followed all over the world.  
 In October 1937, Polish radio began to transmit its programs that were accepted, even in 
the Americas. Broadcasting usually started at 18:00 and that specific program lasted 2 hours per 
day, except on Saturday and Sunday when it lasted for 3 hours. In September 1938, two more 
Short wave stations were set up and some South American countries were able to get a signal for 
Polish radio. The main recipients of transmissions were Polish emigrants throughout Europe, 
                                                 
410 CDA, 284k-3-42/51, Article by Petar Popzlatev, chief of Renewal, p.52. 
411 Ibid., p.54. 
412 A part of the text read by a presenter directly before the Prime Minister’s speech. 
413 After Stojadinovic, the guests were the Minister of the Interior, Anton Korosec, the President of the Senate. 
Zelimir Mazuranic, a Minister without portfolio, Miha Krek and the man presiding at the Parliament Stevan Ciric.  
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United States and Brazil. As one could conclude, based on available sources, the radio service in 
Bulgaria, during the interwar period, could not reach the same level for broadcasting its radio 
programs to the other continents, as Poland. 
As one could see during the mid 1930’s, this was the period when, in all three countries, 
the ruling circles took strong control over the running of radio. To do so, they had to remove all 
the “subversive” elements. By taking a dominant position in the country in the field of radio-
broadcasting, the CPB and the Short-Wave Radio-Station also started preparing news for Radio 
Belgrade. It was observed that “suspicious elements” dominated Radio Belgrade and that control 
over it “proved to be insufficient”. It was estimated that its director Kalafatovic “belonged to 
opposition circles” and that the director of program Veljko Petrovic “was not fully committed to 
the state and national political course” and that the editor in chief of the musical program 
Vukdragovic had “leftist tendencies”.414  
Unlike the Belgrade radio-station, the one in Ljubljana was controlled by Prosvetna 
zveza, the central Slovenian educational association. The head of this society was the university 
professor Franc Lukman who was also a close friend of Korosec. The other members were also 
on the political course of JRZ415 so one could conclude that “the radio station in Ljubljana was in 
quite safe hands and that the Government could, by all accounts, count on it in respect of all the 
issues”.416 This information was also indicative of the fact that in Drava Banovina, the JRZ had 
undisputed control, especially when it came to the Slovenian aspect of the overall operation.417 
After the state gained a 96% stake of radio in Poland, it was clearly time for a change in 
its management structure. The head of Polish radio become “Sanacja” with its prominent 
members Roman Starzynski (1935-1938)418 and Kondrad Libicki (1938-1939)419. The program 
                                                 
414 AY, The Collection of Documents of Milan Stojadinovic (37), folder 75. This consisted of a short report on 
radio-stations of April 1938 which was made by Bogdanovic (possibly Bosko Bogdanovic, who was, for a while, the 
deputy in charge, and later, he was the successor of Lukovic on the function of the Chief of the CPB). 
415 JRZ was Stojadinovic’s political party which was founded in 1936 from the former National Radical Party, 
Slovenian People party and Yugoslav Muslim Organization. 
416 AY, 37-75/537, Short report on radio-stations, appendix to the sent report. 
417 The other members of the Managing Board were the engineer Mario Osana, a university professor at the 
Technical Faculty of Ljubljana. He was in charge of the technical part of the station. Professor Franc Koblar the 
presiding of the Association of Slovenian Writers was in charge of the programme and Miloš Stare  took care of the 
administrative part of the process. 
418 Roman Starzyński (11.IV 1890 – 5.VI 1938) was the older brother of Warsaw’s major. He finished his studies at 
the University of Cracow. In the First World War, he was ensign. Starzynski stayed in the Military service until 
1929 when he took up a position of PAT’s director. From 1933, he was chief of staff for the Ministry for Post and 
Telegraph. As well as being Polish radio director, he was also a member of the International Radiophony Union and 
its budget commission. He wrote several monographs about military and telegraph agencies. 
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director became Dr. Piotr Gorecki, former director of the Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT) and he 
was the man who knew how to inform the public. Other changes were the positions of secretary 
general and administrative director420 so one could safely conclude that in the mid 1930’s; the 
state control over the radio was complete. Radio now became the main instrument in the state’s 
propaganda program. 
The number of the employees in Radio Sofia had also grown during this time. In 1936, 
there were only 22 employees, but in 1941, this figure grew to 99.421 Until the outbreak of World 
War II, Radio Sofia had three directors: Iordan Stubel (Иордан Стубел), Sirak Sirakov (Сирак 
Сираков) and Konstantin Konstantinov (Константин Константинов). The most prominent one 
was Sirakov who remained in his high position until his death in March 1943. A man of many 
talents, Sirakov was the one of the key people responsible for the development of radio in 
Bulgaria.422 
From 1935 to 1939, the number of listeners more than quadrupled, from 11,000 to around 
50,000. Income from radio was more than 12 million levas. According to the propaganda 
publications dedicated to the Kjoseivanov government, the ruling circles were happy to make 
radio “one of the most important institutions for propaganda and national culture”.423 
Another important novelty which took propaganda to a higher level was the introduction 
of live broadcasts. Throughout this period, different events had live broadcasts – Sokol rallies424, 
tennis matches, eulogy for Nikola Pasic, the rallies of the party in power, etc. The first broadcast 
of the JRZ rally was in Skopje on the occasion of Stojadinovic’s visit to Vardar Banovina in the 
summer of 1936. The number of rallies and Prime Minister’s speeches broadcast grew rapidly in 
1938, especially during the pre-election campaign.425 
      In the second half of the 1930’s, the number of live transmissions on Polish radio increased 
rapidly. Events on national holidays like the military parade on Constitutional day (Uchwalenie 
Konstytucji Trzeciego Maja) on 3rd May and Independence Day (Narodowe Święto 
                                                                                                                                                             
419 The directors of the individual stations in 1938 were: Zenon Kosidowski (Warsaw), Zbigniew Cis-Bankiewicz 
(Baranowicze), Stanisław Ligoń (Katowice), Bronisław Winiarz (Cracow), Juliusz Petry (Lwow), Stanisław 
Nowakowski (Lodz), Zdislaw Marynowski (Poznan), Bohdan Pawłowicz (Torun) and Roman Pikiel (Vilnius). 
420 Miszczak, Historia radiofonii, pp. 82-83. 
421 Dimitrov, Istoriya na,  II, pp.55-58. 
422 More about Skitnik’s life and work see: K. Krastev., Sirak Skitnik, Chovekat, poetat, hudoznikat, teatralat [Sirak 
Skitnik, Man, Poet, Artist, Actor], (Sofia, 1974). 
423 I. Minchev, Upravlenie na tvorchestvo i delya [Government of construction and deeds], (Sofia, 1939), p.231. 
424 Form of mass physical activity practiced in the country with the strong Yugoslavian character. 
425 The last pre-election rally in Belgrade on 9 December 1938 was broadcast by all four radio-stations. 
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Niepodległości) on 11th November were seen as the most important. One of the most important 
from the government’s propaganda point of view was the live transmission of the official Rydz-
Smygli becoming a marshal in November 1936.  
            The number of live transmissions in 1937 was 285 (without sport events) which added up 
to 136 hours in total. With 82 sports events being transmitted live, Polish radio reached a level of 
one live transmission per day, which was very advanced in comparison to Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria.426  
            The first live transmission (outside the studio) in Bulgaria was in 1931427 and those kinds 
of events were pretty rare in Bulgaria. Radio in Bulgaria was mainly focused on lectures that 
were delivered inside a studio by prominent government members and pro-government 
journalists. 
As one could see earlier, radio was poorly developed in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but this 
was more advanced in Poland. There were many differing reasons for the insufficient 
development of radio broadcasting in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.  
Apart from the small number of radios in both countries, one could perhaps mention the 
high price of radios, the insufficient electrification of these countries and the lack of skilled 
personnel available. The first two factors were a result of insufficient radio development and the 
financial hardship that most inhabitants had to endure in both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The lack 
of skilled personnel led to an inappropriate use of available technology and enormous repair 
costs.  
Bearing in mind all these problems, people from Radio Belgrade organized a special 
“autocar” during the summer, which travelled around the provincial towns to spread the word 
about radio broadcasting. This was purposefully meant to increase the number of listeners 
through practical discussions “on the field”, collecting information and improving working 
conditions. During 1938, places in Sumadija and Vojvodina were visited.428 
Polish radio also undertook radical measures to increase the popularity of radio. In the 
second half of the 1930’s, around 100,000 popular brochures were delivered to people 
throughout the country. The titles of those brochures were: “How to put together a radio”, “How 
                                                 
426 Radio w Polsce. p.97. 
427 It was a live transmission of a celebration for the Day of Bulgarian Revival. Professor Zlatarov and general 
Kratunkov addressed an audience. 
428 Radio Beograd, July-August of 1938. 
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to set up a radio” and “How to use a radio”.429 The brochures were well illustrated and easily 
written for the mass population. As in the Yugoslav case, there were also special “propaganda 
cars” involved. 
In Bulgaria, those actions were not particularly well developed but one could find some 
brochures like “What is the radio” (“Какво нещо е радиото”) by Svetozar Preneverov. Judging 
by his son’s testimony, Preneverov gave many interviews and had conversations with the 
different social groups with the purpose of convincing them that “radio in Bulgaria was 
reality”.430 
It was important to mention that the radio industry was profitable for governments. The 
income of Polish radio in 1937 was 17,127,024 zlotys and costs were 14,745,830 zlotys, thus the 
profit was 2,381,194 zlotys.431 The majority of that income was raised by taxes paid by the 
listeners and only a small portion was raised from advertisements.432 The income of radio service 
in Bulgaria was significant and growing: in 1934, this was 3,060,029 levas, in 1936, this was 
6,747,819 levas and in 1938, 15,257,524 levas.  
During the war years, income continued to grow and in 1941, this was more than 35 
million levas.433 After the outbreak of war, the radio stations in Yugoslavia and Poland were 
either destroyed or used in servicing the armed forces. Radio in Bulgaria continued to serve state 
propaganda and new war objectives. 
As one could see, the mid 1930’s in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was a period of real 
transformation of the radio as a medium of state propaganda. Even with its slow development, in 
comparison to some European countries, radio was a powerful tool in the hands of the ruling 
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The film industry in the interwar period was more advanced in America than in Europe 
where the USA had 17,000 cinemas in 1937, Soviet Union had 6,337 whilst the leading 
European countries were: Germany with 5,395, UK with 5,000, France with 3,700 and Italy with 
3,600.434  
The film was probably the most powerful propaganda tool in the interwar period. The 
widespread use of the film as a propaganda tool began in Bolshevic’s Soviet Union435 and it was 
quickly spread all over the world. The propagandistic film was especially popular in Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany.436 The three countries under review also used film and cinema in their state’s 
propaganda, but that action was limited with existing technical advancement and the prevailing 
economic climate. 
At the beginning of this section, we will discuss the general situation in the film industry 
in the three countries under review. Comparing the number of citizens and number of cinemas 
with other European nations, Poland was third from the bottom, ahead of only Yugoslavia and 
Albania. In 1939, the total number of cinemas was 789, only 300 of which operated every day. 
The statistical data of that year stated that 98% of the movies in Polish cinemas were imported 
(62% from the USA, 13.4% from Germany, 10.8% from France). On average, each Polish citizen 
only went to the cinema 1.5 times in 1938 with citizens of some towns attending the cinema 
more frequently than the national average, e.g. each citizen in Lwow went to the cinema 13 times 
on average in 1938 and this figure was 12 for both Warsaw and Poznan.437 
Films from the United States were the most popular imported films into Poland during 
the 1930’s with Germany in second place and France way back in third. The share of US movies 
                                                 
434 Maly Rocznik Statysticzny [Little Statistical Yearbook], (Warsaw, 1938), p.336. Data was taken from the Bureau 
of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, (Washington, 1938). 
435 From various literature see: D. Gillespie, Early Soviet cinema, Innovation, ideology and propaganda, (London, 
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imported into Poland was always around 60% but in 1935, this figure rose to 77%.438 The 
number of Polish movies varied during the years as illustrated in the following table: 
 
Polish movies in the 1930’s 
 
Year Polish movies Polish movies (per 
thousand meters 
long) 
Total number of 
Polish movies % 
1931 198 100 10.5 
1932 146 92 12.3 
1933 157 83 10.7 
1934 142 68 11.0 
1935 113 64 9.7 
1936 124 82 13.4 
1937 123 94 13.4 
Source: CAW, Gab. MSWojsk, I.300.1.538 
 
This data illustrated that the number of movies was decreasing, but that the share of 
Polish movies released in Poland grew slightly in percentage terms from 1931-1937, but 
government officials were not impressed with these figures, even the increase of more than 30% 
from 1935-1937 as well the increase of 78% in the production of long endurance films. In total, 
out of the 24 of these types of films produced in 1937, 10 were comedies, 11 were dramas, two 
were melodramas and one was a review with the total costs of those movies being 5,750,000 
zlotys.439 
It was clear that a figure of around 10% Polish movies being released in Poland was not 
satisfactory both for state propaganda and for the people that worked in the culture industry and 
there were live discussions over the years about the future development of the film industry in 
Poland. 
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 A new organization was formed called the Movie Section (Sekcja Filmova), which 
consisted of members of important ministries and they met several times to discuss the way 
forward. These members included representatives of the: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior 
Ministry, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public 
Education, members of WINO, PAT and OZN and on some occasions, they had invited some 
guest participants to their meetings like script writers and legal experts.440  
During those meetings, plans and actual problems were discussed and one of the key 
problems that emerged in these meetings was a lack of financial recourses for the development 
of domestic cinematography. This was mainly due to a low level of trading and capital being 
invested in film production. A representative of the PAT, Tadeusz Katelbach underlined that the 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce left a “symbolic” figure of 100,000 zlotys in its budget for 
the film industry during the period of 1936-1937. This figure compared with 1,000,000 zlotys in 
1931.441 These meetings also underlined the importance of short films for propaganda purposes 
in Poland and several suggestions were made to increase the financing for the Polish film 
industry.442 
 
The film industry in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had always served the propaganda 
purposes of the ruling circles, which were the royal family of Karadjordjevics. When one 
considered the lack of education and general knowledge amongst the majority of citizens in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, it was safe to conclude that this “technological miracle” had 
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1938. 357 13 370 121.120 
1937. 330 13 343 113.971 
1936. 301 17 318 106.014 
1935. 262 33 295 92.905 
• This number included travelling “silent” cinemas: for 1938 at 14, 1937 at 40, 1936 at 31 and 
1935 at 22 cinemas. 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Kingdome of Yugoslavia (1934-1939) 
 
 In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the existing cinemas showed different films. For example, 
108 cinemas showed films every day whilst 110 cinemas only showed films twice a week. Out of 
the biggest cities, Belgrade had 18 cinemas and Zagreb 16443 and  in those cinemas, American 
movies were dominant. During 1935, 678 movies were imported and from this list, 436 came 
from the United States (64%), 144 from Germany (21%), 30 from Austria (4%) and 27 from 
France (3%).444 
Throughout its Section for film and tourism, the CPB showed the propaganda film that 
was primarily political in nature. The main task of this section was to record all important 
political events, make movies about them and then distribute those movies to a wider audience.  
According to its data in 1936, the CPB produced 7,065 meters of film and all the other producers 
only 6,675445 so it was safe to conclude that the Central Bureau was the biggest producer of films 
in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and in addition to the procurement of a modern equipment section 
for film and tourism, the CPB also established good relations with foreign manufacturers, 
                                                 
443 All data from 1938. Statisticki godinjak [Statictical Yearbooks of Kingdome of Yugoslavia for 1938-1939], 
p.396. 
444 CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvestaj Drzavne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini 
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of Yugoslavia for 1935). 
445 Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Izveshtaj o radu za 1936.godinu (Report of annual work for 
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especially those from Germany.446 In addition to the recording and distributing films, the section 
for film and tourism dealt with the censorship of films and other products that were supposed to 
run in the country as well as the censorship of foreign films that were imported, together with the 
official CPB’s section for the application of the law for the press. These joint activities meant 
that the CPB had almost complete control over the development of the film industry in 
Yugoslavia. 
According to the chief of the Cultural Section of the Renewal, cinema was unknown to 
around 80% of the population in Bulgaria,447 but statistical data told us a different story. The 
number of cinemas in Bulgaria was indeed the lowest of the three countries reviewed as 
according to statistics, that number was during the following years: 1933 (114); 1934 (121); 
1935 (114); 1936 (116); 1937 (120); 1938 (142) and 155 in 1939.448 As one could see, the 
number of cinemas constantly grew, except in 1935 due to the economic crisis and this year was 
also critical due to the difficult economic climate in both Poland and Yugoslavia. Sofia had the 
most cinemas as in 1936; it had 32 of the 116 existing cinemas. 
In the existing statistics, one could find the most complete data for 1939. Of the 155 
cinemas in Bulgaria, only 32 were in the villages and 123 in the cities. The broadcast films in 
Bulgaria were more balanced, judging by their origin, than in Poland and Yugoslavia. From 
10,524 film showings, only 3,775 showed movies in English (35.9%). Of the others film 
showings, 2,833 were French speaking (26.9%), 2,622 were in German (24.9%) and 
interestingly, 608 movies came from the Soviet Union (5.8%). As one could see, films from the 
first communist country in the world were not imported or mentioned in the other two states 
under review. That could be due to the historical connections between Bulgaria and Russia and 
the fact that the Russian language and culture were closer to the common Bulgarian citizen. On 
the other hand, only 117 film showings were Bulgarian movies (around 1%).449 
The legislation that regulated the movie industry was very important to understand how 
the three states understood and used this powerful propaganda weapon. The legislation affecting 
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cinema in Poland during the 1930’s became law from March 1934. It regulated various matters 
such as the office rent, records and laboratories, the importation of the movies, the promotion of 
domestic production, the position of cinema, theatre and their technical personnel and 
censorship.  
The examination of films and advertisements was supposed to have been carried out by 
committees, whose composition, methods of appointment and dismissal, duties and powers were 
supposed to be specified by regulation from the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of 
Religious Affairs and Public Education (Art.18). In the one later article, this specified various 
reasons why some films should be banned:  “The authority can refuse permission to display the 
movie if the test shows that the public display would either jeopardize the vital interests of the 
Republic, security, tranquility and public order, damage the reputation of the Republic, or its 
relations abroad, damage the national honor or insult religious feelings, invoke a call to war, 
invoke savagery which affects the viewer or which has a demoralizing affect on them”.450 
The film industry of countries was also under the censorship of the state apparatus and 
when it came to making movies in Yugoslavia, state intervention began in 1928. It was in this 
year that the financial legislation proscribed that not one movie can be shown until it had been 
checked by the censors from the Ministry of Education“.451  
During the 1930’s, the film industry was governed by the State Film Center (Државна 
филмска централа) and a special censors’ committee, which consisted of twelve members and 
their deputies. The members of this committee were three representatives from the Ministry of 
Education, one representative from the Ministry of Army and Navy, two representatives of the 
Ministry of Social Welfare and Public Health (one member was a representative of the national 
women’s educational organizations), two representatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, one 
representative of the Ministry of Trade and one from the Central Press-Bureau.452 The law set the 
tasks of this organization as follows:  
a) to arange and oversee the import, production and transfer of the movies; 
b) to develop the domestic film industry; 
                                                 
450 Ustawa o filmach i ich wyświetlaniu, Dzienik Ustaw. Poz. 323, Nr. 36, p.586. 
451 Lj. Dimic, Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941, [Cultural Politics of Kingdome of Yugoslavia], 
III, (Belgrade, 1997), p.332. 
452 AY, the Fund of the Ministry for Education (66), folder no. 383, The Book of Regulations of the Censorship of 
Films of 22 February 1932. 
186 
 
c) To help education and useful film propaganda.453 
The valid law in this area in Bulgaria during the 1930’s was legalized from April 1930.454 
In its first article, it was underlined that cinematography was under the supreme control of the 
Ministry of People’s Education. Members of the censor’s committee were as follows: The chief 
of Department of cultural institutions and funds in the Ministry of People’s Education, the 
prosecutor from Sofia’s district or his deputy, one representative of Ministry Interior, one 
representative of Ministry for Health, one representative from the Educational committee and 
two special members delegated by the Minister of People’s Education (article 12). 
Representatives of other Ministries or institutions were only invited if the nature of the film 
requested their presence. 
At this point, it was important to mention some data about censorship, present and 
established by the law in these countries. Accordingly, the statistical data in Poland was as 
follows: 
Number of censored film in Poland 1934-1937 
 
Year Censored films Cleared films 
1934 780 769 
1935 714 699 
1936 652 638 
1937 619 605 
Maly Rocznik Statysticzny, Warszawa 1938, p. 336 
 
As one could see, most of the movies that came to the censors’ attention were cleared for 
broadcasting. This was due to the fact that most of the films were already made with the 
standards that would have been considered “acceptable” in the first place. 
                                                 
453 The Law arranging the Transfer of the Movies from 5th December 1931 with changes and appendixes according 
to the article 57/7 of the Financial Law from 1933/34. 
454 The “Law for Cinematography” was published on 29th April in the State’s Journal. 
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The State Film Center in Yugoslavia was a very busy institution. Only in 1935, they sent 
779 films to censors and of these, 100 were domestic and 678 foreign. Only 14 movies were 
forbidden, all of them foreign.455 
One of the most important institutions for the film propaganda of the Second Polish 
Republic was the Film Department of the PAT (Wydział Filmowy PAT). This department was 
formed in 1929 with the production of silent short films. After gathering modernized equipment 
in 1933, they started with the regular chronicles PAT’s Weekly Film Magazine (Tygodnik 
Filmowy PAT). Besides political films, those other films included other genres like musical, 
cultural, artistic etc… 
Short movies had the greatest propaganda significance in the Polish film industry and 
these consisted of a weekly newsreel produced by PAT. That production started in 1927 and until 
the outbreak of WW2, around 600 of them were produced and broadcast. Those films were about 
10 minutes long and only consisted of actual news. It was crucial to mention that the PAT’s 
newsreels were broadcast in every cinema before the regular film showings and in this instance, 
the propaganda impact was very strong and some serious results could have been achieved. Even 
the people who did not share the government’s point of view could have been consciously or 
subconsciously influenced by those journals. 
There were also some special films dedicated to some specific topics. Sometimes, these 
were cultural and educational but on some occasions, they were pure political propaganda. In 
1936, such movies were: Long live the Army (Niech Zyje Armia), Journey of General Edward 
Rydz Smigly to France (Podróż Gen.Edwarda Smigłego Rydza do Francji) and Long live Polish 
Marshal Edward Rydz Smigly (Niech Zyje Marszałek Polski Edward Smigły Rydz).456 The first 
film about the second Polish marshal was 200 minutes and the other was 180 meters long.457 In 
the same year, personnel of the PAT’s film section (“Wydział Filmowy”, founded in 1928) 
consisted of only 17 editors, eight technicians and four janitors and messengers.458 
The emphasis on the labels of the spheres of government exercised by the Central Bureau 
of Film (Centralne Biuro Filmowe, founded in 1928) and the films on the subject were very 
                                                 
455 CDA, 177k-3-927/1. Izvestaj Drzavne filmske centrale o prometu filmova i stanju kinematografa u Kraljevini 
Jugoslaviji 1935.godine (The Report from the State Film Center about the transfer of films and the state of cinemas 
in the Kingdome of Yugoslavia for 1935). 
456 AAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 8-21II. 
457 CAW, General Inspector of the Armed Forces - GISZ 302.4.1634. 
458 Ibid.  
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small and ineffective. Only in 1937, the newly formed Polish Film Company (Polska Spółka 
Filmowa) had made a patriotic and propaganda film Flame Heart (Płomienne serca) directed by 
Romuald Gantkowski. The film was well received by the authorities, received awards at the Film 
Fair in Lvov and got prizes from the War and Interior Ministries. Much less successful was the 
label Orion-Film whose film Commander (Komendant) directed by H. Bigoszta had not been 
approved by the censors for broadcast.459 
As one could see, 20 self-made films had already been made by the CPB during 1936 and 
all of these were broadcast in cinemas all over the country. Amongst the most interesting film 
titles, one could choose either: 
- Travel of the Prime Minister through the Montenegro (broadcast for 247 days with a total 
of 741 broadcasts in 55 cinemas in 46 different places); 
- Meeting of Little Antanta in Bled (broadcast for 252 days with a total of 765 broadcasts in 
70 cinemas in 54 different places); 
- The Opening of the railroad Veles – Bitola (broadcast for 137 days with a total of 411 
broadcasts in 28 cinemas in 26 different places); 
- Celebrations in Zenica (broadcast for 83 days with a total of 249 broadcasts in 18 
cinemas in 17 different places)…460 
The most interesting film from the propagandistic point of view in Yugoslavia was made 
in late 1938. The novelty was introduced during the government of Milan Stojadinovic in 
making the special Party propaganda film On the way of restoration – Yugoslavia yesterday, 
today and tomorrow (Путем препорода – Југославија јуче, данас, сутра).461 This movie was 
especially prepared for the pre-election campaign of December 1938.  
This movie was produced in co-operation with experts from the NSDAP and it was edited 
in Germany with the assistance of personnel from the government party JRZ. This group was led 
by Vojin Djordjevic, an official of the JRZ and the first secretary of the State Film Center. His 
presence left the lasting mark because he was used as the speaker for the movie, but this 
cooperation was not without difficulty.  
                                                 
459 Brzoza, Sowa, Historia Polski, p.432. 
460 Central Press-Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Izvestaj o radu za 1936.godinu [Report of annual work for 
1936], p.64. 
461 For the transcript of the movie see appendix 2. 
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In his report, Djordjevic said that Baron Von Wolzogen did things his way and seldom 
wanted to put some effects “on the cost of the context” 462 and the German side also promised the 
gift of one million placates, but there was no evidence that this promise was kept.463 The film 
arrived late, more than month after the election campaign had began mainly due to the fact that 
the election campaign had already started when the idea to create the film was first discussed. In 
Yugoslavia, 32 copies of the film arrived and during the final two weeks before the elections, the 
government’s propaganda focused its efforts on broadcasting the film in as many locations as 
possible. Purposefully, some cities in Croatia were avoided as no result was expected there and 
according to some reports, the greatest impact of this propaganda was felt in Belgrade.464 
The Director of Renewal Popzlatev, in his report in May 1935, in the final days of this 
propaganda institution, said that the propagandistic role of cinema did not develop due to some 
internal problems within the government.465 One of the reasons for that statement was the fact 
that control over the cinema remained in the hands of the Education Ministry and never passed to 
the Renewal. The Ministry strongly opposed to idea that control of the cinema should be 
entrusted to Popzlatev’s institution. 
In Bulgaria, as in Yugoslavia, there were movies dedicated to the royal dynasty. Those 
movies were propagandistic by nature and were meant for all kinds of social groups. Some of the 
various examples were movies like: Bulgarian Army under the Boris III (“Българската армия 
при цар Борис III”) and The Speech of his majesty Tsar Boris III (“Реч на Н. В. Цар Борис 
III”) as those films naturally did not have any problems with the censors. 
The most famous Bulgarian films with the national propaganda topics in the 1930’s were: 
Revolt of the Slaves (Бунтът на робите, 1933) Tracks of the Balkan (Песента на Балкана, 
1934), In front of the Fatherland we should forget hate (Пред отечеството да забравим 
омразата си, 1935), Enemies (Врагове, 1938), Duke Strahil (Страхил войвода, 1938). During 
the 1940’s, several new films were released with the help of the foundation Bulgarian Deed 
                                                 
462 AY, 37-12-388/390, The Report of Vojin Djordjevic sent to Gradimir Kozomaric, chief of Film Section of JRZ. 
463 AY, 37-12-383, The Letter of Gradimir Kozomaric sent to Milan Stojadinovic from 3rd November 1938. It was 
also interesting to mention stories about the special edition of the movie. It was said that in the end, Stojadinovic 
saluted “Hail Hitler”. That scene was meant only for Germans and it was never played in Yugoslavian cinemas. P. 
Lazetic, ‘Milan Stojadinovic i predizborna kampanja 1938’ [Milan Stojadinovic and the election campaign of 1938], 
Zbornik Istorijskog muzeja Srbije, number 25, (1988), p.124. 
464 AY, 37-12-392. 
465 CDA, 284k-3-42/35-36. 
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(Българско дело). The most well-known films with the strongest national propaganda messages 






The media played a key role in creating, developing and spreading the government’s 
propaganda in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s.  The press was the most 
disperse and the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly, especially in the 
final years before World War Two. The press was also the oldest instrument of state propaganda, 
but also practically the only one that was used by the opposition.  
The governments in these three states tried, but failed to control all newspapers. During 
the whole period, the opposition and neutral press was active and very powerful and one of the 
most readable newspapers in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was not under the control of the 
government, or at least not completely anyway. Harsh censorship was deployed that only partly 
managed to change public opinion completely to the government’s satisfaction. Censorship 
pressure varied depending on the situation, but this remained a constant enemy of the freedom of 
the press. 
During the 1930’s, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of 
these governments. Whilst the start of its development was similar to that in most European 
countries, future development of the radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was slower.  
Ruling circles in these countries soon realized the power of this tool as a form of 
propaganda. During the 1930’s, they invested plenty of resources into its modernization with 
new stations being built and already existing stations being improved and strengthened. The 
number of radio owners increased significantly from year to year but despite all these factors, 
these three states remained at the bottom of the European countries’ list for total number of radio 
owners. The Polish, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments tried to use radio more often as part of 
their plans and desires as radio became the state’s property over the years and many editors were 
                                                 
466 A. Grozev, Nachaloto. Iz istoriyata na balgarskoto kino 1896-1956 [The Beginning. From the History of 
Bulgarian Cinema 1895-1956], (Sofia, 1985), pp.77-84 and pp.165-168. 
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removed from editorials in radio stations because of political disagreements with the 
governments.  Despite its slower development, in comparison to some European countries, the 
radio was seen as a powerful tool in the hands of the government to help with its propaganda 
objectives. 
Film industry was the easiest to control for the governments of the three countries 
because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period under review. The 
government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered 
“acceptable” were broadcast in the cinemas. Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria was poor in comparison to imported films and the company owned by the 
government, or governments’ institutions, made several short propaganda movies and numerous 
newsreels in an attempt to influence public opinion in its favor. Nevertheless, despite its relative 
lack of numbers, the impact of film could not be underestimated because it offered more than the 

























The state propaganda is a deliberate attempt made by the ruling classes to influence the 
opinions of people through the transmission of ideas and values for their specific purposes, both 
by giving or by withholding information. State propaganda is as old as the state itself and has 
existed throughout the centuries, but over time, it has become better organized, along with the 
development of the means of communication and propaganda techniques. The Twentieth century 
has been a real breakthrough and a giant step forward for the development of state propaganda 
and the period of the 1930’s occupies special meaning in this development. With the modern 
means of propaganda at the time, especially radio, it was possible to broadcast messages across 
the boundaries of the individual states and for them to have a much wider impact than before. 
The state propaganda in Europe during the 1930’s was usually carried out by ministries, 
propaganda departments, sections that were located within the individual ministries, private and 
non-governmental organizations. Looking into the institutional organizations, one could classify 
two groups of countries: ones with the ministry for propaganda and ones with the propaganda 
departments within the ministries, government’s bodies or institutions subordinated to them. 
There were only few countries that decided to have a ministry for propaganda before the 
outbreak of the Second World War. The classical examples were Germany and Italy that formed 
their ministries for propaganda in 1933 and 1935 and this was due to the fact that already in the 
1930’s, the word “propaganda” had negative vibes and naming such a ministry raised suspicion 
among others. Even Italy renamed its ministry shortly after the foundation of its own propaganda 
ministry and it became the Ministry for Popular Culture in 1937, but the purpose of this ministry 
remained the same. Some states tried with the same ministry like France in 1938 but those 
attempts were short-lived. 
Most of the other European countries had their own propaganda institutions within some 
ministry. The Central European countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary had two press 
departments within the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the general 
division between them was that the first one was pre-occupied with internal affairs and the 
second with foreign propaganda. However, the relevance of the most important propaganda 
department in the specific countries varied e.g. in Czechoslovakia and Romania, the press 
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department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was dominant and in Turkey and Albania, the 
Ministry of Interior was dominant. Special directions for propaganda, as independent institutions, 
existed in Romania (the General Direction for Press and Propaganda), Portugal (the Secretary for 
National Propaganda) and Greece (the sub-Ministry of Press and Tourism). 
 At the beginning of the Twentieth century, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were newly 
formed states so they had limited experience in the organization of the state’s affairs where 
propaganda had a significant role. The organization of the state propaganda in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s was complex and somewhat difficult for a historian 
to reconstruct due to a lack of sources and in the state propaganda of the countries under  review, 
one could find many similarities, but even more differences.  
Propaganda apparatus functioned in two main directions: at home and abroad and the 
main task of internal propaganda was probably the control of information released to the public. 
That was accomplished firstly by the “filtration” of the news and secondly by censorship and the 
control of information and censorship was part of the state propaganda of the three countries 
under review.  
One could say that that was the primary objective of the propaganda organization and this 
task wasn’t easy because of the existence of opposition that had been active in the whole period 
under review and even under difficult circumstances, the opposition was very strong (Yugoslavia 
in 1938, Poland and Bulgaria in 1935). An even bigger problem for state propaganda was 
perhaps the opposition within i.e. conflicts of interest within the ruling circle, from top to 
bottom, from government members to basic clerks where vanity, rivalry, personal vendettas were 
serious problems for the functioning of state propaganda organizations in these countries. In 
times of limited and restricted democracy, those problems were more acute and more frequent.  
One of the most important similarities between Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was the 
fact that key propaganda decisions were made within small groups of people, often within 
informal groups and the existing propaganda structures were only present to legalize decisions 
that had already been made. They were well financed and their job was one of the most valued in 
the administration with the heads of the propaganda institutions normally being experienced 
journalists who were well educated, intelligent and most importantly, loyal to the regimes. 
The Offices for the Press existed in the countries under review and this was 
commonplace in 1930’s Europe as they were present in every important ministry, but the most 
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important ones were placed in the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Interior.  
During this period, changes occurred that made all three countries different. Poland had 
the most influential press offices in the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Ministry of War until the end of this period. In interwar Yugoslavia, there was the creation of 
the Central Press Bureau in 1929 and this meant that the press offices within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior became less important. Bulgaria was somewhere in 
between the two and at one time; Bulgaria had a central organization (The Directorate for Social 
Renewal, 1934-1935) and offices for the press that functioned separately in the different 
ministries. 
The most important central state propaganda institution in the three countries was the 
Yugoslav Central Press-Bureau (CPB) and this institution was divided into the Administrative, 
the Information and the Publicist Departments throughout most of its existence. These 
departments executed the tasks proscribed by the Book of Regulations and they were divided 
into sections the most important being the Information Department.  
This Department controlled the key tasks such as pre-release proofing of the issues of the 
press (actions which practically amounted to censorship) and informing the home media of the 
situation at home and abroad. Almost all the papers which were published in the country had to 
be pre-emptively proofread before their release and in the towns where there were no 
representatives of the CPB, this task was fulfilled by the state prosecution offices or by the 
officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The information released on the part of the CPB was 
obligatory for all the media in the state and their going along with this practice was achieved 
through warnings, and sometimes even through threats and blackmailing. Apart from the central 
institution, the important jobs were also done by the correspondents who were stationed in the 
most important European cities and in the centers of banovinas in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
 The CPB had a significant number of civil servants and this number was usually round 
150, amongst them were those who were officially employed (on a “regular” salary) and those 
who were secret associates because of the nature of their tasks (on a “secret” salary). The 
institution was financed from the overall budget for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.  
The CPB was financed on regular basis and it usually received an approximately similar 
amount of money (slightly over 18 million dinars), which was considerable financial support at 
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the time. In comparison with the neighboring countries, this financial support was great and this 
was even greater than the spending of countries of a similar size like Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey 
and Czechoslovakia. Still, they spent far less on propaganda than the more developed European 
countries, such as Germany, UK and Italy, but this could also be said of some of the neighboring 
countries, which invested considerable finance into the development of their propaganda, for 
example Hungary.  
The Office for the Press within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Poland and Bulgaria (in 
Yugoslavia only up to 1929) controlled most of the foreign propaganda, together with the 
embassies’ employees, foreign press correspondents and one of the national telegraph agencies. 
Judging by the budget levels, that couldn’t be fully established in this study due to secrecy from 
the governments, Poland spent the most money on foreign propaganda during the 1930’s. That 
was understandable, not only because Poland was the biggest of the three examined countries, 
but also due to a complex situation that was dictated by its geographical position between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. 
There were several similarities between the propaganda organizations in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and propaganda organizations in contemporary Germany and Italy. It 
was correct to say that some of the ideas and structural types in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
were copied from Germany and Italy (for example, the organization of the Committee for 
Coordination of Propaganda in Poland was very similar to the Fascist Ministry for National 
Culture in Italy). However, every propaganda organization was unique due to many factors such 
as cultural differences and that specific state’s political background and it is a personal opinion 
that fascist copies were made mainly for practical reasons because they seemed to work 
practically in Germany and Italy rather than for political likes or dislikes of those regimes. 
The tendency towards increasing centralization of the state propaganda organizations in 
Europe during the last decade before the Second World War was also apparent in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Those tendencies, so obvious in the countries under review in the 
1930’s, had a logical ending in the creation of separate propaganda ministries in Poland and 
Bulgaria after the outbreak of war. In Yugoslavia, that ministry already unofficially existed in the 
form of the Central Press Bureau during the whole of the examined period. 
The news agencies in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were in many ways similar but 
also significantly different. The Polish Telegraph Agency (PAT), Avala Agency and Bulgarian 
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Telegraph Agency (BTA) had the same main responsibilities which were to inform the domestic 
public about events abroad and to inform the foreign public about the situation at home.  
Those main tasks were no different than ones that had other agencies during this period 
all around the world and all three agencies under review had an obligation to inform the public at 
home and abroad “in accordance to the public state interest”. Nevertheless, their most important 
role was to transmit official information, which came from the top of the governing hierarchy so 
everybody knew that the information released was official and “checked”. 
The three agencies were different in size, their relationships with the government, their 
structure, levels of funding and several other, none the less, important things. The BTA, Avala 
and PAT were formed as governmental institutions with the aim to inform and propaganda was, 
without doubt, one of the main content of the agencies’ work, but the three agencies had different 
organizational structures from within their own governments.  
The BTA was initially part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but over time, its position 
weakened and during the 1930’s, the agency even became part of the Office for the Press and 
was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its budget was part of the Ministry’s budget 
and its directors were directors of the Office for the Press. 
Although it was also a state agency, the PAT was in a different position in Poland than its 
Bulgarian counterpart. From the beginning, the PAT was structurally an independent institution 
with various additional tasks and functions and one could conclude, judging by the existing 
documents, that the PAT was considerably better organized than other two agencies. Movie 
making, independent publishing work, wide range foreign correspondent network, highly 
functional advertisement offices were only tied to the Polish agency during the 1930’s.  
The case of the Yugoslav counterpart was different to the other two. The agency started 
as part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but that was changed after a decade when the Avala 
Agency, according to common European practice in the Interwar period, was transformed into a 
joint stock company, but with the state as the dominant owner of the capital as it owned over 
90% of stock capital. Therefore, the transformation of the agency basically meant a structural, 
but not a core change and Avala remained an instrument of the state propaganda and a state 
controlled institution throughout the whole period of its existence. 
The Yugoslav and Bulgarian agencies received an annual donation from the state and in 
the case of Avala, this donation amounted to 5 million dinars, but this sum did not satisfy its 
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needs. The finances were often not spent purposefully, so Avala, almost constantly, worked with 
losses and the BTA was totally dependent on the state funding and the income generated from 
subscribers was not enough to match the costs of both the agencies’ work.  
The only of the three agencies that was almost self-financed was the PAT as the income 
gained from advertisements and especially from sold publications and movies was significant 
and important. However, even those incomes were sometimes insufficient to cover the growing 
costs of the Polish news agency organization and it’s well developed business. 
The difference between the three agencies under the examination was maybe best 
illustrated when one considered the number of the employees with each agency. With the around 
1,000 employees, the PAT was by far the biggest of the three, almost ten times larger than Avala 
and more than thirteen times larger than its Bulgarian counterpart. This difference was also 
apparent when one analyzed the correspondent network so while the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian 
agencies had none or only a few correspondents abroad, the PAT had a highly developed 
organization on a global level with between 70 and 100 foreign correspondents, equivalent to the 
French Havas, which was one of the leading global agencies. 
Judging by the above data, one could also conclude that the Polish Telegraph Agency had 
a more significant role in the state propaganda than news agencies in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. 
The PAT had more responsibilities like publishing official data such as books and magazines and 
making the films that were, in the cases of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the responsibility of other 
propaganda institutions. Those assignments were well beyond the common news agency job 
scope, which only underlined the statement expressed above about the Polish Telegraph 
Agency’s propaganda influence. 
The media (the press, radio and cinema) and people working in them played a very 
important role in creating, developing and spreading the government’s propaganda in Poland, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s.  The press, of the three, was the most disperse and 
the most used tool, but the use of radio and film increased rapidly over time, especially in the 
final years before the Second World War. The press was also the oldest instrument of state 
propaganda, but in the same time, it was practically the only tool that was used by the opposition 
in the three states under review. 
The governments in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria tried, but failed to control all 
newspapers. During the whole period, the opposition and neutral press were active and very 
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powerful and one of the most readable newspapers in these three states was not under the control 
of the government, or at least not completely anyway. Harsh censorship was deployed, but this 
only partly managed to change public opinion completely to the government’s satisfaction and 
censorship pressure varied depending on the internal and foreign situation, but this remained a 
constant enemy of freedom of the press. 
During the 1930’s, radio became an increasingly used propaganda tool in the hands of all 
three governments and the techniques used became more advanced as radio became cheaper, 
thus closer to the common people. The development of radio in Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria 
followed a global trend, but this growth was still slower than in many European countries.  
The ruling circles in these countries soon realized the power of this tool as a form of 
propaganda and during the 1930’s, they invested plenty of resources into its modernization with 
new stations being built and already existing stations being improved and strengthened.  
The number of radio owners increased significantly from year to year but despite all these 
factors, these three states remained at the bottom of the European countries’ list for total number 
of radio owners. The most advanced of the three was Poland where the number of subscribers 
passed one million and the Polish, Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments tried to use radio more 
often as part of their plans and desires as radio became the state’s property over the years and 
many editors were removed from editorials in radio stations because of political disagreements 
with the governments. Despite its slower development, in comparison to some European 
countries, radio was seen as a powerful tool in the hands of the governments to help with their 
overall propaganda objectives. 
The film industry was the easiest to control for the governments of the three countries 
because censorship was legalized and constantly present during the period under review. The 
government committees examined every film, domestic or foreign and only those considered 
“acceptable” were broadcast in the cinemas. Domestic production of films in Poland, Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria was poor in comparison to imported films and the companies owned by the 
government, or governments’ institutions, made several short propaganda movies and numerous 
newsreels in an attempt to influence public opinion in its favor.  
Nevertheless, despite its relative lack of numbers, the impact of film could not be 
underestimated because it offered more than the press and radio as it combined the effects of 
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picture and sound. Poland was also ahead of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in this area and movies 
were often used, even in the schools, for educational purposes. 
 The organization of state propaganda in Eastern and Southeastern Europe respectively in 
Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria during the 1930’s followed many different models set by the 
other European countries. Those examples were often combined with the local tradition and 
experiences with the main aim of the state propaganda in those countries being to control 
domestic public opinion and the organization was set accordingly and the structure was also 




























La propaganda di Stato è un tentativo deliberato, messo in atto dalle classi dirigenti, di 
influenzare le opinioni della popolazione attraverso la trasmissione di idee e valori al servizio di 
specifici obiettivi, sia fornendo sia trattenendo informazioni. La propaganda di stato è antica 
quanto lo Stato stesso ed è esistita per secoli. Nel tempo è diventata più organizzata di pari passo 
con lo sviluppo dei mezzi di comunicazione e delle tecniche. Il ventesimo secolo è il vero punto 
di svolta e un gigantesco passo avanti per la propaganda di stato e in questo gli anni Trenta 
occupano un posto di notevole rilievo. Con i moderni mezzi della propaganda, specialmente la 
radio, è stato possibile trasmettere messaggi attraverso i confini dei singoli Stati ed è stato 
possibile conferire a questi messaggi un impatto molto maggiore che in precedenza. 
La propaganda di stato in Europa durante gli anni Trenta era abitualmente gestita da 
ministeri, dipartimenti, sezioni che erano situate presso i singoli ministeri, organizzazioni private 
e non governative. Per quanto riguarda le organizzazioni istituzionali, gli Stati possono essere 
classificati in due gruppi: quelli che avevano un ministero della propaganda e quelli che avevano 
dipartimenti deputati alla propoganda all’interno dei ministeri, degli organi di governo o delle 
istituzioni a essi subordinate. 
Solo pochi Paesi decisero di istituire ministeri della propaganda prima dello scoppio della 
Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Gli esempi classici sono la Germania e l’Italia, che fondarono 
ministeri deputati alla propaganda rispettivamente nel 1933 e nel 1935. Questo fu dovuto al fatto 
che già negli anni Trenta la parola propaganda assunse un significato principalmente negativo e 
il dare questo nome a un ministero avrebbe suscitato sospetti negli altri Paesi. Persino l’Italia 
rinominò il proprio ministero, poco dopo la fondazione, in Ministero della Cultura Popolare 
(1937), ma lo scopo del ministero rimase lo stesso. Alcuni stati, come la Francia nel 1938, fecero 
tentativi con lo stesso ministero, ma questi tentativi ebbero breve vita. 
La maggior parte degli altri Paesi europei ebbe istituzioni mirate alla propaganda 
all’interno di qualche ministero. Due Stati dell’Europa centrale, la Cecoslovacchia e l’Ungheria, 
avevano due dipartimenti per la stampa presso il Consiglio dei Ministri e il Ministero per gli 
Affari Esteri. La sostanziale differenza fra essi era che il primo si occupava degli affari interni, il 
secondo della propaganda estera. Comunque, la rilevanza dei più importanti dipartimenti della 
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propaganda nei singoli Paesi variava: in Cecoslovacchia e Romania, per esempio, il dipartimento 
della stampa all’interno del Ministero degli Affari Esteri era dominante, mentre in Turchia e 
Albania era preponderante il Ministero degli Interni. Speciali direzioni per la propaganda, nella 
forma di istituzioni indipendenti, esistevano in Romania (la Direzione Generale per la Stampa e 
la Propaganda), Portogallo (la Segreteria per la Propaganda Nazionale) e Grecia (il 
Sottoministero della Stampa e del Turismo). 
All’inizio del ventesimo secolo la Polonia, la Jugoslavia e la Bulgaria erano Stati di 
recente formazione, dunque con limitata esperienza nella gestione degli affari di stato, nei quali 
la propaganda occupava una posizione di rilievo. L’organizzazione della propaganda di stato in 
Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta era complessa ed è difficile per uno storico 
oggi ricostruirla a causa della scarsità di fonti. Nella propaganda di stato dei Paesi presi in esame 
si possono trovare diverse somiglianze, ma soprattutto differenze. 
L’apparato della propaganda funzionava in due direzioni principali: in patria e all’estero. 
L’obiettivo della propaganda interna era probabilmente il controllo dell’informazione disponibile 
presso il pubblico. Ciò era ottenuto innanzi tutto attraverso il “filtraggio” delle notizie e in 
secondo luogo attraverso la censura. Il controllo dell’informazione e la censura erano parte della 
propaganda di stato dei tre Paesi. Si potrebbe affermare che quello fosse l’oggetto principale 
dell’organizzazione della propaganda. Questo obiettivo non era semplice per l’esistenza di 
un’opposizione esistita durante tutto il periodo in esame. Anche in circostanze difficili 
l’opposizione fu molto forte, soprattutto durante alcuni periodi (in Jugoslavia nel 1938, in 
Polonia e Bulgaria nel 1935). Un ostacolo anche maggiore per la propaganda di stato fu forse 
l’opposizione interna, cioè i conflitti fra interessi contrapposti all’interno degli ambienti di 
governo, dal vertice alla base, dai membri del governo ai semplici impiegati. Protagonismi, 
rivalità, vendette personali furono problemi gravi per il funzionamento delle organizzazioni della 
propaganda di stato in questi paesi. In tempi di democrazia ristretta questi problemi furono più 
acuti e più frequenti. 
Una delle somiglianze principali fra Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria fu il fatto che le 
decisioni chiave riguardanti la propaganda fossero prese all’interno di piccoli gruppi di persone, 
spesso all’interno di gruppi aggregatisi informalmente. Le strutture ufficiali erano presenti solo 
per legalizzare decisioni che erano già state prese. Esse erano ben finanziate e il loro lavoro era 
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uno fra i più apprezzati nella pubblica amministrazione. I vertici delle istituzioni della 
propaganda erano quasi sempre esperti giornalisti, colti, intelligenti e soprattutto leali al regime. 
Uffici stampa esistevano nei paesi in esame e questa era una situazione frequente 
nell’Europa degli anni Trenta. Essi erano presenti in ogni ministero rilevante, ma i più importanti 
erano quelli presso il Consiglio dei Ministri, il Minstero degli Affari Esteri e il Ministero degli 
Interni. Durante questo periodo si verificarono cambiamenti che resero differenti i tre Paesi. La 
Polonia aveva gli uffici stampa più influenti presso il Consiglio dei Ministri, il Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri e il Ministero della Guerra fino alla fine di questo periodo. In Jugoslavia fra le due 
guerre fu creato l’Ufficio Centrale per la Stampa (1929) e questo significò che gli uffici stampa 
dei Ministeri degli Affari Esteri e degli Interni divennero meno importanti. La Bulgaria era in 
qualche modo a metà strada fra questi due modelli. A un certo punto, la Bulgaria ebbe 
un’organizzazione centrale (il Direttivo per il Rinnovamento Sociale, 1934-35) e uffici stampa 
che funzionavano indipendentemente nei singoli ministeri. 
L’istituzione centrale per la propaganda di stato più importante nei tre Paesi fu l’Ufficio 
Centrale per la Stampa (UCS) della Jugoslavia. L’istituzione restò divisa nei Dipartimenti 
Amministrativo, d’Informazione e Pubblicista per la maggior parte della sua esistenza. Questi 
dipartimenti rendevano esecutivi gli obiettivi fissati dal Libro dei Regolamenti ed erano divisi in 
sezioni. Il più importante dei tre menzionati era il Dipartimento d’Informazione. Esso era 
incaricato delle missioni chiave come l’approvazione delle pubblicazioni precedente alla stampa 
(azioni che praticamente sostituivano la censura) e la fornitura di informazioni ai media nazionali 
sulla situazione nel Paese e all’estero. Quasi tutto ciò che era pubblicato nel Paese dove essere 
preventivamente approvato prima della distribuzione e nelle città in cui non esistevano 
rappresentanti dell’UCS questo incarico era svolto dagli uffici della Procura di Stato o dagli 
ufficiali del Ministero degli Affari Interni. Le informazioni rilasciate da parte dell’UCS 
dovevano essere obbligatoriamente divulgate da tutti i media dello Stato.La continuità in questa 
pratica era raggiunta attraverso avvisi e talvolta attraverso minacce o ricatti. Al di là 
dell’istituzione centrale, un lavoro importante era svolto anche dai corrispondenti che erano 
insediati nelle cità europee più importanti e nei centri delle banovine (dipartimenti 
amministrativi) del Regno di Jugoslavia. 
L’UCS aveva un numero significativo di addetti civili, numero che si aggirava intorno ai 
150. Fra essi alcuni erano ufficialmente assunti (a salario regolare) e altri erano associati 
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segretamente in ragione della natura dei loro compiti (ed erano pagati segretamente). 
L’istituzione era finanziata tramite un bilancio che era parte di quello della Presidenza del 
Consiglio dei Ministri. L’UCS era finanziato su base regolare. Esso riceveva solitamente un un 
ammontare approssimativamente fisso di denaro (di poco superiore ai 18 milioni di dinari), una 
somma notevole per l’epoca. A confronto con i Paesi confinanti i finanziamenti erogati erano più 
alti rispetto a quelli ricevuti da istituzioni simili per natura e dimensioni (quelle bulgara, greca, 
turca e cecoslovacca). Eppure, erano lontani dai mezzi finanziari che Paesi europei più evoluti, 
come Germania, Inghilterra e Italia, riversavano in simili istituzioni. Ciò è valido anche per 
alcuni dei Paesi confinanti che erogavano finanziamenti considerevoli per lo sviluppo della loro 
propaganda (è il caso, per esempio, dell’Ungheria). 
L’Ufficio per la Stampa presso il Ministero degli Affari Esteri in Polonia e Bulgaria (in 
Jugoslavia solo fino al 1929) controllava la maggior parte della propaganda estera assieme al 
personale delle ambasciate, ai corrispondenti esteri della stampa e a una delle agenzie nazionali 
dei telegrafi. A giudicare dal livello del bilancio, che non ho potuto stabilire con precisione nel 
mio studio a causa della segretezza mantenuta dai governi, la Polonia spendeva la quota più alta 
di finanziamenti nella propaganda estera durante gli anni Trenta. Ciò è comprensibile non solo in 
quanto la Polonia era il più esteso dei tre Paesi esaminati, ma anche in ragione della complessa 
situazione determinata dalla posizione geografica fra la Germania nazista e l’Unione Sovietica. 
C’erano diverse somiglianze fra le organizzazioni della propaganda di Polonia, Jugoslavia e 
Bulgaria e quelle contemporanee di Germania e Italia. È corretto affermare che alcune delle idee 
e delle tipologie strutturali in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria furono copiate da quelle di 
Germania e Italia (per esempio, l’organizzazione del Comitato per la Coordinazione della 
Propaganda in Polonia era molto simile al Ministero per la Cultura Popolare fascista). 
Comunque, ogni organizzazione per la propaganda era unica a causa di molti fattori come le 
differenze culturali e il background politico specifico di ogni Stato. È mia opinione che i calchi 
delle strutture utilizzate dal fascismo fossero realizzati principalmente per ragioni pratiche, in 
quanto sembravano funzionare in Germania e Italia, e meno per l’apprezzamento politico di quei 
regimi. 
La tendenza a incrementare la centralizzazione delle organizzazioni della propaganda di 
stato in Europa durante l’ultimo decennio prima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale vi fu 
apparentemente anche in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria. Questa tendenza, così ovvia nei Paesi 
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esaminati durante gli anni Trenta, ebbe la sua conclusione logica nella creazione di singoli 
ministeri della propaganda in Polonia e Bulgaria dopo lo scoppio della guerra. In Jugoslavia tale 
ministero esisteva già in via non ufficiale nella forma dell’Ufficio Centrale della Stampa durante 
tutto il periodo esaminato. 
Le agenzie di stampa in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria erano per molti versi simili ma 
anche significativamente diverse. L’Agenzia Polacca dei Telegrafi (APT), l’Agenzia Avala e 
l’Agenzia dei Telegrafi della Bulgaria (ATB) avevano gli stessi obiettivi principali, cioè 
informare il pubblico nazionale sugli avvenimenti esteri e informare il pubblico estero sulla 
situazione nel Paese. Questi obiettivi principali non erano diversi da quelli delle altre agenzie 
diffuse nello stesso periodo in tutto il mondo. Le tre agenzie in esame avevano l’obbligo di 
informare il pubblico nazionale e quello estero “in conformità all’interesse pubblico dello Stato”. 
Tuttavia, il loro ruolo principale era trasmettere le informazioni ufficiali provenienti dai vertici 
delle strutture di governo. Ognuno sapeva che le informazioni rilasciate da questi organi erano 
ufficiali e “controllate”. 
Le tre agenzie erano diverse per dimensioni, relazioni con il governo, struttura, 
finanziamenti e numerosi altri non meno importanti fattori. L’ATB, l’Avala e l’APT erano state 
formate come istituzioni governative con l’obiettivo di informare. La propaganda era oltre ogni 
dubbio uno degli argomenti principali del lavoro delle agenzie. Tuttavia, le tre agenzie avevano 
forme di organizzazioni differenti all’interno del governo. L’ATB fu fin dall’inizio parte del 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Con il passare del tempo la sua posizione si fece persino più 
debole. Durante gli anni Trenta l’agenzia divenne parte dell’Ufficio per la Stampa subordinato al 
Ministero degli Affari Esteri. Il suo bilancio era parte del bilancio del Ministero e i suoi direttori 
erano direttori dell’Ufficio per la Stampa. 
Pur essendo anch’essa un’agenzia dello Stato, l’APT era in Polonia in una posizione 
diversa rispetto alla controparte bulgara. Fin dall’inizio l’APT fu un’istituzione strutturalmente 
indipendente con vari compiti e funzioni addizionali. Possiamo concludere, in base ai documenti 
esistenti, che l’APT era di gran lunga meglio organizzata rispetto alle altre due agenzie. La 
produzione di film, la pubblicazione autonoma di materiale, un network di corrispondenti esteri 
ad ampio raggio, un ufficio di pubblicità perfettamente funzionante furono propri solamente 
dell’agenzia polacca negli anni Trenta. 
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Il caso della controparte iugoslava è differente dagli altri due. L’agenzia fu avviata come 
parte del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, ma la situazione cambiò dopo un decennio. L’agenzia 
Avala, conformemente alla pratica comune europea nel periodo fra le due guerre, fu trasformata 
in una Società a Responsabilità Limitata con lo Stato nelle vesti di proprietario del capitale (oltre 
il 90%). Dunque la trasformazione dell’agenzia fu soprattutto strutturale, ma non concettuale. 
Avala rimase lo strumento della propaganda e lo Stato continuò a controllare l’istituzione per 
tutto il periodo della sua esistenza. 
Le agenzie iugoslava e bulgara ricevevano la donazione annua dallo Stato. Nel caso 
dell’Avala tale donazione ammontava a 5 milioni di dinari, ma questa somma non era sufficiente. 
Le disponibilità finanziarie spesso non erano spese in modo mirato, quindi Avala, quasi 
regolarmente, lavorava in perdita. Anche l’ATB era totalmente dipendente dai finanziamenti 
statali. L’introito derivante dalle sottoscrizioni non era sufficiente per coprire i costi in entrambe 
le agenzie. L’unica fra le tre a essere quasi autofinanziata era l’APT. L’introito ricavato tramite 
la pubblicità e, soprattutto, le pubblicazioni vendute e i film era significativo. Tuttavia, persino 
questi solidi ricavi erano talvolta insufficienti a coprire i costi crescenti dell’organizzazione 
dell’agenzia di stampa polacca e del suo ben organizzato business. 
La differenza fra le tre agenzie esaminate diviene forse più evidente se si guarda al 
numero di impiegati. Con i suoi 1000 impiegati circa l’APT era di gran lunga la maggiore delle 
tre, quasi dieci volte più grande dell’Avala e più di tredici volte l’omologa bulgara. Questa 
differenza è evidente anche se guardiamo al network di corrispondenti. Mentre le agenzie 
iugoslava e bulgara avevano pochi o nessun corrispondente all’estero, l’APT aveva 
un’organizzazione avanzata che si piazzava ai massimi livelli mondiali (da 70 fino a 100 
corrispondenti esteri come la francese Havas, una delle agenzie leader globali). 
Giudicando in base ai dati presentati qui sopra possiamo anche concludere che l’Agenzia 
Polacca dei Telegrafi aveva un ruolo più significativo nella propaganda di stato rispetto alle 
agenzie di stampa in Jugoslavia e Bulgaria. l’APT aveva maggiori responsabilità, come la 
pubblicazione di libri e riviste di dati ufficiali e la realizzazione di film che nei casi della 
Jugoslavia e della Bulgaria erano obiettivi di altre istituzioni finalizzate alla propaganda. Questi 
incarichi andavano ben oltre i consueti lavori delle agenzie di stampa, punto che sottolinea 
l’affermazione fatta in precedenza a proposito della rilevanza della propaganda dell’Agenzia 
Polacca dei Telegrafi. 
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I mezzi di comunicazione (stampa, radio e cinema) e coloro che in essi lavoravano 
rivestivano un ruolo molto importante nella creazione, nello sviluppo e nella diffusione della 
propaganda governativa in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta. La stampa, fra 
i tre citati, era il mezzo più diffuso e sfruttato. L’uso della radio e dei film crebbe poi 
rapidamente, specialmente negli ultimi anni prima della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. La stampa 
era anche lo strumento più antico della propaganda, ma allo stesso tempo praticamente l’unico a 
essere usato dall’opposizione nei tre stati esaminati. 
I governi in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria tentarono senza successo di contollare tutti i 
giornali. Durante tutto il periodo, l’opposizione e la stampa neutrale rimasero attive e molto 
influenti e uno dei giornali più letti nei tre stati non era sotto il controllo del governo, o almeno 
non del tutto. Fu dispiegata una dura censura che solo in parte riuscì a cambiare la pubblica 
opinione nella direzione voluta dal governo. La pressione della censura variava a seconda della 
situazione interna ed estera, ma rimase una nemica costante della libertà di stampa. 
Durante gli anni Trenta la radio divenne uno strumento di propaganda sempre più utile 
nelle mani dei governi. Le tecniche divennero più avanzate e la radio divenne più economica, 
quindi più vicina alla gente comune. Lo sviluppo della radio in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria 
seguì questo trend, ma fu più lento che in altri Paesi europei. 
La classe dirigente in questi Paesi comprese presto il potere di questo strumento come 
mezzo di propaganda. Durante gli anni Trenta essi investirono abbondanti risorse nella 
modernizzazione delle radio attraverso la costruzione di nuove stazioni e lo sviluppo e il 
rafforzamento delle stazioni già esistenti. Il numero dei possessori di radio crebbe 
significativamente di anno in anno, ma a dispetto di tutti questi fattori i tre Paesi in esame 
rimasero in fondo alla classifica dei Paesi europei per numero totale di possessori di apparecchi 
radio. Il più avanzato dei tre fu la Polonia, nella quale il numero dei sottoscrittori superò il 
milione. I governi polacco, jugoslavo e bulgaro tentarono di usare la radio più spesso come parte 
dei loro progetti e obiettivi quando la radio divenne proprietà degli Stati attraverso gli anni e 
molti commentatori furono rimossi dalle stazioni radio per contrasti politici con i governi. 
Nonostante il suo sviluppo più lento in confronto a quello di altri Paesi europei, la radio fu vista 




L’industria cinematografica fu la più facilmente controllabile per i governi dei tre Paesi in 
quanto la censura era legalizzata e costantemente presente durante il periodo esaminato. I 
comitati di governo esaminavano ogni film nazionale o estero e solo quelli considerati 
“accettabili” erano distribuiti nei cinema. La produzione nazionale di film in Polonia, Jugoslavia 
e Bulgaria era scarsa se confrontata con i film d’importazione. Le compagnie di proprietà del 
governo, o dalle istituzioni, realizzarono numerosi cortometraggi propagandistici e molti 
cinegiornali nel tentativo di influenzare la pubblica opinione a proprio favore. Tuttavia, 
nonostante la relativa scarsità numerica, l’impatto dei film non deve essere sottovalutato in 
quanto, combinando immagini e suoni, offriva più di quanto facesse la stampa. La Polonia era 
anche in questo campo superiore alla Jugoslavia e alla Bulgaria e i film erano spesso usati anche 
nelle scuole per fini educativi. 
L’organizzazione della propaganda di stato nell’Europa orientale e sudorientale 
rispettivamente in Polonia, Jugoslavia e Bulgaria durante gli anni Trenta seguì molti modelli 
differenti stabiliti da altri Paesi europei. Questi esempi erano spesso combinati con la tradizione 
e le esperienze locali. L’obiettivo principale della propaganda di stato era controllare l’opinione 
pubblica nazionale e l’organizzazione era stabilita di conseguenza. La struttura era anche legata 




















GUIDELINES FOR THE PROPAGANDA OF POLISH 
RADIO (1938)467 
 
Radio increasingly penetrates the broadest sections of society. Thanks to its 
comprehensive advantages, it has become an important factor in the life of every human being. 
Although there are 33 million people in Poland, it has not yet reached 1 million subscribers, that 
if we consider that not just one person, but a whole group, listen to radio and with great focus, 
one can assume that the radio can influence several million people. 
That is why propaganda broadcasting in Poland must go three ways: 
1) Propaganda of the whole radio program;  
2) Development of radiophony in the country, thus increasing the number of 
megaphones; 




  Starting from the director of programs and all the heads of various departments and 
ending with the artist and speaker, we all need to take the principle that the program and 
execution of verbal or musical programs must be discrete, logical with an appropriate dynamic 
propaganda bias. 
As things stand now, radio teaches, educates and entertains and all these departments 
have no bias propaganda. 
A. Radio teaches ... only from the point of view of disseminating knowledge, which is the task of 
the school, but not in the science and educational elements, such is the sense of national pride in 
the value of the individual and the state and in bringing issues to the needs of the national 
defense. 
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Speakers who are presenting research are not going in this direction and have no 
guidance towards connecting them with contemporary knowledge of the needs of the state and its 
needs in future wars. 
It is important not to simply insert a radio program several papers on topics such as 
military, national defense, national economy, etc. expressed by more or less well-known 
personalities or even by members of the government. It seems essential to all scientists, or the 
occasional speakers not only to make a certain amount of news available, usually from a handful 
of selected students, but also to incorporate scientific subjects into a popular form of interesting 
and useful exercises for the state. 
Example: In the story "On Southern waves of Atlantic,” it is said just about the Atlantic. 
How easy would it be to apply this analogy to our Baltic Sea and show the value of our people 
having their own sea? We cannot speak for example of the Baltic Sea, only in the Baltic story 
because there are people who just then talk and cannot or do not want to listen to lectures about 
the Atlantic as they want to know what can be done for the Polish Baltic Sea.  
When speaking of the Atlantic, the speaker ignored the issue of our sea and we lost an 
opportunity to discrete the propaganda. This was no fault of the speaker, but the management 
that did not tell him of the above observations. There are many similar examples of non-use in 
many topics of general knowledge for propaganda purposes. 
In summary, it is necessary that the radio is made by the living word, whether it is serious 
or hilarious, high or popular, that it was a living word in the whole sense of the word, live and it 
is so interesting to the widest possible mass and it focuses on current issues and where only you 
can wake up in a society with a sense of pride and joy for the past or things done and with 
concern for matters that require effort and execution. 
Urging on all speakers to slow down, even if they have the best names, their good papers 
are to be delivered by a special speaker. Peasants or ordinary workers care little whether the 
professor of the University or a member of the Academy of Sciences speaks, they only want to 
hear the speech uttered in a language which they can understand and with a strong voice and 




Let us take examples of Germany and Russia. Polish radio, before this kind of initiative, 
has had no sense of audience and making of such an instrument of propaganda, i.e. radio, the 
lecture hall or lounge for selected papers for discussion. 
Regardless of who wants to learn or who goes to school up to and including universities, 
radio has the task of popularizing scientific topics for those who could not or did not have the 
opportunity to learn these topics. Polish intelligence apparatus constantly stresses that the Polish 
station caters for those that want to listen to it as well as for those malcontents and pessimists 
about the state. They just need to assert themselves and stress the wider objective, which is the 
radio. Combating subversive propaganda over the radio is an issue, involving not only the Polish 
intelligentsia, but also the peasants and ordinary workers. 
From the head of Polish Radio, everyone is required to show an interest in the new 
current, modern Polish life and the current program is a radio reading so it has no life and 
attitudes of propaganda. 
 
B. Radio informs. Most of the listeners of Polish radio have radios only for gaining 
information, particularly in the provinces, where daily radio competes with the local press, which 
often supplies news information. 
So for these reasons, everything should be done on a daily basis in order to provide the 
widest possible coverage for all radio listeners, but the radio has mainly been used for 
propaganda purposes. 
First of all, the radio journal editors have to be specially recognized as spreading 
propaganda, which is quite different from how it looks in the press. Radio cannot literally give 
messages sent by PAT, but it must also be able to pick these messages. Newspapers often publish 
these messages next to their comments, but the radio must always have a strong message with its 
comments to clarify the matter, according to the interests of the state. 
Due to the wide coverage of radio in Poland, the radio has manipulated this information, 
before it is broadcast to the public. For example, news about the work of the OZN will only be 
heard by the producers of these radio messages during the log that covered the broad masses. 
Therefore, special lectures about the OZN will not have the same effect on listeners because 
some of the OZN supporters are not as dependent as others. Consequently, there are necessary 
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and important things to which we all need to listen, but you do not know that they will be 
broadcast on radio. 
News broadcast on radio should be lively and interesting as the monotonous tone of the 
broadcaster is not conducive to effective propaganda because people won’t realize the 
importance and significance of such important news, both home and abroad so it won’t have any 
impact on their lives.  
However, it can often takes several days before an original story is broadcast on the 
radio, but this needs to change because propaganda must remain up-to-date and hot because then 
it captures the attention and gets a reaction from the people, but this message must be 
appropriately communicated to listeners in order to get this reaction. So the best form of control 
in society is to control the pessimism and to build self-confidence so it will be good and rational, 
to deliberately keep the information relevant to news contents, supported by the effects of music 
and vocality. 
Polish Radio has the wrong idea by converting the radio program "Diary of a Southerner” 
into a popular language as one cannot assume that only lower the social classes listen to the daily 
news at noon. 
In the light of the limited number of radio service centers and rural workers, we can 
confidently assume that the greatest increase in radio listeners daily occurs in the evening after 
work, so this diary, which is often very dry and uninteresting, should not be redrafted into 
popular propaganda. Here again, the Polish national radio incorrectly tries to please the 
insignificant number of intelligent listeners, fearing that by raising the visibility of all logs of 
radio, (the wounded, the southern and evening) this will further reduce its level of quality 
broadcasting. It forgets to add, however, that it is the responsibility of radio management, to gain 
more listeners, but at the same time, it should not broadcast material that will insult the 
intelligence of many listeners in order to cater for the lowest common denominator in society. 
Therefore, one can conclude that it is important to publicize and recognize propaganda 
and all such messages given by radio, while the issue of state-creative, political and economic 
material promoted by the OZN, spread throughout the program’s information public letter called 
“Polish Radio”. This was news released in the form of prepared papers, or chats and this brought 




Reports properly directed, with the vivid images of work and efforts of individual human 
clusters are very good forms of propaganda work as these penetrate directly to the students and 
provide them with the best experiences. Foreign radio stations all conduct perfectly directed 
reports and therefore, the listener is experiencing these events sufficiently for the purposes of 
propaganda. 
Here in Poland, the quality of reporting is very low. We do not have an unlimited number 
of capable and qualified people who went into journalism fully trained. Therefore, our reports, 
with the exception of very few, tend to be boring and do not reflect the broader nature of 
reporting, which, in the end, are completely devoid of any propaganda 
The Management’s reports do not consider it appropriate for journalists to prepare for 
their reports as they believe that it is important for them to think on the spot and that is why 
occasionally, some journalists make inappropriate comments.  
The Head of reporting has then prepared a message for the appropriate journalists by 
asking them to fill in the gaps that they set up in the templates for the journalists’ reports. This 
has made journalists unhappy as they feel that this has restricted their freedom to do their jobs 
properly. 
 
Car transmission. Polish Radio has only radio station car, which is a little ridiculous. 
Instead, there are many unnecessary investments, when it would be better to invest in these cars, 
where appropriate. 
Polish Radio broadcasting equipment has a strange device, which can’t be found in the 
car to tune into the radio stations. A production truck of the Polish Radio has woeful equipment. 
It lacks prime communication signaling between an operator on the truck and a reporter. Thence 
absurd situations arise, when with the coverage disk being started, a chief of a report is with 
action. If, on the other hand, was in touch with the truck, he would be able to order the disk to be 
stopped, and thus, to comment at intervals about activities actually happening. Both those 
happening actually and reported about on the air have to be well prepared and always carried-out 
in a propagandist manner. 
There is not much coverage on the radio from the propaganda leading military ceremony, 
military equipment by the public, if you do not have anything better to say across the Polish 
airwaves as there are difficulties of reporting. 
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The Head of radio documentaries ideally should be a young man who is enterprising and 
full of initiatives, as this is one of the most difficult and very important branches of radio work, 
but it is one of the best ways to deliver propaganda messages to the uninformed masses. 
Radio should employ a wide range of skilled reporters, who cover a wide range of different 
issues such as the military, politics, sports, business, church, school, etc. Reporters should also 
train the army and in addition, the OZN for the benefit of both parties. The organization for the 
troops for radio reporters is of course currently under the control of the WINO. 
 
C. Radio - fun. Under this section, you can work the radio to link all the events related to 
broadcasting music and humor in their various forms. Humor is the best way to link and 
manipulate propaganda and educational issues. 
All serious, heavy and generally topics should not be conducive to boring propaganda 
campaigns, but you cannot, as is often done in radio, promote an issue to laugh at the expense of 
other issues. For example, in order to boost their influence in society under the guise of shooting, 
clubs poke fun at a dozen mayors who are reluctant to share in this laugh and at the end of the 
drama, there is the mayor, who appears happy in his village. Such an approach to propaganda is 
false, since all mayors are offended by this type of “humor”, especially when it is at the expense 
of the authentic propaganda idea of building community centers in the local municipalities. 
Like we say, the science on the radio is not only for science itself, so the humor in radio 
is not on the radio to promote humor. It is a difficult balancing act, but not an impossible one, but 
the authors must not be restricted to only broadcast the topics that are sent into the radio and so 
they should use their own imaginations more often. 
It is difficult to require that the author of gay dramas without any guidelines to know 
what propaganda is to rely on the propaganda of his dramas. The head of Polish radio and 
entertainment found, however, that the only way that he can make people laugh is to broadcast 
monologues, light music, genre of radio drama etc.  
However, managers for each radio program have to fulfill their individual program remits 
and because there is no explicit propaganda message in individual radio programs, it is harder for 
that radio program to convey a wider political message to its listeners. 
One will not find in any radio monologue or family drama an example, in which each 
member belongs to another political party. This would be a good analogy to the Polish, in which 
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to create the various lots from which everyone benefits. The demonstration in this radio play is 
that the best features which should be part of Poland are Poles, which then defends many 
listeners from the absurdity and harmfulness of politics. However, the topic of a funny play must 
be imposed on the author by his or her superiors, not knowing the superior's line with such a play 
will not come with a fear of being rejected. 
As there are more listeners of average intelligence, radio should not be used in the humor 
section of satire, especially regarding the relations in the country. An intelligent person will 
understand the satire, but a radio listener often reacts differently to the satire and this satire 
should therefore be avoided in radio programs. 
 
Music. To play music on the radio, serious or light and to educate the masses. However, 
it is important to have a manager, who has a strong understanding of both the musical side as 
well as the propaganda. 
Radio is not responsible with the task of learning music; this is a matter for the music 
schools. Radio has the responsibility of popularizing music where any lessons in music, 
especially with the systematic programs, should disappear from the radio programs, as they only 
include a handful of followers or sick people who cannot leave the beds because they cannot 
afford to receive regular broadcasts. 
Music radio must be available to all. When the radio broadcasts an hour long symphonic 
concert, how does this benefit a worker or peasant in the countryside? They do not listen to it, 
and for many intelligent people who are into music, this is not worth the effort either. The music 
would have to operate solo recitalist fewer, more and orchestras and choirs and so the teams. 
Soloists included in schemes of collective music programs. The average listener is not interested 
in a 30-minute performance by a solo classical artist or mediocre solo artists, but they would like 
to listen to one or two of their songs performed during their concerts, choirs, orchestras, etc. 
In essence, a music program should be lively and varied and not one-dimensional and the 
radio department also has poor cooperation with other departments as the head of music works 
solely for his department and that is why his work has a similar influence to that of a conservator 
and performances of work more or less good talent. We cannot speak about the existing 
influence of propaganda in this particular department. 
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Radio music programs are generally monotonous and do not affect the excitement of the 
masses. The head of the music department of Polish Radio is wrong in supposing that the 
department's curriculum meets the task, if from time to time it will give a concert of works by 
Polish composers. This is the propaganda of Polish music, not the propaganda impact of music 
for the listeners. It would for example select the music choices of foreign works of composers 
with strong voices and not those with long and tedious songs, though not without artistic value, 
as well as those with a very weak impact on intellectual qualities. 
For example, when a person starts their working day and tunes into a radio to listen in the 
morning, records should be selected not randomly, but purposefully. Working citizens would not 
want to listen to dance songs or cabaret walzers, but would listen to good foreign marches or 
Polish composers, so they would feel better on their way to work. Then we can say that the 
morning music acts as propaganda for listeners who are under its influence and they will proceed 
to work with greater willingness. There can be no such program and I've heard that for the kids at 
8 o'clock in the morning, a song is played called "Sleep baby, sleep baby" when they just got up 
and they would not think about sleeping.  
Executives of the music department of Polish Radio believe that they meet the needs of 
propaganda in relation to the village by giving obereks, kuoiaviaks, mazurs, etc. 
The music of Polish composers should include details of their biographies and works of 
that era (Chopin, Moniuszko, Noskowski etc). 
D. General. Polish radio lacks in its work a single line, decision, courage, especially in 
the area of state-propaganda. It senses the fear of a subscriber whose wishes may be contrary to 
the right direction for Polish Radio, a state institution. The radio does not realize that even 
subscribers, dissatisfied with this or that idea in radio policy, will not get rid of the radio 
apparatus, which is not only used for Polish stations. 
Radio is not familiar with propaganda, it does not understand it and know anything about 
it. These shortcomings are covered by radio's assertion that as an institution, it brings together 
people of various shades of national policy and must refrain from any bias towards any other 
social group. This approach is false and in this case, it can be seen as deliberate and forceful 
propaganda. 
In the situation when other countries, without compromising the learning, information 
and entertainment, made radio and cinema as well as the best means of state propaganda with a 
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clear and decisive action program, it is impressive that Polish radio works with a mixture of 
programs without a core, guiding thought and without strong coordination amongst all its 
departments. 
In this case, the OZN can decide to use radio for its own propaganda purposes, and this 
may not be limited to just delivering speeches or messages, but also to have a decisive impact on 
all sections of work in Polish radio so that the findings in the February statement can be 
implemented everywhere. 
The Polish radio stream has a different spirit. All employees from the janitor up to the 
managerial stuff must have only one thought and that is that they should work with enthusiasm 
























On the way of Renewal: Yugoslavia, Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow - movie transcript468 
 
 
 Petrovgrad, November 6, 1938. Young men dressed in the green shirts are marching. In 
the background, we hear a chorus which sings “Salute to the Leader” (“Pozdrav vodji”). Milan 
Stojadinovic waves to the people of Petrovgrad in an open car and they salute him happily. 
Stojadinovic steps out of car, uniformed men salute him. He is climbing onto the balcony, 
followed by the Minister of Agriculture Svetozar Stankovic. People are gathered and they 
applaud him and wave their hats.  
 
SVETOZAR STANKOVIC: 
Dear Banatian brothers. 
City of Petrovgrad, center of Banat 
Woke up all decorated and happy 
Because it was visited by the 
President of the King’s government, (Long live) 
The chief of the Yugoslav Radical Community (Long live) 
And the leader of our movement mister, 
Mister Doctor Milan Stojadinovic. (Long live) 
(Long chants: Leader, leader, leader) 
 
MILAN STOJADINOVIC: 
Dear brothers and friends 
No other part of our state 
That was earlier under enemy rule 
Was not that spontaneous, that joyful, 
                                                 
468 What we see on the screen is written with normal letters and what “actors” are talking about is in cursive. The 
text in the brackets describes that what we see on the screen whilst the “actors” are talking. 
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That thrilled without any condition and agreement 
Approach our national unity 
Like it was done by proud Vojvodina 
Twenty years ago. (Crowd: That’s correct. Hooray.) 
Vojvodina was then economically at the first place 
Other provinces envied Vojvodina 
On her national conscience 
And economic welfare. 
That was the position of Vojvodina twenty years ago 
When our great state and 
National unity was made in the great state 
Of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. 
(Some man: Long live unified Yugoslavia!, 
Crowd: Long live!) 
 
You all from Northern Banat know me now  
In 1925, we, in the Southern Banat, did not give 
One sole mandate to the opposition. 
I know you as you know me. 
My fight knows only for victory. 
And because of that, knowing you, I believe that 
On 11
th
 December, we will have the most complete, 
 biggest and the most glorious 
victory that up until now, we didn’t achieve. 
Long live! 
 
(Chants of approval,  long chants: leader, leader. Stojadinovic happily  
salutes back to the crowd) 
 




Minister without Portfolio, Krek on the platform: 
 
MIHA KREK: 
With the arrival of Milan Stojadinovic’s government 
In internal policy 
Arrived pacification and tranquilization. 
Real people spirit in public administration 
Caused new love of the people towards 
His public administration and 
 also towards the country. 
 
The Minister of Construction Dobrivoje Stoshovic on the same platform. 
 
DOBRIVOJE STOSHOVIC: 
Construction policy reaches that level 
This allows our country rapid 
And planned work on the modernization 
And improvement of our road system. 
 
(Workers building the roads, Milan Stojadinovic cuts the track for the opening of some 
new road).  
 
From one billion loan from 1935, 
We have achieved to complete first, 
Thousands of kilometers of our road system. 
We manage to supply with water, 
 thousands of our villages, 
Small towns and towns and 
We also manage to build 
countless long lasting bridges. 
 




And we also manage to build 
And begin to construct three... (Sound, he suddenly stops.) 
 
The Minister without Portfolio on the same platform. 
 
DJURA JANKOVIC: 
Prime Minister Dr Milan Stojadinovic, 
Welcomes and meets European statesmen. 
 
Scenes of the new hospital built in the Stojadinovic era are being shown. The Minister of 
Social Politics and People’s Health Dragisha Cvetkovic stands on the same platform. 
 
DRAGISHA CVETKOVIC: 
Social policy of the government of 
Milan Stojadinovic delivered big and crucial results. 
Never in our country, nor the biggest reforms, 
Nor useful in the interest of our working people 
Have ever been done before 
 
SPOKESMAN: 
With belief in his great capacity, 
Good will and determination 
We salute him as the leader which 
Led Yugoslavia on the road to renewal 
Towards a better and brighter future. 
 
(The arrival of Milan Stojadinovic on some train station. There were smiling girls in national 
clothing where Stojadinovic receives flowers from one girl.) 
 
The arrival of Milan Stojadinovic in Negotin (Eastern Serbia) on 30th October 1938 
where the crowds welcome him with young boys and girls in national clothing and horsemen 
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with Yugoslav flags. Stojadinovic salutes the crowds with local party leaders and he walks 
through the city, surrounded by the crowds.  
 
The Prime Minister Stojadinovic on an improvised platform. 
 
    MILAN STOJADINOVIC: 
    Brothers, that what we did 
 In the economic field 
    To cut the taxes  
To cut peasants’ debts 
    And in the same time, to raise  
the prices of the peasants’ products. 
 
(The crowd holds Stojadinovic’s portraits with the written slogans.) 
 
And to give good harvest,  
Or to have good harvest, 
Those brothers are not successes 
Those are huge successes,  
Those are miracles 
In the economic policy of our country. 
That’s correct. 
(Chants of approval) 
 
But, in the way that we made miracles  
In the economic field, 
We could say that 
We also created one unseen miracle 
 In the political field. 
The work of my government,  




 (Long live!!!) 
 
It manage to reconciliate your countryman 
Mr Petar Zivkovic 
With Dr Machek in Zagreb. 
 
But, down with the villain! 
(Chants of disapproval) 
 
Our people are saying, when winter is bad, 
When winter is strong 
Then cat and mouse are sleeping together. 
(Stojadinovic is laughing.) 
 
I could conclude that 
Those two gentlemen 
Are predicting for themselves 
Very bad and evil winter. 
(That’s correct.) 
 
That winter will be harder from 
The tops of Old Mountain. 
That will be real Siberian winter for them 
When knees unite with the jaw. 
(That’s correct. Long live the leader!) 
 
Brothers and friends, we are supposed to have 
This reunion last week. 
I decided that it should  
Be today. 
If it was last week 
We could have rain. 
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Today, we have nice weather 
That’s the biggest proof that 
God is with us. 
 Victory is ours. 
(That’s correct!)  
(Chants of approval.) 
 
Milan Stojadinovic followed by Ministers and “green shirts” walk in the streets.  Big 
crowds follow his movements. Stojadinovic salutes the gathered citizens.   
(Chants: Hooray and long live.) 
 
Milan Stojadinovic on the same platform as other ministers. 
 
    МILAN STOJADINOVIC: 
    In one terrible cataclysm 
    When tornado moved states  
And change frontiers 
We are succeeded to preserve 
 peace for our country. 
That means that we are manage 
 to keep safe and save Yugoslavia 
 
SPOKESMAN: 
You have seen what Milan Stojadinovic 
 Has done for you and your country.  
Think, believe and decide.  
On 11th December, every one of you is responsible  
For the destiny of Yugoslavia.  
...With Your help and trust  
He continues his great deed 
Does Dr Milan Stojadinovic.  




In the background, we are seeing a smiling Milan Stojadinovic, and after the statesman finishes, 

































The Main Direction of Renewal 
Section for Propaganda 
 
 




Last year on the 23rd December 1934, the first phase of our propaganda work is finished. 
At the conference that was held last year on the 26th, 27th, and 28th December, the chief of 
propaganda points out, in essence, the big problems that have to be solved in the future. These 
are: 
1. To clear the way for the practical work of the regime. 
2. To remain the most powerful weapon for state control and win over the people for a 
new construction and support of the state. 
3. To bring clarity and new knowledge to people and to create new consciousness for the 
citizens, the state and the whole nation. 
4. To have a strong urge for society’s awakening thoughts, to bring people to the 
consciousness that they should give themselves and to enthusiastically bring people to the tasks 
and goals of the regime. 
5. To be strengthening the bright flame of the people’s enthusiasm and their re-education 
in the spirit of the coming era and to give purpose and scope to the rebuilding of new state. 
6. To use severe and historically objective criticism and to finally assimilate the 
consciousness of the people from the old state and its social and political formations. 
The main goal of the management of the Direction of Renewal is to see the final arrival 
on the highest level of a moral force and working organization, with the aim of activating social 
and national spirit. 
For completing these tasks, I recommend that in the following four months that the 
following plan should be executed: 
 
                                                 




I   POLITICAL AND ECONOMY PLAN 
 
1. In the spirit of article 40 of the act, which forms a list of people from the free citizens, 
officials and others, which could be used for public actions on general political issues. 
2. To prepare plans for meetings in every village and cities where there are no discussions 
on political and economic issues and in villages and cities where meetings were not successfully 
enough with the aim that: 
a) In every place, meetings should be finished within two weeks; 
b) Plans with the names of the places and speakers should be finished at the latest on 20th 
January 1935; 
c) Users of the orders that should be given for organization of the meetings, district 
activists should be ready for organizing the regional, area and district meetings where they 
should be informed by the Direction. For the organization of those meetings, special instructions 
will be sent. 
Note: For the places in which one is needed, a speaker from the Sofia should be marked 
in the plan. 
 
II PROPAGANDA OF THE INITIATIVE OF THE REGIME AND CLEAR 
EXPLANATION OF ITS REFORMATORY ACTIVITY 
 
This type of propaganda highlights the task of making property for the broadest mass of 
people as clear as possible in every initiative of the regime. 
For that goal, it is necessary: 
1. To make a connection with the every representative of every power and competent 
person from every civil and economic power: 
a) Agronomist;    j) Work inspectors; 
b) Veterinarians;    k) Priests; 
c) Medics;     l) Cooperative activists’; 
d) Forester;     m) Librarians; 
e) Inspectors and teachers;   n) Court clerks and legal experts; 
f) Administrators and policemen;  o) Reserve officers; 
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g) Engineers and architects;   p) Reserve non-commissioned officers; 
h) Chief for work;    r) Representatives of economical categories; 
i) Finance administrative;   s) Representatives sport, youth and patriotic 
organizations 
In one common conference, the aim is to organize a clear order of the speeches under 
the initiative of various ministries. 
 
a) Ministry of Interior 
1. Administrative legislation; 
2. People’s health 
 
b) Ministry of People’s Economy 
1. Agriculture and its parts; 
2. Cattle-raising; 
3. Economic-social legislation; 
4. Forest issues; 
5. Credit; 
6. Monopole: hemp, onion and other; 
7. Professional societies, societies of state’s clerks. 
c) Ministry of Finance 
1. New educational reform; 
2. Other special issues. 
d) Ministry of People’s Education 
1. New educational reform; 
2. Other special issues. 
e) Ministry of Justice 
1. New court reform; 
2. Laws that interest peasants. 
f) Ministry of Urbanization 
1. Urbanization; 
2. Law for the roads; 
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3. Work services (regular, part-time) 
NB: You will find materials for speeches in the appendix of this document as well as in the 
brochures of the Direction for Renewal. 
 The speeches should be started in the places that have been already visited by the 
propagandists. In that manner, if one speech is read in these places, we could have six speeches 
in every village and eventually, every speech should be delivered on the 15th April. The plan, 
with the names of all the speakers and the villages, should be presented on the 20th January 
1935. 
NB: The district teachers have organized the so called “people universities” by the order of the 
Ministry of Interior at the request of the Direction for Renewal. This is on the grounds of article 
7 of the regulation that they must prevent them from destroying everything that had been made 
up to this moment. 
 
III   CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROPAGANDA 
 
This type of propaganda aims to give general knowledge to the village and the city in 
cultural and educational, religious, sports, pedagogic and health and other issues. The most 
important aim, however, is to include the following types of propaganda: 
1. Our history 
a) Idealism of the most famous activists before the Liberation. 
b) War for unification of the Bulgarian tribe. 
c) Educational meaning for our national history. 
2. The role of the school in our Revival 
a) Teacher and the new state. 
b) Village and the people’s teacher. 
3. Education 
a) National, civil and society education. 
b) Meaning of the people’s revolution for national education. 
4. Church 
a) What we owe to the Bulgarian church. 





a) Preventive medicine; 
b) Mother; 
c) Care for the child etc. 
 
The best leader in this matter is the purposeful sense of the activist that helps him to 
organize his speeches on the subject in a way that would interest the local community. 
 
I. PREPARATION FOR THE MEETINGS 
1. For good and fruitful preparation, especially for the provinces in the village, it is 
recommended to form, with the help of the major and deputy major, the “Action Committee” 
where teachers, agronomists, priests, librarians and cooperative activists, representatives of 
patriotic organizations, economic categories, manufacturing layers, leaders in the village, all 
participate with special tasks to advertise, prepare and organize the meetings. 
2. The role of the major, his assistant and members of the Action Committee, besides the 
work on touring before the meeting, is to win over hearts and minds of the peasants and to make 
them feel welcomed and invited and not to be left with the feeling that they are going to be 
forced out. In short, the way of organizing the meeting should be characterized with great purity 
and cordiality. 
3. Female teachers and clerks’ wives, like all other intelligent village’s females, are to be 
used like supporting members of the Action Committee for the organization of the meetings with 
women. They should be responsible for the order of dissolution of the parties and for the 
monopoly of alcohol in general as well as all other activities that take away their husbands from 
the family. It is important that we should hear more of their views. 
4. All meetings should begin with the national anthem “Shumi Maritza” and to finish 
with the “Mila Rodino”, all performed by a civil and school’ chorus. 
5. In places where the meetings are organized, if there is a stage, this should be decorated 
with the flags and greenery, and where there is not a stage, the room should be decorated in the 
national decor. The aim should be to transform our meetings into a real national gathering in 




MANANGING THE MEETINGS 
1. The meetings should be opened, managed and closed by either an official 
representative of the government, a major, doctor, agronomist, teacher’s chief, director of high 
school etc, or by an inhabitant of that village. 
2. The opening and closing of the meeting should be done in one special way so from the 
beginning, one could see the differences between yesterday’s party meetings and today’s when 
representatives of the regime and the state are talking. 
3. Chairmen, especially, should stress that our meetings are like religious congregations 
and if everyone is asking questions and quotes, this will kill the impact of these meetings and it 
will be difficult to achieve the desired results.   
 
SPEAKER 
1. The first condition that well organized propaganda has to meet is the unified word of 
the speakers. 
2. For that goal, in the spirit of articles 7 and 39 of the manual, the activists must attend 
seminars to gain a consensus of views amongst the speakers. In those seminars, all the brochures 
of the direction should be viewed and analyzed in order to reform the activity of the regime. 
3. Speakers are chosen because they: 
a) Fanatically believe in the new ideology and in the new state. 
b) Have the ability to speak well and passionately in public. 
c) Have the temperaments of fighters and are prepared to struggle to overcome all 
obstacles and difficult conditions to achieve our goals. 
4. When these kinds of people are found, activists should give them one other type of 
approach that can be described as: 
a) A determination towards a more detailed study into the events of government and to be 
liberated from old partisan attitudes. 
b) Understanding local problems and needs by attending the place of the meetings one 
day earlier and by stimulating a short psychological study of the local people in order to 
understand their hearts and minds. 
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c) Stimulating people with great psychology and knowledge so they can enter deep into 
people’s hearts & minds and understand their audience better. 
d) Making every word relevant to the Bulgarian people. 
e) Always having faith, energy and love in the sincerity of their mission. 
f) Distancing themselves from old attitudes and prejudices, not making false promises 
and receiving obligations. They should only be content with following the correct legal 
procedures. 
g) Being tactful and correct in not accusing one party leader of past events in account of 
others. Let us stress that we are criticizing a system full of vices that destroyed even the best 
ambitions and the purest hearts. This is because experience taught us that whenever a speaker 
had been criticizing the old party life, as a system in general, it was always approved by the 
audience. 
h) Representing the people in a way which, with a refreshing attitude and modesty and 
lack of indulgence, underlines the new spirit of regime. 
i) Believing in justice, the most important word that the world knows and upon which 
today’s regime is based and this should be constantly stressed. 
 
THE RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS 
In the county circular, number 87 from last October, there is always a note written after 
the end of each meeting about the atmosphere of that meeting was held and its results. In the 
addition, one should also add: 
1. A couple of days before each meeting, questionnaires should be sent to the majors or 
deputy majors in the villages, in addition to the existing instructions that are to be strictly 
followed for preparation, organization and removal of the meetings and the effect these have on 
listeners. 
2. Immediately after the conclusion of each meeting, activists are to make contact by 
telephone with the major or his substitute or with the person who is delegated to follow the 
meeting. They will then complete the questionnaire, e.g. one example is a questionnaire which is 
to be immediately sent to the propaganda section of Direction. 
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3. After all that has happened on the same night, the district activists are supposed to 




For every incident that deserves to be especially noted, activists must send an immediate 
report to the section. 
 
MALICIOUS RUMORS 
Each malicious rumor which deliberately aims to bring turmoil to the local population 
should be immediately reported by telephone to the stenographer and this telephone conversation 
has to be immediately followed by a paper report. If, however, the issue is of a confidential 
nature, then a confidential report must be sent as confidential. 
 
IV PRINTED PROPAGANDA 
 
1. Brochures 
a) It should be noted that until now, the action was on the whole destroyed. This was due 
to the fact that the Direction did not have their members in the field in order to fulfill their 
initiatives and also due to the non-rational transfer and use of published brochures. 
b) All the brochures in the future should be send to activists and every one of them, 
according to the local conditions, should use this powerful tool of propaganda to build on the 
impact generated by the speeches.  These brochures should highlight the same issues that 
concern the most intelligent listeners in order to consolidate and affirm existing beliefs delivered 
through the live speeches. 
c) Activists should always aim for the rational synthesis of live and written word to 
increase the knowledge of the masses and strengthen beliefs in the new regime. 
 
2. Newspaper New Days (Нови Дни) 




b) The first obligation of the activists, in the current climate, is to re-awaken interest for 
this newspaper through persistent propaganda. 
c) Force should be excluded in the dealing with the subscribers, like the influence of the 
chief on his subordinates. Only with the cultivation and exacerbation of the needs of the masses 
will they look for the newspapers on their own. 
d) It is especially recommended that volunteers subscribe to the newspaper for between 
3-6 months, but mainly according to the capabilities of these subscribers. 
e) It is especially important for the main administration offices of the newspaper Novi 
Dni to be in contact with the society Strela to arrange for the subscribers to receive their copy of 
the newspapers at the same time as those people who are buying them on the day from the sellers 
on the streets. 
 
3. Province’s Press 
Activists should be fully briefed with the instruction for steering and controlling the press 
according to the Manual 
 
4. Village’s correspondents 
a) According to article number 42 of the Manual, activists should select people from the 
villages as voluntary village correspondents 
b) For this selection process, one should bear in mind that they should be: 
- Devoted sympathizers of the new regime 
- Culturally educated people 
- Well informed about village needs and essences 
- Serious and responsible people that should not misled activists or editorials with biased 
news 
c) For the recommendation that people should be selected from the teachers 
d) Duties of the village correspondents in the field of propaganda will be determined 
during the process. For now, it is enough for them that, beside their correspondent functions, 
they become the closest collaborators of the major, or his assistants and work as an action 
committee for organizing every publishing action. 
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If all of that is accepted and reasonably done, we could expect brilliant results, but that is 
essential before we, as members of the Renewal, could be imbued with high knowledge and with 
great enthusiasm. Let it be known that only faith and fanatical belief is what influences the 
masses. 
Strong will is a crucial element in overcoming great obstacles in person and let us be 
conscious conductors of that will and strengthen the authority of the state in the conscience of the 
people.  
       Chief Director: 
       Petar Popzlatev 
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